59. Circumstances, Species, and the Goodness of the Will

Summary

This lecture examines whether circumstances can constitute new moral species of acts (Articles 10-11) and introduces the question of what determines the goodness of the interior act of the will (Question 19). Berquist explores the distinction between circumstances that remain accidents versus those that become principal conditions of the object, and argues that the goodness of the will depends primarily on its object as understood by reason, not merely on quantitative increases or decreases in badness.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Article 10: Can Circumstances Constitute a New Moral Species? #

The Problem: Whether circumstances can give species to a moral act, making it a fundamentally different kind of act rather than merely a worse instance of the same act.

Key Resolution: A circumstance can constitute a new species of act when it becomes a principal condition of the object itself and regards a special order of reason. Normally, circumstances remain accidents and do not give species.

Example - Sacrilege: Taking what belongs to another (theft) is the basic act. When the place becomes sacred (a circumstance), this circumstance transforms into a condition of the object itself, creating a new species of sin (sacrilege) rather than merely a worse theft.

Article 11: The “More and Less” Problem #

The Question: Does every circumstance that increases goodness or badness constitute a new species?

Key Distinction - More and Less vs. Difference in Species:

Stealing $50 versus $100: same species (theft), merely intensified badness
Both presuppose the same essential condition: taking what is not yours
The circumstance of amount aggravates or diminishes the sin but does not diversify the species

The Critical Principle: A circumstance gives species only if it regards a special order of reason. If it presupposes another condition from which the act derives its species, it does not create a new species but only intensifies the existing one.

Potential Exception: If the amount stolen deprives someone of their means of subsistence (as opposed to a small loss to a wealthy person), this might constitute a different species because it creates a new relation to reason—not merely a quantitative difference.

Introduction to Question 19: The Goodness of the Interior Act of the Will #

Framework: The lecture transitions from circumstances in general to examining what makes the interior act of the will (the act itself, not external behavior) good or bad.

Ten Sub-Questions to Be Addressed:

Does goodness of the will depend on its object?
Does it depend on the object alone?
Does it depend on reason (internal law)?
Does it depend on eternal law?
Whether the will following errant reason is bad
[Other questions follow but are not developed in this lecture]
Does goodness depend on intention of the end?
Does quantity of goodness/badness follow quantity of intention?
Does goodness depend on conformity to divine will?
Is such conformity necessary for the will to be good?

Article 1: Does Goodness of Will Depend on Object? #

The Objection’s Logic:

The will is always of the good (as its object)
Therefore every willing would be good
This seems to make goodness of the will automatic

Thomas’s Resolution:

Good and bad are per se differences of the act of the will
Just as true and false are per se differences of acts of reason
The difference of species in acts comes from their objects
Therefore, good and bad in the will’s acts must be properly noted according to their objects

The Heart Principle: “The will goes to its object.” Following Scripture: “Where your heart is, there your treasure shall be.” This means examining where the will is directed reveals the character of the will.

Key Arguments #

On Circumstances and Species #

Against Circumstances Giving Species:

Objection: Circumstances are accidents; accidents don’t constitute species
Response: In natural things this is true, but reason’s process is not fixed to one form—what is a circumstance in one consideration can become a principal condition of the object in another

Against Every Circumstance Adding Badness Creating New Species:

Objection: Every circumstance that aggravates evil adds a new defect, thus a new species
Response: Not every circumstance has in itself a reason of goodness or badness; some presuppose another condition from which the act derives its species
Therefore: Quantitative aggravation does not diversify species

On the Goodness of the Will #

Why Goodness Depends on Object:

Good and bad are per se differences of the will’s act
Acts are distinguished by their objects (as shown in previous question)
The object is what the will wills; it is proposed to the will by reason
The good as understood (not merely as sensible) is the proper object of the will

Important Definitions #

Circumstantia (Circumstance) #

Normally an accident of the act that does not give it species. However, when it regards a special order of reason and becomes a principal condition of the object itself, it can constitute a new moral species.

Species (in moral acts) #

The fundamental kind or type of moral act, determined by the object as related to reason. Distinguished from mere intensification (magis vel minus—more or less).

Magis vel minus (More and Less) #

Quantitative differences that intensify or diminish an act without changing its fundamental character or species. Example: $50 vs. $100 in theft—both the same species of badness, merely more or less intense.

Ordo rationis (Order of Reason) #

The relation of an act to reason. When a circumstance regards a special order of reason, it can become constitutive of a new species rather than remaining a mere accident.

Examples & Illustrations #

Quantitative Differences in Theft #

Same species: Taking $50 vs. $100 from another—both are theft
Intensification, not diversification: The amount aggravates the sin but does not make it a different kind of wrong
The condition that matters: What makes it wrong is that “it is not yours,” not the quantity taken

Depriving of Subsistence (Possible Species Difference) #

Stealing $100 from someone with only $100 (their means of living)
Vs. stealing the same amount from someone with a million dollars
Question: Does this create a new species? This might constitute a different order of reason (deprivation of necessities) rather than mere quantitative difference

Ladder Theft with Circumstance #

Your neighbor borrows your ladder
You have the right to reclaim it
But not while he is on it painting his house
The circumstance (time/situation) changes what reason permits, thus changes the moral species of the act

Pilgrimage #

One person walks one mile; another walks ten miles
Same species of act: pilgrimage
Difference in degree: The longer journey may show greater virtue or devotion, but it does not make it a different kind of act
Application: Not every increase in goodness creates a new species

Temporal Circumstance #

“Willing to do geometry when one ought to go to church”
The circumstance of time becomes part of what makes the act repugnant to reason
This is not merely a quantitative difference; it regards a special order of reason

Notable Quotes #

“The circumstance, according as it gives some species to the act, is considered as a condition of the object itself, and as a specific difference of it.” — Thomas Aquinas (via Berquist)

“A circumstance remaining in the ratio of a circumstance, since it has the ratio of an accident, does not give species. But according as it is changed into a principal condition of the object, according to this, it gives species.” — Thomas Aquinas (via Berquist)

“To take another’s in a large or small quantity does not diversify the species of sin; nevertheless, it is able to aggravate or diminish the sin.” — Thomas Aquinas (via Berquist)

“Good and bad are per se differences of the act of the will, just as true and false are per se differences of acts of reason.” — Thomas Aquinas (via Berquist)

“The will goes to the object. I left my heart in San Francisco… There your heart shall be.” — Berquist (Scripture application)

Questions Addressed #

Can a circumstance constitute a new moral species? #

Resolution: Yes, but only when it becomes a principal condition of the object and regards a special order of reason. Normally circumstances remain accidents and do not give species.

Does every circumstance that increases badness create a new species? #

Resolution: No. Only those circumstances that regard a special order of reason do so. Mere quantitative increases (more or less of the same thing) aggravate or diminish but do not diversify species.

Does goodness of the will depend on its object? #

Resolution: Yes. Good and bad are per se differences of the will’s act, distinguished by their objects. The will’s goodness must be noted according to its object, which is the good as understood by reason.

Pedagogical Notes #

Translation Challenge: Berquist discusses the difficulty of translating ratio into English. The word can mean reason, order, account, or relationship depending on context. This reflects deeper differences between Greek/Latin thinking (cause imagined as above, effect hanging from it) versus Germanic/Anglo-Saxon thinking (cause as ground, holding up the effect below).

Methodological Note: The lecture illustrates Pope Paul VI’s teaching that one should proceed from the general to particular, just as Euclid teaches quadrilateral before square. Thomas does this by first examining goodness of human acts in general, then the interior act of the will in particular, then the exterior act.