Lecture 51

51. Consent and Use: Acts of the Will and Reason

Summary
This lecture examines two related acts of the rational appetite: consent (consensus) and use (uti). Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of whether consent concerns the end or means toward the end, and whether use is an act of the will or reason. The discussion establishes that consent and use are distinctive to rational animals and properly concern things ordered toward an end, not the end itself.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

  • Definition: The application of appetitive motion to something pre-existing in one’s power
  • Proper Object: Concerns things ordered toward an end, not the end itself
  • Natural vs. Consented: The end is naturally desired without consent; only means require consent
  • Rationality: Unique to rational animals; brute animals lack true consent because they cannot apply their appetitive motion—they are moved by natural instinct alone
  • Order in Action: Follows counseling about means; presupposes the determination of counsel

Use (Uti) #

  • Definition: The application of some principle of action to an operation; taking something in the faculty of the will
  • Primary Agent: Primarily an act of the will as the first mover; secondarily an act of reason as directing
  • Proper Object: Concerns things toward the end, not the end itself (though the end can be used equivocally in reference to its possession)
  • Rationality Requirement: Requires judgment over what is applied; only rational animals truly use things
  • Order in Action: Follows choice and precedes execution; the will’s motion toward carrying out what has been chosen

The Principle: “That on Account of Which Each Thing, That More” #

  • Aristotelian principle: If the same property belongs to two things, but to one because of the other, to which does it belong more? To the cause.
  • Examples: sweetness belongs more to sugar than coffee (because the coffee’s sweetness is from the sugar); goodness belongs more to the end than to means (because means are good because of the end)
  • Application: Just as we know conclusions through premises, so we consent to means on account of the end

Key Arguments #

Objection 1: Consent seems to be about the end itself, since “that on account of which each thing is, that more”—and the end is that for which means exist.

Response:

  • The end is naturally desired without consent; consent applies specifically to means
  • The end functions like premises in a demonstration—we know conclusions through premises, but we don’t have scientia (reasoned knowledge) of premises themselves; rather, we have intellectus (intellectual understanding) of them
  • Therefore, the end itself does not fall under consent; rather, simple willing is the fundamental act concerning the end

Objection 2: The intemperate man has his end (the delight/pleasure of the act), and he consents in the work; therefore consent can be about an end.

Response: The intemperate man consents to the doing of the act on account of the pleasure (his end), not to the pleasure itself. He consents to the means (the act) ordered to his end (the pleasure).

Objection: Brute animals determine their appetite to something; they execute deeds through instinct; therefore they consent.

Response: Consent requires applying appetitive motion—having it in one’s power to apply or not apply. Brute animals’ determination is passive, from natural instinct, not active application. Only rational nature can apply or withhold appetitive motion; therefore only rational animals consent.

On Use vs. Reason #

Objection: Augustine says use means referring something to another, which is the function of reason; therefore use is an act of reason, not the will.

Response:

  • Use is primarily and chiefly an act of the will as the first mover of the soul’s powers
  • It is secondarily an act of reason as directing
  • Reason directs what the will applies; the will applies the powers of the soul and body’s members to operation
  • Just as building is attributed to the builder, not to the tools (hammer, saw), so use is attributed to the will, not to the powers it moves

On Use and Brute Animals #

Objection: Brute animals apply their members to action (feet to walking, horns to striking, teeth to biting); therefore they use.

Response: Use requires judgment over what is applied—the ability to refer one thing to another. Brute animals act by natural instinct, not by seeing the order of means to end. They do not properly apply their members; they are moved by nature. The example of the wasp demonstrates this: acting with remarkable precision but showing no understanding when circumstances change.

On Use and the End #

Objection: Augustine says to enjoy implies absolute motion of appetite; use implies motion to something for another; but both use and enjoyment belong to animals. If enjoyment belongs to animals, so does use.

Response: To enjoy belongs to brute animals, but use does not. The last end can be spoken of in two ways: simply (the thing itself) and toward someone (the possession of it). One enjoys the end simply; one uses it insofar as one refers it to possession. God is enjoyed, not used (properly speaking).

Important Definitions #

  • Latin: con + sentire (to sense together, to feel with)
  • Implies application and conjunction to that which is consented to
  • Distinct from assent (assentire), which implies distance
  • An act of the desiring power, though reason directs it

Use (Uti) #

  • Latin: to take in the faculty of the will
  • Implies application of a principle of action to operation
  • Involves reference (relatio) of one thing to another
  • Distinguished from enjoyment (frui) by its relation to another end
  • Simple Willing: The fundamental act of will regarding the end (e.g., naturally willing to be happy); no consent required
  • Consent: The application of appetitive motion to means ordered toward an end; requires prior determination by counsel

Examples & Illustrations #

The Medicine Example #

  • I consent to take medicine because of health (the end), not because of the medicine itself
  • The end (health) is what I more properly consent to in a primary sense
  • The means (taking medicine) I consent to on account of the end

The Intemperate Man #

  • The intemperate man has pleasure as his end
  • He consents to the act on account of the pleasure, not to the pleasure itself
  • His consent concerns the means (the act) ordered to his end (pleasure)

The Wasp Behavior #

  • The wasp squeezes its victim’s head just enough to paralyze, not kill
  • It digs a hole of appropriate size, drags the victim by antenna, deposits eggs
  • When the antenna is removed, the wasp fills the hole without the victim inside
  • Shows the wasp acts by instinct without understanding the order of means to end
  • Even Fabre, trying to replicate the precise pressure, often killed the victim instead

Saint Paul and the Beatification Process #

  • Implied example of someone neither consenting nor using reason for an end beyond themselves

Questions Addressed #

Article 3: Is Consent About the End or About Means? #

Central Question: Does consent pertain to the end itself or only to things ordered toward the end?

Answer: Properly speaking, consent is only about things ordered toward the end. The end is naturally desired without consent. The application of appetitive motion presupposes the determination of counsel about means. Just as we know conclusions through premises (but not premises themselves by reasoned knowledge), so we consent to means on account of the end (but not to the end itself through consent). When there is only one means to an end that pleases, consent and choice do not differ in reality, only in definition.

Article 1 (Q16): Is Use an Act of the Will or Reason? #

Central Question: Does use belong to the will or to reason?

Answer: Use is primarily and chiefly an act of the will as the first mover of the soul’s powers. It is secondarily an act of reason as directing. The will applies the powers of the soul and the body’s members to operation. Just as building is attributed to the builder, not to the tools, so use is attributed to the will, not to the powers it moves. The execution of the will is ultimate—the will is the final agent.

Article 2 (Q16): Does Use Belong to Brute Animals? #

Central Question: Can brute animals use things, or is use unique to rational animals?

Answer: Use properly belongs only to rational animals. Use requires judgment over what is applied—the ability to refer one thing to another. This is the function of reason. Brute animals act by natural instinct; they do not apply their members with understanding of the order of means to end. To apply something to another is not possible except for that which has judgment over that, which pertains to reason. Therefore, only the rational animal both consents and uses.