Lecture 42

42. Fruition and the Appetitive Power

Summary
This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of fruition (frui) or enjoyment, exploring whether fruition is an act of the appetitive power or the intellect, and how the will and understanding relate to the experience of the good. Berquist clarifies the distinction between the act of understanding (vision) and the act of willing (enjoyment), and demonstrates how sensible fruits provide the linguistic foundation for understanding spiritual fruition. The lecture also explores gratitude and thanksgiving as natural human responses to goods received, connecting the analysis to practical monastic concerns about recognizing dependence on God.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Question of Fruition’s Power #

  • Whether fruition (frui, enjoyment) is an act of the appetitive power (will) or the apprehensive power (intellect/understanding)
  • Initial objections claim fruition pertains to the intellect because the fruit of human life is beatitude, which is an act of the intellect in seeing God face to face
  • Counter-objections (from Augustine) argue fruition is fundamentally an act of love, which belongs to the appetitive power

The Sensible Foundation of Terminology #

  • The word “fruition” is derived from sensible fruits (apples, blueberries, etc.), which are the most manifest to us
  • Sensible fruits are what are last expected from a tree and perceived with sweetness
  • This sensible meaning provides the linguistic basis for understanding spiritual fruition
  • The principle: naming moves from the more manifest (sensible) to the less manifest (spiritual)

Vision vs. Enjoyment: Two Acts in One Thing #

  • Vision of God (seeing God face to face) is an act of the understanding insofar as it is vision
  • Enjoyment of that vision is an act of the will insofar as the vision is a good and an end
  • One reality (the beatific vision) is the object of two powers: the understanding achieves it as the acting power; the will moves toward it and enjoys it as the moving power
  • This resolves the apparent contradiction: fruition is not only of the appetitive power, yet involves the intellect

The Perfection of Other Powers Contained in the Good #

  • The perfection and end of any power, insofar as it is a certain good, pertains to the appetitive (desiring) power
  • The appetitive power moves the other powers to their ends and enjoys the end when each power attains it
  • Example: The will moves the ear to listen to Mozart; when the ear perceives beautiful music, the will obtains its end in that good

Two Elements in Pleasure #

  1. Perception of suitability: The apprehension that something is fitting or suitable (pertains to the knowing power)
  2. Complacency (being pleased): The satisfaction in what is perceived as fitting (pertains to the appetitive power)
  • Pleasure is completed in the appetitive power, though it accompanies the operation of other powers

The Gift of Gratitude #

  • Practical reflection on the natural human duty to thank parents and others for goods received
  • The principle: one can never thank enough those to whom one is in debt, yet should thank God even more for giving us such benefactors
  • Example: Thank Mozart for his music, but thank God more for giving us Mozart
  • The distinction between thanking human instruments and thanking God as primary cause

Key Arguments #

Against Fruition Being Only of the Intellect #

  • Fruition involves delight and pleasure, which pertain to the sensing and desiring powers, not merely understanding
  • Each sensory and intellectual power has its own end and perfection; all such perfections, insofar as they are goods, pertain to the appetitive power
  • If fruition belonged only to intellect, brute animals could not experience any fruition (yet they clearly enjoy their ends, however imperfectly)

For Fruition Being an Act of the Appetitive Power #

  • Augustine defines fruition: to adhere by love to something on account of itself (propter ipsum)
  • Love pertains to the appetitive power
  • Therefore fruition, as the act of resting in an end loved for itself, is an act of the appetitive power
  • The will is the power that moves toward the end and, when the end is attained, enjoys it

The Resolution: One Thing, Two Acts #

  • A single reality (e.g., the beatific vision) can pertain to diverse powers for diverse reasons
  • The vision itself, insofar as it is a vision, is an act of understanding
  • The same vision, insofar as it is a good and an end, is the object and perfection of the will
  • Thus the understanding achieves the end as the acting power; the will moves toward it and enjoys it as the desiring power

Important Definitions #

Fruition (frui) / Enjoyment #

  • The act of resting in or possessing an end with delight
  • Properly an act of the appetitive (desiring) power, not the intellect
  • Involves both knowledge (perceiving suitability) and love (complacency in what is suitable)
  • The word is derived from sensible fruits because fruits are the last expected product of a tree, perceived with sweetness

The Good (Bonum) #

  • The object of the appetitive power (as stated by Aristotle in Metaphysics II: “if you do away with the end, you do away with the good”)
  • Every power, insofar as its perfection is a good, falls under the appetitive power’s domain
  • Particular goods can be willed because they appear good; only the universal good necessarily moves the will

Suitability / Convenience (Convenentia) #

  • The perception that something is fitting or appropriate
  • Pertains to the knowing (apprehensive) power
  • Distinguished from complacency (the pleasure taken in what is suitable), which pertains to the appetitive power

Per Se vs. Per Accidens (by itself / by accident) #

  • Per se: Belongs to something by its own nature or substance
  • Per accidens: Belongs to something incidentally, not by its nature
  • All knowledge is per se good (knowledge as such is good), but acquiring knowledge may be per accidens bad (if untimely or harmful for other reasons)
  • This distinction prevents confusion: we do not say knowledge is bad per se, even if acquiring certain knowledge at certain times is bad per accidens

Manifest (Manifestum) #

  • That which is evident or apparent to the senses
  • Example: catching someone with their hand in the cookie jar is manifest theft
  • In naming, the more manifest (sensible) provides the term, which is then extended to the less manifest (spiritual)

The Last (Ultimum) / The End (Finis) #

  • The fruition pertains to something last expected or ultimate
  • A tree’s fruit is the last thing produced; we expect the tree itself first, then flowers, then fruit
  • The end is the last thing intended but the first thing willed (in order of intention, not of execution)

Examples & Illustrations #

Sensible Fruits as Foundation #

  • Green apples from trees in childhood: crisp and sour, manifest to the senses
  • Blueberries and blackberries picked fresh
  • Fruit trees planted by his daughter: takes time to develop before producing fruit
  • These sensible experiences provide the linguistic foundation for understanding spiritual fruition

Gratitude and Benefactors #

  • Cicero: “The son is always in debt to his father, and always owes him more thanks than he can give”
  • Plato thanked the gods for meeting Socrates
  • Though we cannot thank enough those who benefit us, we should thank God even more for giving us such benefactors
  • One’s gratitude to Mozart for his music should be exceeded by gratitude to God for giving us Mozart
  • The principle applies universally: thank Homer, Sophocles, Shakespeare for their works, but thank God more

The Pet Example #

  • Telling the cat that it will have steak tonight
  • The cat may perceive the sensible good (the food) but does not understand “end” in the rational sense
  • This illustrates that brute animals have a kind of imperfect fruition (they enjoy their ends without understanding what “end” means)

Seeing and Understanding #

  • The Greek word for knowledge (adenai) derives from seeing
  • The blind man says “I see” to mean “I understand”
  • Vision of God face to face (beatific vision) involves both understanding and loving that vision
  • Seeing God is the act of understanding; enjoying God is the act of will

Listening to Mozart #

  • One can ask: Do my ears enjoy Mozart’s music?
  • Do my eyes enjoy Titian’s or da Vinci’s paintings?
  • This shows that fruition/enjoyment is not restricted to one power but pertains to the appetitive power as it accompanies the operation of sensory powers

The Feast of Reason #

  • Socrates calls intellectual understanding a “feast of reason”
  • Just as the senses enjoy sensible goods, the intellect (in its operation) provides material for the will to enjoy intellectual goods

Notable Quotes #

“The son is always in debt to his father.” — Cicero (on the perpetual gratitude owed to benefactors, extended to God)

“Nature loves to hide.” — Heraclitus (quoted regarding why interior acts are not as sensible as external fruits)

“He that has ears to hear, let him hear.” — Scriptural reference (on the necessity of perceiving with understanding, not merely sensation)

“The only way to avoid vainglory and jactantia is to realize anything good in you comes from God.” — Church Father (quoted through Thomas, on proper ordering of gratitude toward God)

Questions Addressed #

Question 11, Article 1: Is Fruition an Act of the Appetitive Power or the Understanding? #

Objections:

  1. The fruit of human life is beatitude, which is the act of the intellect seeing God face to face; therefore fruition pertains to intellect, not appetitive power
  2. Each power has its own end and perfection; sight’s end is to see the visible; hearing’s end is to perceive sounds; therefore fruition (the achieving of an end) pertains to each power, not only appetitive
  3. Fruition implies delight and pleasure; sensible pleasure pertains to sense perception; intellectual delight to understanding; therefore fruition pertains to apprehensive powers

Thomas’s Answer (Berquist’s exposition):

  • One reality can pertain to diverse powers for diverse reasons
  • The vision itself of God, insofar as it is a vision, is an act of the understanding (the acting power that achieves the end)
  • The same vision, insofar as it is a good and an end, is the object of the will (the moving power that directs toward the end)
  • Thus: Enjoyment of the beatific vision is an act of the will, even though the vision itself is an act of intellect
  • This resolves all three objections by distinguishing the two aspects of a single reality

On the Linguistic Derivation of “Fruition” #

  • Why do we call spiritual enjoyment “fruition”? Because sensible fruits are the most manifest to us (most evident through sense)
  • Sensible fruits are the last thing a tree produces, perceived with sweetness
  • The word “fruit” is extended from the sensible realm (what trees produce) to the spiritual realm (what the will produces/enjoys)
  • This illustrates the principle: naming proceeds from the more manifest to the less manifest

On the Two Elements of Pleasure #

  • Perception of suitability: Knowing that something is fitting (act of apprehensive power)
  • Complacency: Being pleased by what is suitable (act of appetitive power)
  • Pleasure is completed in the appetitive power, though it requires both elements
  • This shows why fruition cannot be reduced to intellect alone: the element of satisfaction, delight, and rest pertains to the appetitive power

On Per Se vs. Per Accidens Good #

  • If all knowledge is per se good, why worry about teaching certain knowledge at certain times?
  • Answer: Knowledge is per se good (knowledge as such is good), but acquiring it may be per accidens bad (unsuitable timing, harmful consequences, etc.)
  • This distinction prevents the false conclusion that because knowledge is good, all knowledge should be given to all persons at all times
  • Example: Teaching sex education facts to a five-year-old may be per accidens bad, not because knowledge is bad per se, but because the context is unsuitable
  • Even Aristotle notes in Categories that this distinction (per se vs. per accidens) is so fundamental that it “deceives even the wise”

Connections to Prior Topics #

From Question 10 (Will’s Motion by Objects and God) #

  • The distinction between exercise (whether to act) and specification (what to will) of the will’s act
  • Only the perfect good (beatitude) necessarily determines the will’s exercise
  • Particular goods may be willed but not necessarily

From the Metaphysics of God’s Causality #

  • How God’s unchanging will relates to contingent effects in creatures
  • The distinction between absolute impossibility and impossibility by supposition
  • Example: If God has willed me to exist, it is (by supposition) impossible that I not exist; but it was not (absolutely) impossible before the supposition
  • Similar logic applies to fruition: if beatitude is possessed, it is impossible not to enjoy it; but not all fruition requires actual possession

The Role of the Example in Teaching #

  • Berquist emphasizes how understanding fruition in creatures (sensible fruits, gratitude to human benefactors) prepares the mind for understanding fruition in God
  • This reflects the principle from metaphysics: natural philosophy and creature-focused analysis prepare for theology
  • The contemplation of God as the ultimate good and the source of all goods flows naturally from understanding goodness in creatures