48. The Nature of Counsel and Its Structure

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Counsel as Inquiry #

• Definition: Counsel is formally an inquiry of reason (quaestio) about singular, contingent matters ordered to human action
• Distinction from Desire: Though Damascene defines counsel as “an inquiring desire” (appetitus inquisitivus), it is materially about what the will desires but formally an act of reason
• Why Inquiry is Necessary: Because human action concerns particular contingent things subject to variation and uncertainty, reason cannot judge without prior investigation
• Comparison to Demonstrative Science: Just as dialectic precedes certainty in theoretical matters, inquiry must precede judgment in practical matters

The Formal/Material Distinction #

• Acts of two powers ordered to each other can be denominated from either power
• In choice: materially an act of will, formally ordered by reason
• In counsel: materially an act of will (the desire about which inquiry is made), but formally an act of reason (the inquiry itself)
• Implication: Both counsel and choice can be attributed to either power depending on perspective

Counsel and the End #

• The End as Principle: The end functions as a premise or principle in practical reasoning, not as a conclusion
• Premises Are Not Investigated: Just as axioms in geometry are supposed, not proven, the end is supposed, not counseled about
• Continuous Demonstrations: One demonstration’s conclusion can be another’s premise; what is an end in one inquiry can be means in another (e.g., health of body ordered to salvation of soul)
• Strictly Speaking: Counsel is about things ordered to the end, not about the end itself

Practical Certitude in Contingents #

• The Problem: Singular contingent things lack absolute necessity and admit of variation
• The Solution: Though they lack necessity in themselves, they can have practical certitude when determined relative to present circumstance
• Key Formula: “For Socrates to sit is not necessary, but for him to sit when he sits is necessary”
• Parallels Science: Just as one can have certitude about conclusions from premises in demonstration, so one can have certitude about singular actions when circumstances are specified

Key Arguments #

Article 1: Is Counsel an Inquiry? #

Objections:

• Damascene says counsel is desire, not inquiry
• Inquiry belongs to discursive understanding; but God takes counsel and is not discursive
• Inquiry is about doubtful things, but counsel concerns certain goods

Resolution:

• When two powers’ acts are ordered together, each can be denominated from the other power
• Reason and will cooperate: reason directs toward things ordered to the end; will tends according to reason’s rule
• Therefore, counsel is materially an act of will (desire) but formally an act of reason (inquiry)
• To God: Counsel in God means the certitude of His judgment without the discursive inquiry found in us

Article 2: Is Counsel About Ends or Only Means? #

Key Principle: The end has the notion of a beginning (ἀρχή/principium); beginnings are not investigated but supposed

Reasoning:

• Just as a premise is not questioned in demonstration but presupposed, so the end is not counseled about but presupposed
• One can take counsel about things ordered to an end only if the end is already fixed
• However, what is an end in one context can be a means in another (continuous demonstrations)

Important Definitions #

Consilium (Counsel) #

• From Latin “concilium”: sitting together (many considerations brought together)
• An inquiry of reason concerning singular, contingent things ordered to action
• Presupposes a desired end
• Produces a sententia (judgment) upon which choice acts

Sententia (Judgment) #

• The conclusion of practical reasoning that counsel produces
• What choice follows upon; the judgment about what should be done
• Distinct from mere opinion by its ordered relation to action

Resolutio (Resolution) #

• Movement from composed/complex to simple/principles
• In practical reasoning: proceeding backward from the intended end to present possible action
• Contrasts with compositio (moving from simple to complex)

Examples & Illustrations #

Statistics and Multiple Perspectives #

• Wisconsin students score higher than Texas students in national tests (overall average)
• But when disaggregated by race: white students in Texas > white students in Wisconsin; black students in Texas > black students in Wisconsin; Hispanic students in Texas > Hispanic students in Wisconsin
• Illustrates how one must investigate the particular circumstances; surface judgments can be misleading

Military Deliberation #

• MacArthur at the Incheon Landing: though he had witnessed a similar operation in 1905 (suggesting it could be done), he still consulted extensively with officers, reviewed the plan again, picked up his Bible and confirmed the decision
• Shows that counsel is not mere hesitation but serious investigation of contingent possibilities even when prior experience exists

Priestly Deliberation #

• Story of a bishop considering leaving the priesthood who spoke with John Paul II: they prayed together multiple times; the bishop initially thought he should leave; after extended prayer and return to church, concluded he should stay
• Illustrates how counsel requires extended consideration and can reverse initial judgments

Questions Addressed #

Is counsel an inquiry?

• Yes, formally it is an inquiry of reason about doubtful singular matters, though materially concerning what the will desires to do

Can counsel concern ends?

• Strictly no: ends function as premises, not conclusions. However, what is an end in one practical syllogism can be a means in another

What is the relationship between counsel and choice?

• Counsel produces a judgment (sententia); choice follows upon that judgment. Choice is more an act of will; counsel is more an act of reason

Notable Quotes #

“Counsel is an inquiring desire” (Damascene, as cited by Thomas)

“Choice is the desire of those things which have been counseled beforehand” (Aristotle, Ethics III, as cited by Thomas)

“For Socrates to sit is not necessary, but for him to sit when he sits is necessary” (Thomas, on practical certitude in contingent matters)

“In doubtful things and uncertain things, reason does not put forth a judgment without an inquiry preceding” (Thomas’s principle of why counsel is necessary)

Pedagogical Methods #

Thomas’s Argumentative Form #

• Each article follows: objections, counter-thesis, resolution with replies
• Berquist emphasizes that this form, though appearing artificial, forces careful thinking and prevents rashness
• Comparison to constitutional forms and artistic constraints: seeming impediments actually enable better expression
• Contrast with modern philosophers who often contradict predecessors (e.g., Aristotle) without engagement or refutation