62. The Goodness of the Will: Object, Intention, and Merit

Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript

Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Goodness of the Will and Intention of the End #

• The Core Question: Does the goodness of the will depend upon the intention of the end (Article 7)?
• Thomas’s Solution: Intention operates in two ways:
  1. Preceding (Causally): When intention comes before and causes the willing, it gives the reason for goodness to what is willed. Example: fasting on account of God makes fasting good through its ordering to God.
  2. Following (Accompanying): When intention comes after an act already willed, it does not retroactively change the goodness of the first act, only the subsequent act (and only if the will is repeated with the new intention).

The Principle: Evil from Singular Defects, Good from Integral Cause #

• Dionysius’s Principle: “Malum contingit ex singulari defectibus, bonum ex tota integra causa” — evil happens from individual defects, good from whole integral cause.
• Application to Willing: For the will to be good, it must satisfy multiple conditions:
  1. The object willed must be good in itself
  2. It must be willed under the aspect of good (not under the appearance of bad)
• Consequence: If either condition fails, the will is bad. Example: giving alms for empty glory wills something good (alms) but under a bad aspect (vainglory), making the will bad.

The Quantity of Merit (Article 8) #

• The Question: Does the quantity of goodness in the will depend upon the quantity of goodness in the intention?
• Two-fold Quantity to Consider:
  1. On the side of object: One wills a greater or lesser good
  2. On the side of intensity: One wills more or less intensely (from the agent’s side)

Non-Proportionality of Act to Intention #

• The exterior act may not achieve the proportion intended due to:
  1. Inadequate means: Giving ten pounds cannot achieve the intention to buy something worth one hundred pounds
  2. External impediments: Intending to go to Rome but being prevented by unforeseen obstacles
• The interior act of the will, however, can will an object not proportional to the end, making the will less good than the intention, yet the good intention still “redounds” formally upon the will

Intensity of Intention and Its Redounding #

• When considering intensity of both intention and act, the intensity of intention does redound formally on both interior and exterior acts
• However, materially speaking, one may not act as intensely as one intends. Example: One may not so intensely wish to take medicine as one intensely wishes health, yet the intense intention of health redounds formally on the willing of medicine
• Critical Distinction: One may intend to intensely will or do something without actually doing so intensely

Merit and the Intensity of Act #

• Key Principle: “Non quantum aliquis intendit mereri, tantum meretur” — not as much as one intends to merit does one merit
• Reason: The quantity of merit consists in the intensity of the act, not the intention
• Example: Intending to gain a plenary indulgence is a great intention, but if one lacks the intensity of interior repugnance (not merely to mortal sin but even to venial sin), the merit achieved will not match the intention

Key Arguments #

Argument 1: Intention as Preceding Cause #

• Objection: Some saints speak of “purity of intention” as if intention alone determines goodness; Augustine says intention is the reward God considers
• Thomas’s Response: When intention precedes and causes the will, it acts as the reason for goodness. The order to the end becomes part of what makes the object good. Thus the goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end.

Argument 2: Evil in Willing Good for Bad Reason #

• Objection: One who wills to obey God for empty glory has a bad intention but wills something good (obedience); or one who steals to give alms wills something good (alms) for a bad end (theft)
• Thomas’s Response: The will cannot be called good if a bad intention is the cause of the willing. The one who gives alms for empty glory “wills it under the reason of something bad,” and thus “insofar as it’s willed by him, it is bad.”

Argument 3: Intention as Following #

• Objection: A good intention cannot make a bad act good if it comes after
• Thomas’s Response: Correct. A subsequent intention does not redeem a prior act willed for bad reasons. However, a subsequent good intention makes the subsequent act of will good (and one is not made depraved by prior acts if the subsequent act is good).

Argument 4: The Stoic Problem (Alluded to) #

• Berquist references the famous De Kahnik story: a philosopher refuses to discuss a question privately but wishes to discuss it before a crowd, suggesting he cares more for empty glory than truth. This illustrates how the same external act (discussion) can have different worth depending on the intention and circumstances.

Important Definitions #

• Intention (praecisio intentio): The ordering of an act to an end; can be preceding (causing the willing) or following (accompanying an already-willed act)
• Object under an aspect (sub ratione): Not merely the physical thing willed, but the thing as understood under a formal reason (e.g., alms under the aspect of empty glory, not under the aspect of charity)
• Redounding: The flowing back of intensity or quality from one act upon another (e.g., intense intention of health “redounding” formally on the will to take medicine)
• Integral cause (causa tota integra): A cause that requires all its parts to produce the effect; applied to goodness, which requires both a good object and the right intention
• Singular defect (singularis defectus): Any one missing element that causes the whole to be defective; applied to evil, which can result from any one failure
• Materially vs. Formally: Materially = with respect to the actual intensity of the act itself; formally = with respect to the formal reason or aspect under which something is willed

Examples & Illustrations #

The Widow and the Unjust Judge (Luke 18) #

• The judge renders the widow’s case not from justice but to silence her complaints and “render her case” to have peace
• Point: He does what is just materially, but not with the intention of justice; thus the act, while externally just, is less meritorious because the interior intention was bad (to achieve quiet, not to achieve justice)

Fasting for God vs. for Empty Glory #

• Fasting is good in itself, but if willed for empty glory, the will is bad because the good act is willed under the bad aspect (vainglory)
• By contrast, if willed on account of God, fasting takes on the character of good

The De Kahnik Story #

• A famous philosopher refuses to discuss a philosophical question privately but agrees to discuss it before a crowd
• Question: Is he really interested in truth, or is there empty glory motivating him?
• Point: The same act (philosophical discussion) has different moral worth depending on whether it’s done for truth or for reputation

Protagoras and Socrates (from Plato’s Protagoras) #

• Protagoras wishes to give long speeches rather than engage in dialectical conversation; he wants an audience to admire his wonderful speeches
• Socrates, by contrast, wishes to pursue truth through dialogue
• Lesson: We naturally judge people by their fame, but the way they proceed reveals their true intention. Protagoras’s method (long speeches) is not suited to pursuing truth; Socrates’s method (short questioning) is.
• When Socrates gets Protagoras to contradict himself and asks what he’ll do about it, Protagoras says, “That’s a contradiction I’ve learned to live with.”
• Point: Contradictions in reasoning show defective intention or understanding; the method of proceeding reveals whether one seeks truth or reputation

The Biologist and the Biology Professor #

• A student and professor disagree on the number of chambers in a frog’s heart
• Student’s evidence: “I’ve been working in the lab, and every frog I’ve cut open has this number”
• Professor’s answer: “I used a deck of cards, and this came out”
• Application: We naturally trust the professor’s position and reputation, but if we examine the method and reasoning, we should trust the student
• Parallel: Trust should follow method and reasoning, not mere reputation

The Man Building the Tower #

• Our Lord gives the example of a man who sets out to build a tower but cannot finish it because he hasn’t counted the cost
• Application: One may intend to achieve something great (build a great tower) but lack proportional means (sufficient money, resources)
• Point: Intention and achievable act may not be proportional

The Medicine and Health Example #

• One may not so intensely wish to take medicine as one intensely wishes health
• Yet: The intense intention of health formally redounds upon the willing of medicine, making the act of taking medicine more intense formally, even if materially the act is done with less intensity
• Application: The intensity of the end formally affects the intensity of willing the means

Plenary Indulgence #

• One may greatly intend to gain a plenary indulgence (which is a great good)
• But: If one does not meet the conditions (repugnance not only to mortal sin but even to venial sin), the merit achieved will not match the intention
• Point: Intention alone does not determine merit; the actual intensity of the act does

The Checkbook Example #

• If you have the wrong numbers in your checkbook, or if you add/subtract incorrectly, you get the wrong final answer
• Application: Just as mathematics requires both correct numbers and correct operations, the will requires both a good object and the right intention for it to be fully good
• Point: Any single defect ruins the result; integrity in all parts is required for goodness

The Nose and Beauty (Cleopatra) #

• If a nose is too long, ears too big, or any feature is disproportionate, a person can be ugly
• Blaise Pascal: “If Cleopatra’s nose had been a millimeter longer, it would have changed the history of the world” (Bodum vero ex tota integra causa)
• Application: Beauty requires all features to be right; any single defect can ruin beauty
• Parallel to Morality: Just as beauty requires integral perfection, goodness of will requires integral causation

The Syllogism Error #

• Example: “Every mother is a woman. No man is a mother. Therefore, no man is a woman.”
• Problem: The premises are all true, but the conclusion does NOT follow necessarily (this is obvious when we rephrase: “Every cat is an animal. No dog is a cat. Therefore, no dog is an animal.”)
• Point: In reasoning, any defect in form (logical form) ruins the argument, even if the matter (content) is true
• Application: Just as logic requires both true premises and valid form, morality requires both good objects and right intention

Questions Addressed #

Article 7: Does the goodness of the will depend upon the intention of the end? #

• Answer: Yes, when the intention precedes and causes the willing. The order to the end becomes the reason for the goodness of what is willed.
• Exception: When intention merely accompanies or follows the will, a subsequent good intention does not retroactively make a bad act good, only the subsequent act (if the will is renewed with that intention).
• Implication: The timing and causal role of intention matters fundamentally.

Article 8: Does the quantity of goodness in the will depend upon the quantity of goodness in the intention? #

• Answer: No, not simply. Merit depends on the intensity of the act of the will, not on the quantity of the good intended or the magnitude of one’s intention.
• Nuance: The intensity of intention does redound formally on the act of will, making the act formally more intense, even if materially it may not be.
• Critical Point: One may intend a very great good but lack the means or interior intensity to achieve it, and thus merit less than one intends.

Why is goodness different from badness regarding intention? #

• Principle: A bad intention alone suffices to make the will bad, but a good intention does not alone suffice to make the will good.
• Reason: Evil results from any singular defect (ex singulari defectus), while good requires integral causation (ex tota integra causa).
• Application: If one wills something bad, the will is bad. If one wills something good but under the aspect of bad (or for a bad reason), the will is still bad. For the will to be truly good, both the object and the intention (and aspect) must be good.

Notable Quotes #

“The good from a whole integral cause; the bad from singular defects.” (Dionysius, cited by Thomas)

“The intention can be in two ways to the will: in one way as preceding, coming before, in a causal way; in another way as accompanying it.” (Thomas’s solution to Article 7)

“For the one who wishes to give alms for the sake of getting some empty glory, wishes that which of itself is good, but he wills it under the reason of something bad. And therefore insofar as it’s willed by him, it is bad.” (Thomas’s explanation of how good acts can be willed badly)

“Not as much as one intends to merit does one merit, because the quantity of the merit consists in the intensity of the act.” (Thomas on why intention does not determine merit)

“The will cannot be called good if a bad intention is the cause of the willing.” (Thomas’s principle on the causal role of intention)

“Love is a wisdom, dangerous people.” (Berquist’s pithy observation on the dangers of pursuing even good things like wisdom with the wrong intention)