44. Intention as an Act of the Will

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• The Essential Nature of Intention: Intentio literally means “to tend toward” or “to tend into” (tendere in aliquid). It is fundamentally an act of the will, not of understanding, though it necessarily presupposes knowledge.
• Intention vs. Other Acts of the Will: Three distinct acts characterize the will’s relation to the end:
  • Voluntas (volition): willing the end absolutely, as good in itself
  • Fruition (frui): resting in and enjoying the end, once achieved
  • Intention (intentio): tending toward the end as the term of motion
• The Role of Reason: Intention presupposes the ordering of reason, which proposes the end to the will. Reason orders; the will executes that order by moving toward the end.
• Intention and Intermediate Ends: Intention is not limited to the last end alone. One can intend intermediate ends and means ordered to the ultimate end.
• Multiple Simultaneous Intentions: One can intend multiple things at the same time if they are ordered to each other (as means to end) or unified under a common notion.

Key Arguments #

Article 1: Is Intention an Act of Understanding or Will? #

Against Intention Being an Act of the Will:

• The “eye” (oculus) in Matthew 6:22 signifies intention, and the eye is a knowing power
• Intention is called “light” by the Lord, suggesting it pertains to knowledge
• Intention involves ordering toward the end, and ordering is an act of reason

Thomas’s Resolution:

• Intention is properly an act of the will because the will moves all other powers toward their ends
• The object of the will is the good, which is essentially the same as the end
• The eye is used metaphorically for intention; intention presupposes knowledge but is not itself an act of knowledge
• While reason orders things, the will executes this ordering by tending toward the end
• Knowledge is to intention as the color outside the eye is to vision—presupposed but not identical

Article 2: Does Intention Regard Only the Last End? #

Arguments That It Does:

• Augustine says the crying out to God is the intention of the heart, and God is the last end
• The term terminus (end) has the notion of what is last
• Fruition belongs only to the last end, so intention should too

Thomas’s Resolution:

• In motion, an end can be taken in two ways:
  • The last end itself: that in which one rests completely
  • An intermediate end: the terminus of one part of motion but the beginning of another
• Both are true ends and can be objects of intention
• Example: In traveling from A to C through B, one can intend both B and C
• The last end is unique in providing complete rest to the appetite, but intermediate ends can also be intended as ends

Article 3: Can One Intend Two Things Simultaneously? #

Arguments Against Multiple Simultaneous Intentions:

• Augustine: one cannot at the same time intend God and bodily comfort (as distinct last ends)
• One motion cannot have many terms from one side
• One cannot understand many things at the same time

Thomas’s Resolution:

• If two things are ordered to each other, one can intend both simultaneously (e.g., making medicine and achieving health through it)
• If two things are not ordered to each other, they cannot both be intended in one motion
• Things that are many secundum rem (in reality) can be taken as one secundum rationem (in reason)
• Nature exemplifies this: the tongue is ordered to both taste and speech
• One can choose and practice something for multiple purposes if it serves multiple ends

Important Definitions #

• Intentio (Intention): The act of the will by which it tends toward an end, presupposing the ordering of reason. It implies motion toward the end rather than rest in it.
• Voluntas (Volition): The act of the will by which it wills the end absolutely, in itself, without yet considering motion toward it or means to it.
• Fruition (Frui): The act of the will by which it rests in and delights in the end, having achieved or possessing it.
• Terminus: The end or limit of motion; what one arrives at or aims at through motion.
• Secundum rem: According to reality; as things actually are in themselves.
• Secundum rationem: According to reason; in the order of understanding and rational consideration.
• Tendere: To tend, to stretch toward, to move toward.

Examples & Illustrations #

• The Tongue and Its Utilities: Nature orders the tongue to both taste and speech. Similarly, reason can order one act or means toward multiple ends.
• Killing Two Birds with One Stone: An example of intending two ends through one means when those ends are ordered to each other.
• Making Medicine for Health: When one wills to take medicine on account of health, this is one motion of the will toward both health and the medicine, because health is the reason for willing the medicine.
• The Journey from A to C through B: Point B is both an end (of the first leg) and a beginning (of the second leg). One can intend both B and C in a single journey.
• Wealth as Unifying Multiple Acquisitions: One can acquire wine and a vestment by intending them both as means to acquiring wealth, thus unifying two diverse acquisitions under one intention.
• Daylight Saving Time and False Imagination: When one moves the clock back, one might think one will wake up earlier (false imagination based on likeness to earlier clock time), but one actually wakes up later. This demonstrates how likeness can deceive without seeing difference.

Notable Quotes #

“Intention, just as the name itself sounds, signifies to tend in something, right? Towards something or into something, right?” — Thomas Aquinas (via Berquist)

“The will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end, as has been said above, right? Whence it is manifest that intention properly is an act of the will.” — Thomas Aquinas (via Berquist)

“The end is the reason for willing the means; the same act falls upon the object and upon the reason of the object.” — Thomas Aquinas (via Berquist)

“Our hearts are restless until they rest in you.” — Augustine (regarding the last end)

“Likeness is a slippery thing, and you’ve got to be on your guard, most of all, against likeness.” — Plato (via Berquist)

Questions Addressed #

1. Is intention an act of understanding or of will? Intention is an act of the will, not understanding. It presupposes knowledge (reason must propose the end to the will), but intention itself is the will’s act of tending toward the end.

2. Can intention regard only the last end? No. Intention can regard both the ultimate end and intermediate ends that are ordered to the ultimate end.

3. Can one intend two things at the same time? Yes, if they are ordered to each other (e.g., means to end) or if they can be unified under one rational consideration.

4. How does intention presuppose reason without being an act of reason? Reason provides the ordering of things toward ends; the will then executes this ordering by tending toward the ends that reason proposes. Just as the eye presupposes light but is not itself light, intention presupposes reason’s ordering but is not itself an act of understanding.