Lecture 52

52. Command as an Act of Reason and Its Nature in Animals

Summary
This lecture examines whether command (imperium) is an act of reason or the will, and whether brute animals possess the capacity to command. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of command as essentially an act of reason that presupposes an act of the will, and argues that command requires the ordering power of reason, which only rational animals possess. The lecture uses examples from animal behavior to illustrate the difference between natural instinct and rational ordering.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Command as an Act of Reason #

  • Thomas’s position: Command (imperium) is essentially an act of reason, not the will, though it presupposes an act of the will
  • Command involves ordering: To command means to order something to be done through a certain intimation or declaration
  • Two modes of intimation:
    • Indicative mode: stating what is done (e.g., “this is done by you”)
    • Imperative mode: commanding what should be done (e.g., “do this”)
  • Will as first mover: While the will is the first mover of all powers in the soul, reason is the second mover that directs through command
  • Reason’s distinctive function: To order through intimation is proper to reason, which has the capacity to see before (ratio = reason)

Command in Brute Animals #

  • Brutes lack command entirely: Animals cannot truly command because they lack reason; they possess only mover and moved, not commander and commanded
  • Natural instinct vs. rational ordering: Brute animals act through natural instinct; when they apprehend something convenient or unsuitable, they are naturally moved to pursuit or flight
  • The body-soul relationship in brutes: While the soul moves the body in brutes, the soul does not command the body because commanding requires the ordering power of reason
  • Inability to adapt: When circumstances change (as in Fabre’s antenna experiment), brutes cannot adjust their behavior because they do not understand the order of means to end

Command and the Desiring Power #

  • Avicenna’s fourfold mover: Perfecting, disposing, commanding, and counseling
  • In rational animals only: The desiring power commands motion only insofar as it moves through reason-commanding, and this occurs only in men
  • In brute animals: The desiring power is not properly commanding; it merely moves

Key Arguments #

Against Command Being an Act of the Will #

  1. Command moves something; the will moves all other powers; therefore command seems an act of the will
  2. The free man commands the slave; liberty is rooted in the will; therefore command pertains to the will
  3. Action follows immediately upon command, but not immediately upon reason’s judgment; therefore command is an act of will

Thomas’s Resolution #

  • Command is not “to move in just any way” but involves a certain intimatio (intimation/declaration)
  • Ordering through intimation is proper to reason alone
  • The will is the first mover; reason is the second mover that directs the will’s motion through command
  • Command presupposes the will’s motion but is formally constituted by reason’s ordering power

Against Command in Brute Animals #

  1. The appetitive faculty commands motion (per Avicenna); brutes have appetitive faculties; therefore brutes command
  2. The body obeys the soul as servant obeys master; therefore the soul commands the body, even in brutes
  3. Brutes make impetus to work; therefore they possess command (per Damascene)

Thomas’s Resolution #

  • Command requires ordering (ordinare), which is proper to reason alone
  • In brutes, there is mover and moved, but not commander and commanded
  • Impetus in brutes comes from natural instinct, not from the ordering of reason
  • The soul moves the body in brutes but does not order it

Important Definitions #

Command (Imperium) #

  • An act of reason that orders something to be done through intimation or declaration
  • Presupposes an act of the will as the first mover of all powers
  • Distinct from mere motion; involves the ordering power unique to reason

Intimation/Declaration (Intimatio) #

  • The declaration or announcement by which reason orders something
  • Can be expressed in the indicative mode (stating) or imperative mode (commanding)
  • The formal element that makes command an act of reason

First Mover vs. Second Mover #

  • First mover: The will, which initiates motion in all powers of the soul
  • Second mover: Reason, which directs the motion initiated by the will through command
  • The power of the first mover remains in the act of the second mover

Examples & Illustrations #

Fabre’s Wasp Experiment #

  • A wasp paralyzes its victim by squeezing the head just enough to paralyze but not kill it
  • The wasp digs a hole, measures it, drags the victim by the antenna, deposits eggs, and covers it
  • When Fabre snapped off the antenna, the wasp returned and filled the hole with dirt—but without the victim
  • Significance: The wasp acts by instinct, not by understanding the order of means to end; it cannot adapt when the antenna (its only cue) is removed
  • Even Fabre, with reason, struggled to replicate the exact pressure needed, showing how subtle the instinctive action is

The Monkey and Humans #

  • Psychologists raised a monkey alongside a human child
  • The monkey was ahead in physical abilities until language and words developed
  • Once language entered, the child surpassed the monkey
  • Significance: Language and reason allow humans to understand the order of words to things, which animals cannot do

Natural Migration and Memory #

  • Birds migrate over a thousand miles and stop in the same locations and even the same branch, year after year
  • Individual birds are attracted to flocks; migration is guided by natural instinct and memory
  • Significance: This demonstrates the power of natural instinct and memory in brutes, but not rational ordering

Cardinals and Nesting Habits #

  • Cardinals return to the same bush year after year to nest
  • Significance: An example of natural instinct and habituation in brute animals

Questions Addressed #

Article 1: Is Command an Act of Reason or Will? #

  • Question: Does command belong to reason or to the will?
  • Arguments: Various objections suggest command belongs to the will because it moves things and liberty is rooted in the will
  • Resolution: Command is essentially an act of reason, but presupposes an act of the will. Reason orders through intimation; the will provides the first motion that reason directs.

Article 2: Does Command Belong to Brute Animals? #

  • Question: Can brute animals command themselves or others?
  • Arguments: Objections suggest brutes have appetitive powers that command motion, and the soul commands the body even in brutes
  • Resolution: No. Command requires the ordering power of reason, which only rational animals possess. Brutes act through natural instinct, not rational ordering. In brutes, the soul moves the body but does not command it.

Contextual Observations #

  • The lecture distinguishes between mover and moved (found in all living things) and commander and commanded (found only in rational beings)
  • This distinction is crucial for understanding why animals can perform complex behaviors without possessing reason
  • The root of liberty is the will as subject, but as cause it is reason (liberum arbitrium = free judgment from reason)
  • The inability of brutes to adapt when circumstances change reveals they do not grasp the rational order underlying their actions