60. The Goodness of the Will: Object, Reason, and Eternal Law

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Will’s Goodness Depends on Its Object #

• The will’s goodness is determined per se by its object, not primarily by circumstances
• Good and bad are specific differences of the will’s acts, just as true and false are specific differences of reason’s acts
• The will can be directed toward an apparent good (bonum secundum quid)—something having some aspect of goodness but not truly good
• Circumstances may aggravate or diminish moral acts but do not constitute their species unless they introduce a new relation to reason

Object, End, and the Unity of Measure #

• The end is the object of the will; the end and the good are essentially the same thing
• Because end and good are identical, the goodness from the object does not differ from the goodness from the end (unlike other powers, which can have objects distinct from their ends)
• The will’s first act is not to will willing, but to will something other than willing—the last end; therefore the last end cannot be the will’s own act
• This shows reason (not will) is the chief end of man, as reason is more proper to man than desire, which animals also possess

Reason as Proximate Measure #

• Human reason is the proximate measure of the will’s goodness
• The good must be understood (intelligible good) to be proportioned to the will; merely sensible or imaginary goods are proportioned to sense appetite
• Reason proposes the object to the will; the will cannot tend toward anything except what reason presents as good
• The goodness of the will depends on reason in the same way it depends on the object, because the object is always the good as known by reason

The Eternal Law as Ultimate Standard #

• The eternal law is the divine reason governing all creation
• Human reason is derived from and participates in the eternal law as an image of it
• The light of reason is sealed upon us from God’s face (Psalm 4: “The light of your face, Lord, is sealed upon us”)
• In ordered causes, the effect depends more on the first cause than on the second cause; therefore the will’s goodness depends more on eternal law than on human reason
• When human reason fails, we must recur to eternal reason

Proximate vs. Remote Measures #

• Multiple measures can exist in hierarchical order; each lower measure derives from the higher
• A proximate measure must be homogenous with what it measures (e.g., a surface is measured by square units, not linear units)
• The virtuous man can serve as a proximate measure for lesser people in a particular virtue (following Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Book IX)
• The eternal law, though remote and not directly known as it exists in God’s mind, becomes known to us through natural reason (derived from it as its image) or through revelation

Key Arguments #

Article 1: Does Goodness of Will Depend on Object? #

• Objection 1: Dionysius says the will is always of the good; therefore every willing should be good
  • Response: The will is sometimes of an apparent good (having some aspect of goodness) rather than true good; this does not render the act good
• Objection 2: Goodness depends on circumstances
  • Response: Good and bad are per se differences of the will’s acts; circumstances are accidents that do not constitute species
• Key principle: In any genus, what is first is simple and consists in fewer things; the will’s goodness, being the beginning of human acts, depends per se on one thing—the object—not on diverse circumstances

Article 2: Does Goodness Depend Only on Object, or Also on Circumstances? #

• Objection: Acts can be willed at the wrong time, in the wrong way, or to excess; circumstances thus affect goodness
  • Response 1: When someone wills something “when he ought not,” this describes the object as willed differently (e.g., seeking geometry when one should attend church is not willing the good of geometry properly)
  • Response 2: Circumstances affecting the thing willed change what is actually willed; circumstances affecting the act of willing do not excuse if the will aims at the good
• Key distinction: Ignorance of circumstances excuses badness of will only insofar as the circumstances describe the thing willed itself (e.g., not knowing one is shooting one’s father makes the act involuntary)

Article 3: Does Goodness Depend on Reason? #

• Objection 1: Good pertains to the will before reason; therefore goodness does not depend on reason
  • Response: The good under the ratio of desirable pertains to the will before reason; but the good under the ratio of true pertains to reason first
  • The desire of the will cannot be about the good unless it is first grasped by reason
• Objection 2: Aristotle says the good of practical intellect is truth conformed to rectified appetite, suggesting reason depends on the will’s goodness
  • Response: Prudence (practical wisdom) presupposes the will is rectified toward a suitable end, but that end itself requires reason to grasp it rightly
• Key principle: Reason and will move each other differently—reason moves the will through the object presented; the will moves reason through the end

Article 4: Does Goodness Depend on Eternal Law? #

• Objection 1: Reason is the proximate measure; eternal law is too remote and unknown to be a measure
  • Response: Multiple measures can exist in hierarchical order; the second cause’s effect depends more on the first cause
• Objection 2: A measure must be homogenous with what it measures; eternal law is not homogenous with human will
  • Response: The proximate measure must be homogenous; the remote measure need not be
• Objection 3: Eternal law is unknown; therefore it cannot be a measure
  • Response: Although unknown as it exists in God’s mind, eternal law becomes known through natural reason (its image) or revelation
• Key conclusion: The goodness of human will depends more on eternal law than on human reason, because human reason itself is derived from eternal law

Important Definitions #

Bonum Secundum Quid (Apparent Good) #

• Something that has some aspect or appearance of goodness but is not truly good in itself
• The object toward which a bad will can be directed
• Distinguished from bonum simpliciter (the true good)

Ratio (Aspect/Notion/Form Under Which) #

• The way something is grasped or presented by reason
• An act can be good in itself but presented under a bad ratio by erroneous reason
• The will follows the ratio (aspect) presented to it by reason

Homogenous (Homogeneous) #

• Sharing the same kind or nature; being of the same order
• Required between a measure and what is measured (e.g., surface measured by area, not length)
• Applied to proximate measures but not necessarily to remote measures

Ordo Rationis (Order of Reason) #

• The ordering or regulation that reason provides to acts
• The will’s goodness consists in being subject to this order
• When the will violates this order, it is bad

Examples & Illustrations #

Apparent Good with Aspect of Goodness #

• The will can tend toward something having some character or aspect of good without being truly good
• Example mentioned: loving something that is bad because it appears good in some diminished sense

Seeking Vainglory #

• A person seeking empty glory in all actions:
  • Whether giving alms or refusing alms, the act is bad
  • But they are not “perplexed” (without a way out) because they can dismiss the bad intention
  • Illustration of how the ratio presented by reason governs the will

Mistaken Identity #

• A man approaches a woman he believes to be his wife, but she is another woman:
  • If due to deception (not his fault), his will is excused—involuntary ignorance
  • If due to his negligence or refusal to know, his will is not excused—culpable ignorance
• Shows how circumstances that describe the object affect whether the act is willed at all

The Geometry Student #

• Seeking to do geometry when one should be attending church:
  • This is not simply “willing the good of geometry at the wrong time”
  • Rather, it is willing geometry improperly ordered, not willing the true good
  • The circumstance of time becomes part of what is willed

Animals vs. Humans #

• Animals have claws and horns for fighting; humans continually invent new weapons
• Illustration of reason being proper to man—reason, not will or desire, distinguishes humans
• Reference to Aquinas paraphrasing Hesiod: some people think for themselves, some think as others think, some don’t think at all

The Magnolia Tree #

• Anecdote about trees that “want” water in such a way they damage pipes:
  • Illustrates natural desire in plants
  • Shows that desire is not peculiar to man; reason is what makes the will distinctly human

Notable Quotes #

“The will is not always of the true good, but sometimes of the apparent good, which has some aspect of good.”

“Good and bad are per se differences of the acts of the will, just as true and false are specific differences of reason’s acts.”

“The good understood is the object proportioned to the will. The sensible good, or the imaginary good, is not proportioned to the will, but to the sense appetite.”

“The goodness of the will depends upon reason in the same way that it depends upon the object, because the object really is the good as known [by reason].”

“In all ordered causes, the effect more depends upon the first cause than upon the second cause, because the second cause does not act except in the power of the first cause.”

“The light of reason that is in us, to that extent is able to show us the good and to rule our will insofar as it is the light of your face [of God].”

“Whence it is manifest that much more does the goodness of the human will depend upon the eternal law than even upon human reason.”

Questions Addressed #

1. Does the goodness of the will depend on its object?

   • Yes; good and bad are per se specific differences of the will’s acts, determined by the object, which may be truly good or merely apparently good

2. Does goodness depend only on the object, or also on circumstances?

   • Primarily on the object alone; circumstances may aggravate or diminish but do not constitute the species unless they change what is actually willed

3. Does goodness depend on reason?

   • Yes; reason proposes the object to the will; the goodness of the will depends on reason in the same way it depends on the object (the good as known)

4. Does goodness depend on the eternal law?

   • Yes, ultimately and more fundamentally; human reason derives its authority from eternal law (divine reason); when human reason fails, we must recur to eternal reason

5. How do multiple hierarchical measures relate?

   • A proximate measure must be homogenous with what it measures; remote measures need not be; multiple measures can exist in ordered hierarchy, each deriving from the higher