Lecture 55

55. Good and Bad in Human Actions

Summary
Berquist explores the metaphysical and moral foundations of good and bad in human acts, drawing on Thomistic principles that good and being are convertible. The lecture establishes that badness is a privation (lack of something that ought to be present) rather than positive non-being, and examines how human actions derive their moral quality primarily from their object—which gives them species—while circumstances and the end provide secondary determination of goodness or badness.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

  • Good and Being as Convertible: Good and being are interchangeable concepts. Insofar as something has being, it has goodness; insofar as it lacks being or fullness of being, it lacks goodness.
  • Bad as Privation, Not Non-Being: Bad is not absolute non-being but a privatio—the lack of something that a thing is able to have and should have. This is crucial: a bad act still has some being and goodness, but it lacks the fullness of being owed to human action.
  • Fullness of Being and Human Perfection: God alone has the entire fullness of his being in a simple way. Each creature has only the fullness of being suitable to its nature. A complete human being requires body and soul, all powers of knowledge and motion. Lacking any part of this owed fullness constitutes deficiency.
  • Reason as the Measure of Human Acts: A good human act is one that has the order and measure that reason should impose. A bad human act is one lacking this order or measure. This is what distinguishes moral acts as human: they proceed from reason and will.
  • Species of Actions from Object: Just as a natural thing gains its species from its form, a moral action gains its species from its object. The object is to action what the term is to motion.

Key Arguments #

Objection 1: Every Action is Good #

  • Dionysius’s Argument: The bad acts only by virtue of the good; therefore, no action is bad.
  • Second Argument (from Act and Potency): Nothing acts except insofar as it is in act. Bad is not an act but a lack of act. Therefore, nothing acts insofar as it is bad, only insofar as it is good. Hence every action is good.
  • Third Argument (Causality): The bad cannot be a cause except through some good. Every action has a per se effect. Therefore, no action is bad.
  • Thomas’s Resolution: Bad acts in virtue of a deficient good—something that has being yet lacks proper order. A blind man has being and goodness (he is alive) but lacks sight. When he walks, his act has being but lacks the order sight should give it. The act is good secundum quid (in some way, insofar as it has being) but bad simpliciter (simply, insofar as it lacks proper form).

Objection 2: Object Does Not Determine Goodness #

  • Augustine’s Argument: Things in themselves are good; the bad comes only from their use by sinners. Therefore, the object itself does not make an act bad.
  • Analogy Argument: The object is to action as matter is to form. Goodness comes from form, not matter. Therefore, goodness is not from the object.
  • Causality Argument: Object is to action as effect to cause. Goodness of a cause does not depend on its effect. Therefore, goodness does not depend on the object.
  • Thomas’s Resolution: The object does give the species to the act and is the first source of its goodness or badness. Just as a natural thing’s first goodness is from its form (which gives it species), a moral act’s first goodness is from its suitable object. An act is called good ex genere (from its kind) when it uses something suitable to it. The first evil is when the object is unsuitable to reason—this is called bad ex genere. Though exterior things are good in themselves, they do not always have suitable proportion to a particular action (e.g., taking another’s pen lacks the proportion of ownership required for the act to be good).

Important Definitions #

  • Good (Bonum): That which has fullness of being suitable to a thing’s nature. Convertible with being.
  • Bad (Malum): A privatio—the lack of something that a thing is able to have and should have. Not absolute non-being but deficiency in a thing that possesses being.
  • Privation (Privatio): The absence of a form or perfection that belongs to the natural state of a thing. Example: blindness in a man (who naturally sees) but not in a stone.
  • Three Meanings of Bad:
    1. Bad as the lack itself (e.g., blindness as the privation)
    2. Bad as what has the lack (e.g., the blind eye or blind man)
    3. Bad as what produces the lack (e.g., an instrument or cause of blindness)
  • Secundum Quid vs. Simpliciter: Secundum quid means “in some way” or “qualified” (having being but lacking proper order); simpliciter means “simply” or “absolutely” (possessing full proper order). Hitler is good secundum quid (he has being) but bad simpliciter (he lacks the fullness of being owed to human nature, particularly reason and virtue).
  • Actus Moralis (Moral Act): An act proceeding from reason and will. Moral does not necessarily mean good—a moral act can be morally bad (unreasonable). Contrasts with natural acts (from nature without reason) like heartbeat or digestion.
  • Ex Genere (From Its Kind/Species): The first determination of moral quality, derived from the object itself. An act is good ex genere when its object is suitable to reason.
  • Species (Species): The essential nature of a thing, determined by its formal principle. For actions, the object determines the species.

Examples & Illustrations #

  • The Pen: Taking a pen from a store home with you. The pen itself is good (it writes), but the act is bad because the pen is not proportioned to you—it belongs to another. The object is good but unsuitable to this action.
  • The Doctor Drinking Before Surgery: Drinking alcohol is not inherently bad, but doing so before operating on a patient lacks the measure reason should impose. The act lacks proper order.
  • Excessive Eating: A movie actress who ate so much her stomach burst. This lacks the measure reason should give to eating.
  • Teenagers and Alcohol: Drinking an entire bottle of whiskey straight. The body’s pain signals show this lacks the measure of reason. When your body gives you pain, that is a sign not to do such things.
  • Adultery vs. Conjugal Act: Both produce human generation as a per se effect. Yet they differ in species morally because adultery lacks the order reason should govern procreation (marriage), while the conjugal act within marriage conforms to reason.
  • The Blind Man Walking: A blind man has goodness (he is alive, has the power to walk) but lacks sight, which should direct his walking. When he walks, his motion has being but lacks the order sight should give it, so he walks hesitantly or stumbles.
  • Small Beer at Breakfast: In medieval England, drinking small beer (weak beer) at breakfast was reasonable because water was unsafe. In modern times, the same act might be unreasonable. Circumstances determine whether reason is satisfied.

Notable Quotes #

“Sin is nothing, and the man who sins becomes nothing.” — Augustine (cited by Thomas, with qualification that this somewhat overstates things)

“They were made abominable just as the things which they loved.” — Osee/Hosea, cited approvingly by Thomas: if you love disgusting things, you become disgusting yourself.

“The bad does not act except by virtue of the good.” — Dionysius, cited as an objection that Thomas must answer.

Questions Addressed #

Question 18, Article 1: Is Every Action Good? #

  • Answer: No. Every action insofar as it has being has some goodness. But insofar as it lacks the fullness of being owed to human action (the order and measure of reason), it falls short of goodness and is called bad. A bad act is not absolutely nothing, but something deficient.

Question 18, Article 2: Does Human Action Have Goodness or Badness from Its Object? #

  • Answer: Yes. The object gives the species to the act, just as form gives species to a natural thing. The object is the first and primary source of an act’s moral quality. An act is called good ex genere when its object is suitable to reason; bad ex genere when its object lacks this suitability.