64. Interior and Exterior Acts: Goodness and Dependence
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Lecture Notes
Main Topics #
Article 1: Priority of Goodness and Badness in Interior vs. Exterior Acts #
Thomas addresses whether moral goodness/badness primarily resides in the interior act of the will or the exterior act. Key distinctions:
Two aspects of exterior act goodness:
- By its suitable matter and circumstances (depends on reason)
- By its order to the end (depends on the will)
The object of the will: The exterior act is the object of the will insofar as it is proposed by reason as something good and ordered. In this sense, the exterior act is before the will’s goodness.
The will’s causation: The will is compared to the exterior act as an efficient cause. The goodness of the will is the form of the exterior act as it exists in its agent cause, making the will’s goodness prior in the order of causation.
Reason’s role: The goodness from suitable matter and circumstances depends on reason grasping and ordering the object, not on the will itself.
Article 2: Whether the Whole Goodness/Badness of Exterior Acts Depends on the Will #
Key Principle: Malum ex singulari defectu, bonum ex integra causa (Evil from any single defect, good from an integral whole cause) - attributed to Dionysius
The Two-fold Goodness Distinction:
From order to the end - depends entirely on the will. If the will is bad (wrong end or wrong means), the exterior act is bad.
From suitable matter and circumstances - does NOT depend solely on the will; depends on reason.
Integrity Required for Complete Goodness: For an exterior act to be simply good, it must be good on both counts:
- Good will from the proper end
- Good object (suitable matter and circumstances)
A single defect suffices to make an act bad, but multiple goods are required for complete goodness.
Objections Addressed:
- The Matthew 7 text about good and bad trees is clarified: the good tree must have goodness both from the act being willed AND from the end intended
- Augustine’s principle that “one sins by the will” is interpreted correctly: one sins not only by willing a bad end but also by willing a bad means/act
Article 3: Whether Interior and Exterior Acts Have the Same Goodness #
The Central Insight: Interior and exterior acts are:
- One in the genus of nature (they constitute one action)
- Distinct in the genus of morals (they can have different moral qualities)
Two Cases:
When exterior act is good only from its order to the end - The goodness is the same goodness flowing from the will’s intention through the act. Example: bitter medicine is good only insofar as it is ordered to health.
When exterior act has intrinsic goodness from matter/circumstances - The goodnesses are other and other (different). Example: a savory medicine has goodness both intrinsically (pleasant taste) and from its order to health.
The Redounding Principle:
- The goodness of the end (from the will) “flows over” to the exterior act
- The goodness of the matter and circumstances “redounds” back upon the act of the will
Objection Responses:
- Different powers produce different acts, but these diverse acts constitute something one in the genus of morality
- Virtue requires different intellectual and moral virtues in different powers, but this doesn’t prevent a unity of goodness derived by analogy/proportion rather than univocally
- The causation analogy: Just as health is one goodness whether predicated of the body, the medicine (productive of health), or the urine (sign of health), so the goodness of the will is one goodness derived to the exterior act
Key Arguments #
The Scriptural Objection (Matthew 7:17-18) #
Objection: “A good tree cannot produce bad fruit; a bad tree cannot produce good fruit”
Interpretation: The will (tree) determines the exterior act (fruit), so goodness must primarily be in the will.
Thomas’s Response: The good tree must have goodness from BOTH:
- Its own object/nature (the act it wills)
- Its intention of the proper end
Without both, the exterior act remains bad even if the intention is good (e.g., Robin Hood stealing to give alms).
The Virtue Argument (Aristotle, Ethics II) #
Objection: Virtue makes its possessor good and renders the act good. Different virtues exist in different powers (intellectual in reason, moral in the appetitive faculty). Therefore, different goodness exists in interior and exterior acts.
Thomas’s Response: Moral virtues are ordered to acts as their ends; prudence (practical wisdom) orders the means to those ends. While virtues are in different powers, the goodness of reason itself is partaken in each virtue, creating a unity through participation rather than univocity.
The Causation Objection #
Objection: Cause and effect cannot be the same. Interior goodness causes exterior goodness. Therefore, they cannot have the same goodness.
Thomas’s Response: There are two types of causal derivation:
- Univocal causation - produces other goodness in the effect (e.g., father and son)
- Analogical/proportional causation - produces one goodness in both (e.g., health in animal body, medicine, and urine)
The will’s goodness is derived to the exterior act by analogy/proportion, not univocally, allowing for one goodness in both.
Important Definitions #
Apprehensio/Apprehensive Powers - The knowing and desiring powers of the soul, called “grasping” (ἀπό + ἁπτή) because they contain their objects within themselves. The knowing power grasps the object in itself; the will’s act is more in the object than the object in the will.
Virtus (Virtue) - A quality that makes its possessor good and renders their act good. Example: the virtue of a knife is what enables it to cut well; the vice is what makes it cut poorly.
Malum/Badness - Privation or lack of good; can occur from any single defect.
Bonum/Goodness - Requires integrity; must lack no single required good.
Formalis/Formal Causation - The will has itself to the exterior act as form to matter; from form coming to matter, one thing results.
Examples & Illustrations #
Robin Hood #
Stealing to give alms to the poor. The exterior act (theft) is bad in its matter and circumstances. The end (helping the poor) may be good, but the will is still bad because it wills a bad act (theft) to achieve the end. This shows that a good end does not justify or make good a bad act.
The Knife #
A sharp knife has the virtue of cutting well; a dull knife has vice (inability to cut well). This illustrates that virtue is a quality enabling the possessor to perform its act well, not the act itself.
The Bitter Medicine vs. Savory Medicine #
- Bitter medicine: Goodness comes only from its order to health; no intrinsic goodness
- Savory medicine: Has goodness both from its pleasant taste (intrinsic, from matter) and from its order to health (extrinsic, from end)
This illustrates the two-fold goodness of exterior acts.
De Connick’s Insight #
Berquist recalls Charles de Koninck, a medieval philosophy professor, who after teaching Aristotle’s Physics since the 1930s, still discovered new insights with each reading. This exemplifies how rich philosophical texts continue to reveal subtleties to attentive readers, analogous to how Mozart’s concertos reward deeper listening.
Notable Quotes #
“Malum contingit ex singulari defectu, bonum ex integra causa” (Evil happens from any single defect; good from an integral whole cause) - Dionysius, cited by Thomas
“The will is that by which one sins and lives rightly”
- Augustine, Book of Retractions
“Your treasure, as our Lord said, your heart shall be”
- Berquist, illustrating that the will’s object is more in the object than in the will itself
Questions Addressed #
Q1: Does goodness/badness consist primarily in interior or exterior acts? #
Answer: Both, but distinctly. Goodness from order to the end is primarily in the will’s interior act; goodness from suitable matter and circumstances is primarily grasped by reason in the exterior act. The will’s goodness is prior in causation; reason’s grasp of the object is prior in the order of knowledge.
Q2: Does the whole goodness/badness of exterior acts depend on the will? #
Answer: No. Exterior acts have intrinsic goodness/badness from their matter and circumstances (depending on reason). However, for an act to be simply good morally, both the exterior act AND the will must be good. One defect suffices for badness; integrity is required for complete goodness.
Q3: Do interior and exterior acts have the same goodness? #
Answer: Sometimes yes, sometimes no. When the exterior act has goodness only from its order to the end, it shares the same goodness with the interior act of the will. When the exterior act has intrinsic goodness from matter/circumstances, the goodnesses differ but are related through the redounding of end-goodness and matter-goodness flowing between them.