40. Nature and the Natural Motion of the Will

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Nature and Its Meanings #

• Nature (natura) has multiple related meanings: birth/generation, the source within a thing, an intrinsic principle of motion and rest, and what a thing is (its substance/essence)
• Nature always preserves a sense of something “within” or “from within”—this is why Heraclitus says “nature loves to hide”
• What belongs to a thing per se (through itself) is natural to it; what belongs per accidens (through another) is reduced to what is per se as to a principle
• The principle of per se and per accidens is foundational: “the through itself is before the through another”

The Will’s Natural Foundation #

• The will is founded on nature, though it transcends mere natural determination
• The will must naturally tend toward the good in general (bonum in communi), just as every power naturally turns toward its proper object
• The will naturally wills things pertaining to human nature: being, living, knowledge of truth, and the avoidance of misery
• These natural inclinations are comprehended under the object of the will as under a universal good

Natural vs. Voluntary as Opposed Causes #

• Natural and voluntary agents are divided against each other as distinct causes (from Aristotle’s Physics II)
• Yet the will, being founded in nature, must partake of what is proper to nature
• The will has its own mode of causality: to be lord of its own acts (dominum suorum actuum), which differs from the determinacy proper to nature
• A thing must be what it is before it can do anything else—nature is always prior in the order of being

The Distinction Between Nature Considered as Nature vs. the Will #

• The will has a nature (it is what it is), but it is not merely natural—it is open to opposites (indifferens ad opposita)
• When we distinguish will from nature, we are not denying the will has a nature; we are distinguishing what is only nature from something that transcends mere natural determination
• This is like the distinction between reason considered as a nature (determined to one) and reason as reason (open to opposites)

The Priority of Nature in Being #

• In all things, those not belonging per se are reduced to something per se as a principle
• Nature is what is first in a thing—it must precede all other determinations
• This holds even in God secundum rationem (according to our way of conceiving): nature (being) is first, though in God nature and being are identical
• Thomas begins with the substance of God before treating his operations, following the order of nature’s priority

Key Arguments #

Objection 1: The Will Cannot Be Moved Naturally #

• Argument: Natural agents are divided against voluntary agents; the will always has itself to opposites; therefore nothing is natural to the will
• Response: The will is founded on nature and must naturally tend toward the good in general, but this does not determine it to any particular good. The will’s openness to opposites does not exclude a natural inclination to its proper object (the good).

Objection 2: The Will Is Not Always in Act #

• Argument: What is natural is always in act (e.g., fire is always hot); the will is not always willing; therefore nothing natural belongs to the will
• Response: Things natural following from form are always in act, but things following from matter are sometimes only in potency. Motion (motio) is the act of what exists in potency insofar as it is in potency. The will’s willing, being a kind of motion, need not always be in act. By contrast, God’s will, being pure act, always wills.

Important Definitions #

Nature (Natura) #

• An intrinsic principle of motion and rest in things
• What a thing is; its substance or essence
• Always implies something “within” or “from within,” distinguishing it from external or accidental properties

Per Se (Through Itself) vs. Per Accidens (Through Another) #

• Per se: what belongs to a thing by its own substance or nature
• Per accidens: what belongs to a thing through something else as a principle
• The per se is prior to and causes the per accidens

Motion (Motio) #

• The act of what exists in potency insofar as it is in potency
• Applied to the will’s transition from not-willing to willing
• Distinguished from the eternal, unchanging act of God’s will

The Good in General (Bonum in Communi) #

• The universal object of the will, toward which the will naturally tends
• Corresponds to “being” or “the true” in relation to the understanding
• Analogous to how every power naturally turns toward its proper object

Examples & Illustrations #

Anger and Temperament (from family discussion) #

• The lecturer notes that an irascible father may have an irascible son—temperament runs in families through parents
• This shows how certain natural inclinations are passed down through bodily nature
• Distinguishes this from the will’s freedom, which is not similarly inherited or necessitated

Fire and Natural Properties #

• Fire is always hot because heat follows naturally from fire’s form
• A stone naturally falls downward because of its heavy nature
• These are contrasted with the will, which need not always be in act of willing, even though it naturally tends toward the good

Being and Living #

• Every creature naturally wills to be and to live (being and life are naturally desired)
• Knowledge of truth is naturally willed because it pertains to the understanding, which is part of the whole human person
• These show the will comprehends under its object things that pertain to human nature as a whole, not just the will’s specific operation

Life Example (from contemporary discussion) #

• Berquist recalls a cartoon from the 1940s where a man on the street says, “What do you think of life?” and responds, “I’m in favor of it”
• This illustrates the natural tendency to will being and to escape misery
• Shows how the good in general (life itself) naturally appeals to the will

Notable Quotes #

“Nature loves to hide” — Heraclitus (referenced as explanation of why nature means what is within)

“For me, the better thing is to die and be with Christ. But it is more necessary for you that I remain” — St. Paul (illustrating how the will can will something as better while willing something else as more necessary)

“A thing has to be what it is before it can be anything else” — Berquist’s articulation of nature’s priority in being

Questions Addressed #

Q1: Is the will moved naturally to something? #

• Answer: Yes. The will naturally tends toward the good in general and toward those things pertaining to human nature (being, living, knowledge of truth). However, the will is not naturally determined to any particular good.
• Key distinction: The will’s natural inclination to the good in general does not entail necessity regarding particular goods, because the will is founded on nature but open to opposites.

The Central Philosophical Principle #

• Question: Does the way we know have to be the way things are? (Referenced regarding Boethius’s reconciliation of God’s eternal knowledge with temporal contingency)
• Answer: No. The way we know need not match the way things are. This insight is necessary to understand how God knows time eternally without falsity, and how the will can be free while moved by God.