41. The Will's Motion by God and Necessity

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Problem of Divine Motion and Freedom #

• Whether God’s infinite power necessarily determines the will to particular acts
• The apparent tension between God’s omnipotence and human free will
• How divine motion relates to the nature of the will as a contingent power

The Distinction Between Two Modes of Motion #

Thomas distinguishes two ways the will can be moved:

1. Exercise of the act (exercitium actus) - Whether to will or not to will at all
2. Specification of the act - What particular object is willed, determined by the object

God’s motion in the first mode does not necessitate the will, but in the second mode, necessity depends on the object’s perfection.

Natural Willing and Perfect Good #

• The will naturally tends toward the good in general, just as every power inclines toward its proper object
• Only beatitudo (perfect happiness/beatitude) - the universal good lacking nothing - necessarily moves the will
• Particular goods, insofar as they lack some aspect of goodness, can be repudiated or refused by the will
• Example: Going to Mass might interfere with sleep; one can refuse it under that consideration even though it is a genuine good

Divine Motion Preserves Nature Rather Than Corrupts It #

Berquist emphasizes a crucial principle from Dionysius:

• God moves all things according to their nature
• It would be MORE repugnant to divine motion if the will were moved by necessity, since contingency belongs to the will’s nature
• For necessary causes, effects follow with necessity through divine motion; for contingent causes, effects follow contingently
• Example: God does not make it natural for the dead to rise, but it is natural to each thing to be subject to divine power

The Incompossibility Principle #

A critical distinction between two types of impossibility:

• It is not simply impossible for the will not to be moved when God moves it (this would imply contradiction in God’s omnipotence)
• However, it is impossible through that condition - i.e., impossible given the supposition that God wills it
• This preserves God’s causality while maintaining contingency in the will’s nature

Key Arguments #

Against Necessity in Divine Motion #

Objection from Scripture (Sirach/Ecclesiasticus 15:14)

• “God constituted man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel” (in manu consilii sui)
• This implies the will retains its freedom and is not moved by necessity

Response via Dionysius’ Principle

• Divine providence does not corrupt the nature of things but preserves it (servire)
• Since the will’s nature is to be indeterminate and capable of opposites, God’s motion must respect this nature
• God moves the will freely, not by necessity, because freedom befits the will’s own nature

The Condition of Custom (consuetudo) as Second Nature #

Berquist illustrates how acquired dispositions shape what seems natural:

• Custom becomes like a second nature, making the unnatural seem natural
• Example: Aristotle notes that those trained in geometry want to proceed mathematically everywhere
• Example: Lord Kelvin insisted “if it’s not mathematical, it’s not science”
• Example: Meteorologists still use “sunrise” and “sunset” despite knowing the earth rotates
• Application: When a person acquires virtue through habit, virtuous acts become natural to them, yet they remain free

Important Definitions #

Exercitium actus (Exercise of the Act) #

• The initiation and performance of willing or not willing
• Not determined by the object, but by God as first mover
• Remains contingent and free

Specificatio actus (Specification of the Act) #

• The determination of what is willed, arising from the object of the will
• Depends on how the good is apprehended
• Can be necessary if the object is a perfect good; contingent for imperfect goods

Beatitudo (Beatitude/Perfect Happiness) #

• The universal and perfect good lacking nothing
• The only object that necessarily moves the will
• Constitutes the will’s ultimate end

Impossibile (Impossible) #

• Simpliciter (simply): In itself, without qualification
• Per accidens (accidentally) or ex suppositione (from/through condition): Made impossible by a given supposition

Consuetudo (Custom/Habit) #

• Acts repeatedly performed until they become second nature
• Makes the unnatural seem natural and obvious
• Can dispose the will toward what is naturally difficult

Examples & Illustrations #

On Particular Goods and Refusability #

• Going to Mass: While attending Mass is objectively good, one might consider only the aspect “it will interfere with my sleep.” Under that partial consideration, one can refuse it, since no particular good contains all goodness
• Rest vs. Virtue: One considers relaxation; another considers study of Euclid’s geometry. The will can choose according to diverse considerations of what seems good

On Divine Omnipotence #

• The Horse and Water: An attempted analogy to show God’s motion cannot fail - as leading a horse to water, one expects it to drink. But this analogy is imperfect because God’s motion respects the nature of the will to remain contingent

On Natural Inclination with Freedom #

• The Child and the Bramble Bush (St. Francis/St. Bernard reference): When one has the virtue of penance through habit, throwing oneself on a bramble bush becomes natural, yet still freely chosen
• Confession example: A penitent who has acquired the virtue of penance naturally desires penances; the confessor sees this as freely chosen virtue, not necessity

Notable Quotes #

“It does not pertain to Divine Providence to corrupt the nature of things, but to save it” (Dionysius) — Cited by Thomas to show God’s motion preserves rather than violates the will’s nature

“God from the beginning constituted man and left him in the hand of his own counsel” — Sirach/Ecclesiasticus 15:14, used to defend human freedom against determinism

“Such as a man is, so does the end seem to him” — Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics III), explaining how passion and disposition shape perception of the good

“Custom is like a second nature” — Thomas Aquinas, on how habit makes acquired dispositions seem natural

Questions Addressed #

Q1: Does God necessarily move the will? #

Objection: God has infinite power; one cannot resist God; therefore God necessarily moves the will.

Resolution: God moves the will according to its nature. The will’s nature is to be indeterminate and capable of contraries. Therefore, God’s motion respects this nature by moving it contingently rather than necessarily. The will’s freedom befits its own nature more than does necessity.

Q2: Do things naturally willed by the will become necessary when God moves toward them? #

Objection: Whatever is natural to a thing is done by God in it; the will naturally wills happiness; therefore God necessarily determines the will to happiness.

Resolution: It is natural to everything to be subject to divine power, but this does not mean whatever is done in things is natural to them. God does not make it natural for the dead to rise; He simply maintains their subjection to His power. Similarly, God moves the will freely, which is consonant with its nature.

Q3: Is it possible for the will not to be moved when God moves it? #

Objection: If God moves the will and the will does not move, God’s operation becomes inefficacious—impossible.

Resolution: It is not simply impossible for the will not to move (which would contradict God’s perfection), but it is impossible through the condition that God wills it. The distinction between absolute and conditional impossibility preserves both divine omnipotence and the will’s contingent nature.

Q4: How does natural motion differ from the will’s motion by God? #

Berquist clarifies through Aristotelian doctrine of necessary vs. contingent causes:

• Necessary natural causes (fire burning) produce necessary effects through divine motion
• Contingent causes (the will, a rational power) produce contingent effects through divine motion
• This shows God’s motion respects the mode of causality inherent in each creature

Theological Implications #

Human Responsibility Preserved #

If the will were moved necessarily by God, human sin and merit would be unintelligible. The lecture implicitly supports the doctrine that human freedom is preserved for moral accountability.

Nature of Grace and Merit #

The lecture suggests that God’s grace works per modum naturae (according to the mode of nature), elevating the will’s natural operations without destroying them. This grounds the possibility of meritorious acts under grace.

The Saints and Divine Instinct #

Berquist notes that saints are said to act “according to divine instinct” (secundum divinam instinctam), yet their actions are freely chosen. This exemplifies how acquired virtue through grace makes virtuous action seem and become natural while remaining free.