49. Counsel, Deliberation, and the Order of Practical Reasoning

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• The Nature of Counsel: Counsel as a bringing together (collatio) of many considerations about how to achieve a desired end
• Counsel vs. Other Knowing: Distinction between counsel about contingent particulars and demonstrative knowledge of universal necessities
• Counsel and Ends: Whether counsel concerns ends themselves or only the means ordered to ends
• Scope of Counsel: What kinds of things are proper subjects of counsel—human actions, laws, future events, actions of others
• Counsel and Doubt: Counsel as inquiry presupposes doubt; manifest things do not require counsel
• The Order of Counsel: Whether counsel proceeds resolutive (from end to means) or compositive (from means to end)
• The Infinity Problem: Whether the inquiry of counsel proceeds infinitely or has definite stopping points

Key Arguments #

On the Nature of Counsel #

• Objection: Collatio (bringing together) occurs even in immobile things not done by us, so counsel is not only about human actions
• Response: Counsel properly implies collatio about singular circumstances of things to be done; this is distinct from abstract reasoning about nature
• Thomas’s Position: Counsel properly implies bringing together considerations about contingent singulars that are within our power to do

On Counsel About Ends #

• Objection: Choice is about all things done by us; counsel precedes choice; therefore counsel is about all things done by us, including ends
• Response: Counsel is properly about means to an end. When counsel concerns what appears to be an end, it does so only insofar as that end is ordered to a further end. The ultimate end cannot be the subject of counsel proper—it must be supposed as the starting point
• Key Principle: An end, insofar as it is an end, is not subject to counsel; counsel is about how that end is to be achieved

On What Things Require Counsel #

• Objection: All human actions are done by us, so counsel should concern all human actions
• Response: Not all actions require counsel. Things are excluded from counsel in two ways:
  • Things already determined by art or discipline (the means are settled)
  • Small things that little aid or impede achieving the end (the matter is inconsequential)
• Example: The writer does not take counsel about how to hold the pen, as this is determined by the art

On Counsel About Others’ Actions #

• Objection: We sometimes seek counsel about the actions of others, which are not done by us
• Response: We seek counsel about others’ actions insofar as we are somehow united with them—either through affection (as in friendship) or as a principal agent with an instrument. Master and servant are, in a way, one cause

On the Order of Counsel: Resolutive vs. Compositive #

• Objection: Counsel cannot proceed resolutively because human doings proceed compositively, from simple to complex
• Response: Although operations proceed compositively (from simple to complex), the reasoning about operations is ordered resolutively (from end to means). The end of reasoning becomes the beginning of doing. Example: I have a headache; I want relief; therefore I want aspirin; therefore I need to go to the pharmacy; therefore this is what I can do now
• Key Distinction: Reason begins from what is before by reason (the end) but not necessarily from what is before in time

On the Infinity of Counsel #

• Objection: Singular contingents are infinite; counsel concerns singulars; therefore counsel’s inquiry is infinite
• Objection: Every human action can be impeded, and impediments must be considered; therefore counsel must continually expand
• Response: The inquiry of counsel is finite both in act and in principle:
  • From the beginning: There is a proper beginning found in the very nature of what is to be done—the end itself, about which there is no counsel but which is supposed
  • From another beginning: Just as demonstrative science supposes some things from other sciences, counsel supposes certain starting points taken through sense (“this is bread”) and through speculative or practical sciences (“adultery is prohibited by God”)
  • From the end: The inquiry terminates when one arrives at that which is immediately in one’s power to do
• Important Note: Singulars are infinite only in potency, not in act. What is infinite in potency does not prevent determinate action
• Certainty in Contingents: Although singular contingent things are variable, something certain can be grasped in them—namely, as they are now. “For Socrates to sit is not necessary, but for him to sit when he sits is necessary”

Important Definitions #

Consilium (Counsel) #

• Literal: From “con” (together) and “silium” (sitting together)—a bringing together
• Philosophical: An inquiry of reason about how to achieve a desired end through consideration of multiple conditions and circumstances
• Key Features:
  • Concerns contingent particulars
  • Presupposes doubt about how to proceed
  • Ordered to singular human actions
  • Proceeds from end to means (resolutive order)

Collatio #

• Bringing together; the act of considering multiple factors together
• Distinguished from mere abstract reasoning by its concern with singular circumstances

Resolutive Order (Ordo Resolutivus) #

• Proceeding from what is intended (the end) backward to what can be done now (immediate means)
• The proper order of practical reasoning, though opposite to the order of actual doing

Compositive Order (Ordo Compositivus) #

• Proceeding from simple to complex
• The order of actual operation, contrary to the order of reasoning about operation

Examples & Illustrations #

The Headache Example #

• “I have a headache; I want to get rid of it; therefore I want aspirin; I don’t have aspirin; therefore I want to go to the drugstore; I can do that now”
• Illustrates resolutive order: reasoning moves backward from the intended end to the present action

The Mice and the Bell #

• “The mice arrived at the idea that a bell was needed to avoid danger from the cat. Then they realized that was not possible because no one is willing to bell the cat”
• Illustrates how counsel can determine that something is necessary to an end but still find no means available

Soft Bread and Hard Rolls #

• Hard bread placed in microwave for 20-30 seconds softens and becomes edible
• Soft rolls placed in the oven (200 degrees) become even softer and lose their quality
• Illustrates how the same action (heating) has different effects on different subjects, requiring particular consideration

Writing and Penmanship #

• The writer does not take counsel about how to hold the pen
• This is determined by the art of writing itself
• Shows how craft knowledge eliminates the need for counsel in certain particulars

Breakfast Example #

• “Did I take counsel this morning? Did I make tea for my wife and me in four minutes? Was there counsel in that?”
• Not every habitual action requires counsel, even if it is ordered to an end
• Shows that practice and habit can eliminate deliberation

Notable Quotes #

“Counsel properly implies a bringing together, had among many things, which also the name itself designates… For counsel is said, as it were, concilium, alongside, I guess. In that many sit together.”

“The order of reasoning about things to be done is contrary to the order of doing. The end of the inquiry is the beginning of the doing.”

“Singulars are not infinite in act, but in potency. Nothing prevents a counsel from being in potency infinite, according as forever there can occur things to be inquired by what?”

“For Socrates to sit is not necessary, but for him to sit when he sits is necessary. And this can be taken with certitude.”

“History is always more complicated than we think.”

Questions Addressed #

Q1: Is counsel only about things done by us? #

• Answer: Properly speaking, yes. Counsel concerns those things which are in our power to do and which involve contingency and doubt about how to proceed. However, we may take counsel about things ordered to our operations (such as laws) insofar as they direct us to action. We also take counsel about others’ actions insofar as we are united with them through affection or causality

Q2: About which human actions do we take counsel? #

• Answer: We do not take counsel about all human actions. We exclude from counsel: (1) things already determined by art or discipline (whose manner of performance is settled), and (2) small things that little help or hinder achieving the end (where the particular choice matters little). We take counsel about matters that involve genuine uncertainty about how best to achieve a desired end

Q3: Does counsel proceed in a resolutive or compositive manner? #

• Answer: Counsel proceeds resolutively—from the intended end backward to the immediate action that can be performed now. Although the actual doing proceeds compositively (from simple means to complex results), the reasoning about what to do must work backward from the end to discover what steps are needed

Q4: Does the inquiry of counsel proceed to infinity? #

• Answer: No. Although singulars are infinite in potency, the inquiry of counsel is finite both in act and in principle. It has definite starting points (the end desired, and basic truths known through sense and science) and a definite ending point (the action immediately within one’s power). While new circumstances might always be imaginable, practical deliberation must arrive at a determinate conclusion sufficient for action

Connections to Key Thomistic Doctrines #

• Reason and Will: The discussion of ends shows how reason determines what should be done, while will must then apply itself to that determination through consent
• Practical vs. Theoretical Knowledge: Counsel concerns particular contingent things knowable only through careful consideration, unlike demonstrative science’s universal necessary truths
• The Problem of Infinite Regress: The resolution of how counsel can proceed determinately despite the apparent infinity of contingent particulars

Philosophical Implications #

• The Rationality of Action: Counsel shows how human action is properly rational—it involves reasoned consideration of means to ends
• The Limits of Reason: Not everything requires reasoned deliberation; habit, craft, and the smallness of a matter can eliminate the need for counsel
• Contingency and Knowledge: Even in contingent affairs, something determinate can be known and acted upon with certainty sufficient for action
• The Structure of Practical Thought: The resolutive order of counsel reveals how practical thinking works backward from desired ends to available means