37. What Moves the Will: Understanding and Sense Appetite

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Overview of Question 9 #

Question 9 investigates what moves the will through six articles:

1. Whether the understanding moves the will
2. Whether sense appetite moves the will
3. Whether the will moves itself 4-6. Whether the will is moved by exterior agents and celestial bodies

The first three articles concern interior movers (understanding, sense appetite, will), while articles 4-6 address exterior causes.

Preliminary Framework: The End as Cause #

Berquist emphasizes Aristotle’s teaching on the telos (end) as the fourth kind of cause:

• Last in time: The meal comes after cooking activity
• First in intention: The desired meal motivates all cooking work
• Something good: The end appears good or is truly good

The word “end” emphasizes temporal lastness, but “purpose” better captures the causal priority of the end in intention. The end is a causa causarum (cause of causes); all other causes are ordered to it.

Article 1: Does the Understanding Move the Will? #

The Problem (Objections) #

• Augustine’s Authority: We can know the good but lack affection to do it (Psalm 118). If the understanding moved the will necessarily, our action would follow our knowledge.
• Analogy to Imagination: The imagination shows what is desirable to sense appetite but does not necessarily move it. Similarly, understanding showing truth to the will does not necessarily move it.
• Reverse Causality: The will moves the understanding (we understand when we will), so understanding cannot move the will.

Thomas’s Solution: Two Modes of Motion #

Thomas distinguishes two ways something needs to be moved:

1. Exercise of the act (ἐνέργεια): Whether to act or not act

   • The will is in potency regarding whether to understand at all
   • The will moves the understanding in this respect

2. Determination of the act (σχῆμα): What specific thing to do, how to specify the act

   • The understanding presents the object to the will as a form
   • The understanding moves the will in this respect

Critical Distinction: Speculative vs. Practical Intellect #

• Speculative intellect (knowledge of abstract truths) does not move the will
  • Knowing that “even number times itself yields an even number” does not motivate action
• Practical intellect (knowledge of what is good here and now) does move the will
  • It apprehends the good as both true and desirable
  • It grasps particular goods under the universal notion of the good

The understanding moves the will not from necessity but from the presentation of its object. The will remains free to accept or reject what reason presents.

Resolution of Reciprocal Causality #

The will and understanding move each other, but not in the same respect:

• Understanding moves the will regarding determination (what to will)
• Will moves the understanding regarding exercise (whether to understand)
• This is like a marriage where each spouse influences the other differently

The Relationship of True and Good #

Berquist notes a peculiar relationship between truth and goodness:

• Truth is more universal as a form (it informs the mind)
• Goodness is more universal as an end (all things desire it)
• Truth is a particular good; goodness is perfective through form
• A particular truth (e.g., “this wine is sweet”) is comprehended under the universal good
• The good itself is grasped according to a special notion comprehended under the universal notion of truth

This is not a genus-species relationship (like animal-dog) but a mutual universality depending on the mode of consideration.

Article 2: Can Sense Appetite Move the Will? [Abbreviated in transcript] #

The transcript references this article but provides limited direct content. From context, sense appetite can influence the will through passion (emotion), affecting what appears suitable to a person in that state.

Article 3: Does the Will Move Itself? [Implicit] #

The lecture touches on the principle “omne movens in quantum movens est in actu” (every mover as such is in act), but does not fully develop Article 3. The principle would seem to prohibit self-motion of the will.

Key Arguments #

The Primacy and Causality of the End #

• The end commands all other causes: “the art to which pertains the end moves by its command the art to which pertains that which is toward the end”
• Example: The farmer’s use of the wagon commands the wagon-maker’s art, which commands the steel supplier’s art
• Each lower art is ordered to the end of the next higher art
• The end is first in intention though last in time

The Role of the Will as Universal Mover #

• The good in general, which has the notion of end, is the object of the will
• Therefore, the will moves other powers of the soul to their acts
• “The ends and perfections of all other powers are comprehended under the object of the will as certain particular goods”
• Example: We use other powers (sense, imagination, understanding) when we wish, i.e., in service of what the will intends

The Hierarchy of Arts and Powers #

• “The leader of the army, who intends the common good, the victory of the army and also the order of the whole army, moves by his command someone from the tributes, who intends the order of one squad”
• Powers with universal ends command powers with particular ends
• The universal good (the will’s object) subordinates all particular goods

Why Understanding Presents Rather Than Compels #

• The understanding moves the will by determining its object (like a form)
• The will is not moved from necessity; it remains free
• The practical intellect (not mere speculative knowledge) moves the will because it grasps the good as desirable
• Knowledge of abstract truth (“even times even equals even”) presents no object of desire to the will

Important Definitions #

τέλος (telos) / finis (end) #

• That for the sake of which something is done
• Last in time, first in intention
• Something good (or appears good)
• A kind of cause (aitia)

Exercitium actus (exercise of the act) #

• The movement regarding whether to act or not act
• Whether to use a power or not
• The will moves other powers in this respect

Determinatio actus (determination of the act) #

• The specification of what act to perform, how to perform it
• Which object to pursue
• The understanding moves the will in this respect by presenting the object

Intellectus speculativus (speculative intellect) #

• Reason directed toward abstract truth
• Does not necessarily move the will
• Example: mathematical knowledge

Intellectus practicus (practical intellect) #

• Reason directed toward action and the good here and now
• Can move the will by presenting what is good and desirable
• Examples: knowing “this food is harmful” or “theft violates justice”

Examples & Illustrations #

The Cook and the Meal #

The cook (mover) is at the beginning of cooking; the finished meal (end) is at the end in time. Yet the meal is first in intention because the desire for it motivates all cooking activity. The cook does not move himself like “this glass” (Berquist gestures), but through the prior intention of the end.

Farm Wagons and Engineering #

Berquist’s father made farm wagons. The farmer’s use of the wagon commands the wagon-maker’s engineering, which in turn commands the supplier’s provision of steel. Each art is ordered to the end of the next higher art. The farmer knows what properties the wagon must have (strength, durability); the engineer designs accordingly; the supplier provides the right materials.

Even Times Even #

Knowing that “an even number times itself yields an even number” (mathematical truth) does not move the will to action. This illustrates that speculative truth does not necessarily move; something must be presented as good and desirable for the practical intellect to move the will.

The Anecdote About Chesterton on Marriage #

Berquist recounts a Chesterton impersonator at a pro-life dinner discussing marriage and incompatibility. Chesterton supposedly said it is foolish to cite incompatibility as reason for divorce, since “men and women are essentially incompatible.” This illustrates mutual influence: a man sees a woman as irrationally sensitive; a woman sees a man as selfish. Yet each moves the other.

The Little Dog #

Berquist observes a small dog that barks aggressively at passersby despite being unable to protect its owner. The dog’s natural irascibility (disposition) makes aggression appear suitable to it. This illustrates how disposition shapes what appears good, even when reason might suggest otherwise.

Powerful Men and Irascibility #

Kennedy, LBJ, Patton, and Pius XI are noted as naturally irascible. Yet this irascibility, when properly directed, can drive great accomplishments (Patton’s leadership, Kennedy’s vigor). St. Francis de Sales overcame his natural irascibility to become known for mildness. The disposition can be changed, but it requires grace and habit.

Notable Quotes #

“The understanding, what flies before, and there follows a slow or no affection. We know the good, nor does it delight to do it… Give me grace.” — Augustine, on Psalm 118 (cited by Thomas)

“The desirable, understood, is the unmoved mover; the will is the moved mover.” — Aristotle, On the Soul III (cited by Thomas)

“For we use the other powers when we wish, yeah? For the ends and the perfections of all the other powers, huh? Are comprehended under the object of the will, as certain, what? Particular goods, right?” — Berquist, interpreting Thomas

“The art to which pertains the end moves by its command the art to which pertains that which is to the end. As the ship governing, commands the making of the ship.” — Thomas Aquinas, citing Aristotle (Physics II)

“Things in motion soon catch the eye.” — Shakespeare (cited by Berquist on why we know the end as temporal last before knowing it as intentional first)

Questions Addressed #

Q: How can we know the good but lack the will to do it (Augustine’s problem)? #

A: The understanding presents the good to the will, but the will is not moved by necessity. The understanding moves regarding determination (what is good), but the will remains free in exercise (whether to act). Practical knowledge can fail to move the will if the person is not disposed to receive it or if understanding remains merely speculative rather than practical.

Q: If the imagination shows what is desirable to sense appetite but does not necessarily move it, why does the understanding move the will? #

A: The understanding presents the object as both true and good (not merely as present, as imagination does). When something is apprehended not only as present but as good, the will is moved in determination of its act, though not in exercise. The will remains free.

Q: How can the will move the understanding if the understanding moves the will (apparent circularity)? #

A: They move each other in different respects:

• The will moves the understanding regarding exercise: we understand when we will to understand
• The understanding moves the will regarding determination: it presents what is good to pursue
• This parallels a marriage where each spouse influences the other differently

Q: How can the understanding present an object without compelling the will? #

A: The understanding moves as a form (determining the act), not as a mover (compelling the act). Presentation of truth is not the same as causation of desire. The practical intellect presents what is good here and now, but the will retains freedom to assent or reject.

Connections to Prior Content #

Berquist opened the lecture with a rule of divisions (dividing theology into two, three, or both) to provide context for how Question 9 fits within the Summa’s structure. The discussion of the end as cause draws on Aristotelian Physics II and connects to earlier discussion of circumstances of human acts (where the end is the chief circumstance). The distinction between speculative and practical intellect is Aristotelian and foundational to understanding how the will operates.

Pedagogical Approach #

Berquist emphasizes:

• Clarifying language: Distinguishing “end” (temporal) from “purpose” (intentional) to avoid confusion
• Concrete examples: Farm wagons, cooking, small dogs, and powerful men illustrate abstract principles
• Mutual influence without confusion: The relationship between understanding and will is reciprocal but operates in different modes
• Freedom and causality: Understanding moves the will without denying human freedom; the will is not moved from necessity
• The importance of disposition: What appears good depends on both object and subject; habit and passion shape perception