50. Consent as an Act of the Will

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Lecture Notes

Context and Structure #

This lecture addresses Question 15 of the Summa Theologiae (II-II), which examines consent as one of the acts of the will. The material comes after discussions of counsel (Question 14) and will precede discussions of choice and use. Consent is positioned within the order of acts of the will directed toward means to an end.

Main Topics #

The Nature of Consent #

• Etymology and Meaning: Consent (Latin: consentire) literally means “to sense together” or “to sense with,” composed of con (together) + sentire (to sense)
• Core Function: Consent is the application of the appetitive motion to something—it implies both a judgment (from preceding counsel) and an inclination of appetite toward what pleases
• Key Distinction: The application of appetite requires the power to apply or not apply it; this is what distinguishes consent from mere desire
• Analogy to Sensation: Just as the hand grasps something physically, the mind grasps things through knowledge; appetite “grasps” through tasting or experiencing delight

Consent as an Act of the Will, Not Reason (Properly Speaking) #

• The Apparent Problem: Augustine attributes consent to “higher reason,” and reason is a grasping (apprehensive/cognitive) power; therefore, consent would seem to belong to reason
• Thomas’s Resolution: When Augustine speaks of reason (or when Aristotle says “the will is in reason”), this refers to the rational part of the soul as a whole, not to reason as a cognitive faculty distinct from will
• The Will’s Position: The will operates at the rational level of the soul (the highest, most immaterial level), not at the sensory or emotional level; hence it can be said to be “in reason” even though it is properly an appetitive power
• Practical Consequence: The will is the first mover that applies all other powers of the soul to their operations; this application is primarily a function of the will, not of reason

The Distinction Between Knowing and Desiring Powers #

• Apprehensive (Knowing) Power: Moves from the thing into the mind; grasps things into itself; concerned with what is present (sensation) or universals (understanding)
• Appetitive (Desiring) Power: Goes out toward the thing; is inclination or motion toward what is known; concerned with what pleases or delights
• The Transference of “Sense” to Appetite: The word sentire (to sense) is properly an act of the knowing power but is carried over to appetite by analogy—the will “senses” or “tastes” things through its inclination and the delight it finds in them
• Example from Scripture: “Taste and see how sweet is the Lord” (Psalm 33)—here “taste” is transferred from physical sensation to the will’s experience of divine goodness

Consent and Brute Animals #

• The Question: Do animals consent, since they have appetites and perform actions?
• Thomas’s Answer: No. Brute animals do not properly possess consent because they lack the power to apply or not apply their appetitive motion
• Why Animals Lack Consent:
  • Animals’ appetitive motions are passive determinations arising from natural instinct, not active applications
  • Consent requires the power to judge and determine whether and how to apply appetite
  • This power belongs to reason alone
• The Analogy of the Staff: Just as a staff cannot move a stone (only something with power over the staff can do this), animals cannot apply their appetite (only rational beings can)
• Important Clarification: Animals may have appetites determined to particular objects, but this is passive determination, not the active application that consent entails
• Examples: A dog may desire to go outside, but we do not say the dog “consents” to go outside; animals may overeat until death if constantly fed, showing they cannot apply or withhold their appetite

Consent Concerns Means, Not Ends #

• The Principle: Consent properly concerns only things ordered to an end (means), not the end itself
• Why the End Is Excluded from Consent: The end is naturally desired and serves as the premise for practical reasoning; it does not require the judgment and application that consent involves
• Example: One does not consent to health; one naturally desires health. One consents to taking medicine as the means to health.
• Basis in Counsel: Counsel investigates and judges the means to an end; consent applies the appetite to what counsel has determined; the end, being manifest, does not require this investigation and determination

Consent and Higher Reason #

• The Question: Does consent pertain to higher reason, lower reason, or both?
• Thomas’s Answer: Consent in action pertains to higher reason insofar as higher reason does not dissent from eternal truth
• Distinction of Reason Levels:
  • Higher reason: Looks to eternal reasons and divine law; directs action according to universal principles
  • Lower reason: Concerns temporal and practical matters; orders means to ends; applies universal principles to particular actions
• The Architectonic Model: Just as geometry (higher art) directs natural philosophy (lower art), higher reason directs lower reason
• Yet All Acts Require Will’s Consent: Even though higher reason directs, the will must consent to the application; no voluntary act occurs without the will’s active consent at the rational level

Key Arguments #

Against Consent Being an Act of Reason #

Objection 1: From Augustine

• Augustine attributes consent to higher reason
• Reason is a grasping (cognitive) power
• Therefore, consent belongs to reason

Response:

• Augustine means reason as the rational part of the soul, which includes both intellect and will
• When Aristotle says “the will is in reason,” he means the will operates at the rational level, not that reason (cognition) is the faculty of consent
• The will is rational because it follows upon reason and operates in light of reason’s judgments

Objection 2: From Etymology

• The word “consent” (consentire) comes from sentire (to sense)
• Sensing is an act of the knowing power
• Therefore, consent is an act of the knowing power

Response:

• The word sentire is carried over by analogy from sensation to appetite
• The will “senses” or “tastes” things through its inclination toward them and the delight it finds in them
• This is similar to how “understanding” (intelligere) is called “seeing” by extension from physical sight
• The primary meaning of sentire is sensation; the secondary meaning (appetite’s inclination) is by likeness

Objection 3: From Assentire (to Assent)

• Assentire is made from the same word sentire as consentire
• Assentire properly pertains to intellect (a knowing power)
• Therefore, consentire also pertains to a knowing power

Response:

• Assentire means “to sense toward” (ad-sentire), implying a distance and motion toward
• Consentire means “to sense together” (con-sentire), implying conjunction and adherence
• The motion of intellect is from the thing to the mind (it is drawn toward understanding), so assentire is more proper to intellect
• The motion of will is toward the thing itself, so consentire is more proper to the will
• Although both words may be used interchangeably in practice, consentire more properly names the will’s act

Against Consent in Brute Animals #

Objection 1

• Consent implies determination of appetite to one thing
• The appetite of brute animals is determined to something
• Therefore, consent is found in brute animals

Response:

• Animals have appetite determined to objects, but this determination is passive (from natural instinct), not active
• Consent requires the active application of appetite—the power to apply or not apply it
• Only rational beings have this power; animals’ motions are determined for them by nature

Objection 2

• Consent precedes the execution of a deed
• Animals execute deeds
• Therefore, if there is no consent in animals, there would be no execution of deeds in them
• But animals clearly do execute deeds
• Therefore, consent must be in animals

Response:

• It is true that execution can follow from what precedes it, but not every preceding thing is the cause of what follows
• Execution of a deed can follow from multiple sources: consent (in rational beings) or from the impetuous motion of appetite (in animals)
• When one of several possible causes is removed, the effect does not necessarily cease if another cause remains
• Example: Hardening can result from heat (bricks hardened by fire) or from cold (water congealed by cold); removing heat does not remove all hardening
• Similarly: The execution of a deed in animals follows from impetuous appetite motion, not from consent

Objection 3

• Men sometimes are said to consent to doing something from passion (anger, concupiscence)
• This suggests that consent and passion operate in similar ways
• But if animals have passion, why not consent?

Response:

• Men who act from passion are still able not to follow the passion—reason can check or redirect it
• Brute animals cannot do this; they are subject to their passions without the power to resist or redirect them
• Therefore, there is not the same reason for attributing consent to both
• The difference is not in having passion but in having the rational power to apply or withhold consent despite passion

Important Definitions #

Consent (Consentire) #

• The active application of the appetitive motion to what pleases, following upon the judgment of counsel
• Implies both cognition (judgment of what is good) and appetite (inclination toward it)
• Requires the power to apply or not apply one’s appetite
• Properly an act of the will (though directed by reason), not of reason as such

The Rational Part of the Soul #

• Contrasted with the sensory and vegetative parts
• Includes both the intellective power and the will
• The will is “in reason” because it operates at this most immaterial, highest level
• When Augustine or Aristotle attribute things to “reason,” they sometimes mean this whole rational part, not reason as cognitive faculty alone

Higher vs. Lower Reason #

• Higher reason (superior rationis): Concerns eternal reasons; operates according to divine law; does not dissent from eternal truth
• Lower reason (inferior rationis): Concerns temporal, practical matters; applies universal principles to particular cases
• The higher directs the lower, as geometry directs natural philosophy
• Both are reason, but they operate at different levels of abstraction and universality

Passive vs. Active Determination of Appetite #

• Passive: When appetite is determined by nature or instinct (as in animals); the animal does not determine its own appetite but undergoes determination
• Active: When appetite is determined by the will’s judgment and application (as in rational beings); the rational being determines its own appetite
• Consent implies active determination

Application (Applicatio) #

• The act of directing or bringing one thing to bear on another
• In the context of consent: the will’s directing of the appetitive motion toward a particular object or action
• Requires the power to apply or not apply (freedom)
• Only rational beings possess this power

Examples & Illustrations #

Medicine and Health #

• One does not consent to health (the end); one naturally desires it
• One consents to taking medicine (the means to health)
• Reason judges medicine suitable; the will consents to apply itself to taking it

The Dog Going Outside #

• A dog may have appetite to go outside
• We would not properly say the dog “consents” to go outside
• The dog’s motion is determined by instinct and desire, not by the dog’s active judgment and application
• A person, by contrast, can consent or refuse to go outside based on judgment about what is suitable

Animal Overeating #

• Some animals, when given food continuously, will eat until they die from overeating
• This shows they cannot apply or withhold their appetitive motion based on judgment
• They lack the rational power to determine their appetite

Tasting and the Will #

• “Taste and see how sweet is the Lord” (Psalm 33)
• The word “taste” is carried over from sensation to the will’s experience
• The will “tastes” divine goodness through its inclination and delight in it
• This illustrates how the word sentire (to sense) applies analogously to the will

The Staff and the Stone #

• A staff cannot move a stone by itself; something with power over the staff must move it
• Similarly, an animal cannot apply its appetitive motion to one thing or another; only reason (in rational beings) possesses this power
• This analogy clarifies the distinction between passive and active determination

The Architectonic Arts #

• Geometry (higher art) determines principles
• Natural philosophy (lower art) applies these principles to natural bodies
• Similarly, higher reason determines universal principles; lower reason applies them to particular actions
• Yet the lower art must receive and acknowledge the direction of the higher
• By analogy: The will must consent to what higher reason directs

Notable Quotes #

“To consent implies the applying or the application of the sense to something… But it is a property of the sense that it knows things that are present here and now, singulars.” — Thomas Aquinas (via Berquist’s reading)

“Where your treasure is, there your heart will be also.” — Used to illustrate how the appetitive power goes out to the thing, in contrast to knowledge which draws things into the mind

“I left my heart in San Francisco.” — Berquist’s example of how we ordinarily speak of the will/heart going out to things

“Pride is the main cause of error.” — Berquist, reflecting Thomas’s teaching that pride impedes both listening to wiser teachers and accurate judgment

“That on account of which each thing [is desired], that more.” — The principle that the end is more desirable than the means (cited in contextual notes; may reflect this lecture’s discussion)

“This guy you call the dumb ox, their bellow will be heard around the world.” — Albert the Great, prophesying about Thomas Aquinas (cited as an example of intellectual humility and recognition of greatness)

Questions Addressed #

Article 1: Is Consent an Act of the Appetitive or Cognitive Power? #

Question: Does consent belong to reason (the knowing/apprehensive power) as Augustine suggests, or to the will (the appetitive power)?

Answer: Consent is properly an act of the will (appetitive power), though reason directs it. When Augustine attributes consent to “higher reason” or when Aristotle says “the will is in reason,” they refer to the rational part of the soul as a whole, which includes both intellect and will. The will operates at this rational level, making it a rational appetite. Consent involves the will’s inclination toward what pleases and its adherence to it—a motion characteristic of appetite, not cognition.

Key Point: The word “consent” (consentire) is carried over from sentire (to sense) by analogy to appetite’s “tasting” or experiencing delight in things, showing its fundamental connection to appetite rather than cognition.

Article 2: Does Consent Belong to Brute Animals? #

Question: Since animals have appetites and perform actions, do they consent to these actions?

Answer: No, properly speaking. Consent requires the active application of appetite—the power to apply or not apply one’s appetitive motion. Brute animals lack this power. Their appetitive motions are passive determinations from natural instinct, not active applications that would constitute consent.

Key Distinction:

• Animals have appetites determined to objects (passive)
• Rational beings have the power to apply or not apply their appetite (active)
• Only the latter is properly called consent

Evidence: Animals cannot refrain from acting on their appetites (e.g., some will overeat until death); they cannot judge and apply their appetite. Rational beings can resist passion through reason and can apply or withhold their appetitive motion based on judgment.

Article 3: Is Consent About the End or Only About Means? #

Question: Can one consent to an end itself, or only to means ordered to an end?

Answer: Consent properly concerns only means to an end, not the end itself. The end is naturally desired and serves as the premise for practical reasoning; it does not require the judgment and determination that consent involves.

Reasoning:

• Counsel investigates means to the end and judges which are suitable
• Consent applies appetite to what counsel has determined
• The end, being manifest and naturally desired, requires no such investigation or determination
• When an end becomes doubtful or contingent, it is no longer treated as an end but as a means to a further end

Example: Health is an end naturally willed; one does not consent to health. One consents to the means (medicine) that leads to health.

Article 4: Does Consent Pertain Only to Higher Reason? #

Question: Is consent an act exclusively of higher reason, or can it also concern lower reason?

Answer: Consent in action pertains to higher reason insofar as higher reason does not dissent from eternal truth. Yet all voluntary acts require the will’s consent at the rational level, connecting both higher and lower reason.

Structure:

• Higher reason directs according to eternal principles and divine law
• Lower reason applies these to particular, temporal matters
• Consent follows higher reason’s direction but is executed through lower reason’s application
• The will’s consent is the active, rational determination at the highest level of the soul

Connections to Surrounding Material #

Relation to Question 14 (Counsel) #

• Counsel precedes consent in the order of acts of the will
• Counsel investigates and judges the means; consent applies appetite to what counsel has determined
• Together, they form the deliberative process of the will toward action

Relation to Questions on Acts of the Will #

• Consent is one of several acts: counsel, choice, consent, use
• It follows upon counsel and precedes or accompanies choice
• It is a crucial middle term in the will’s journey from reasoning about means to executing action

Pedagogical Emphases #

1. The Importance of Etymology and Analogy: Berquist emphasizes how philosophical language operates through transfer of terms by analogy (e.g., “sense” from sensation to appetite). Understanding these transfers is crucial to understanding the concepts.

2. Careful Reading of Primary Texts: The lecture stresses the danger of misreading Augustine or Aristotle through hasty interpretation. “Reason” can mean the cognitive faculty or the rational part of the soul; precision is essential.

3. The Value of Intellectual Humility: Examples of Albert the Great recognizing Thomas’s genius, or Haydn praising Mozart, illustrate how pride impedes learning and how great minds recognize greatness in others.

4. Active vs. Passive: The distinction between passive determination (natural instinct) and active application (rational choice) runs through much of Thomistic philosophy and is crucial for understanding human freedom.