36. The Will and Its Acts: End Versus Means

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• Voluntas as Power vs. Act: The term voluntas can mean either the power of the will itself or the act of willing. This distinction is crucial for understanding whether the will extends to both ends and means.
• The Problem of Diverse Objects: Can one power be ordered to objects that differ in genus (the end versus the means)?
• The Analogy with Intellect: Just as the intellect knows both principles (by themselves) and conclusions (through principles), the will wills both the end (by itself) and the means (through the end).
• Habits vs. Powers: Not every diversity of habit indicates a diversity of powers; different habits can perfect the same power.
• The Unity and Diversity of Willing Acts: Whether the will moves toward the end and means by one act or by distinct acts.

Key Arguments #

Second Objection: The Will is of the End Alone #

Premises:

1. Aristotle teaches (Nicomachean Ethics III) that voluntas is of the end, while choice (prohairesis) is of means.
2. Diverse powers are ordered to objects of diverse genera.
3. The end (as an honest or pleasant good) and the useful (the means) are in diverse genera of good.
4. Therefore, if the will is of the end, it is not of the means.

Supporting Arguments:

• Habits are perfections of powers, and operative arts show that one habit orders to the end while another orders to the means (e.g., the gubernatorial art uses the ship, while the ship-making art produces it).

Counter-Argument from Natural Philosophy #

• In natural motion, the same power moves through the middle to reach the end (as a stone falls and arrives at its end).
• Therefore, the will should also move toward both the means and the end through a single power.

Thomas’s Resolution #

Distinction of Meaning:

• When voluntas names the power itself, it extends to both the end and the means, as all objects sharing the notion of “good” fall under the will’s object.
• When voluntas names the act properly, it refers to the end alone. A simple act of a power is named from the power itself and concerns the power’s proper object, which for the will is what is good in itself (the end).

Key Principle: That which is good for itself and willed is always the end. What is willed toward the end is not good or willed on account of itself but on account of the end.

Third Objection: Single Act vs. Diverse Acts #

Arguments for One Act:

1. “Where there is one for the sake of another, there is one only” (Topics).
2. Light is the reason for seeing color; by the same act both are seen.
3. Natural motion through middles to the end is one motion.

Counter-Argument: Acts are diversified by their objects. The end and the useful are diverse species of good, so different acts should follow.

Thomas’s Resolution: Two Aspects of One Act #

The will moves toward the end in two ways:

1. Absolutely by itself: The end is willed for its own sake.
2. As the reason for willing the means: The end functions as the formal reason why means are willed.

Same Act, Different Aspects: The will’s movement toward the means and toward the end (as reason for the means) is one and the same act. The will wills the means insofar as it wills the end.

Distinct Acts: However, the act by which the will is borne toward the end absolutely is distinct from the act by which it is moved toward the end as reason for the means.

Temporal Precedence: Sometimes the first act (willing the end absolutely) precedes in time. For example, one first wills to be healthy, and then, upon deliberating about how to be healed, wills to take medicine.

Important Definitions #

• Voluntas (willing): Can signify either the power by which we will, or the act of willing itself. Properly speaking (as act), voluntas is of the end alone.
• The End (finis): That which is willed for itself; that which is good or desirable in itself; always the first reason for willing anything ordered to it.
• The Means (quae sunt ad finem): Those things ordered to the end; willed not for themselves but on account of the end.
• Honest Good (bonum honestum): The end that is good in itself (in the genus of quality, action, or passion).
• Useful Good (bonum utile): The means, useful as ordered to another good.
• Simple Act: An act named from the power itself, concerning the proper object of that power (e.g., understanding concerns what is known in itself; willing concerns what is good in itself—the end).

Examples & Illustrations #

The Health and Medicine Example #

• One can will health without willing to take medicine.
• But one cannot will medicine as medicine without willing health.
• Taking medicine is willed insofar as health (the end) is willed.

The Ship and the Arts #

• The gubernatorial art (the art of using the ship) is ordered to the end: the use and navigation of the ship.
• The ship-making art considers the means: the making of the ship.
• The ruling art commands the making art because the end (use) commands the means (production).
• Within each art, there is consideration of both the end proper to that art and what is ordered to it.

The Pill Anecdote #

• Berquist’s personal example of taking pills for health or life preservation, not for the pills themselves.
• The will is moved toward taking the pill because the will is moved toward the end (health or life).

Light and Color #

• When color is seen, light is necessarily seen by the same act.
• But light can be seen without color being seen.
• Similarly, whenever the means are willed, the end must be willed in the same act; but one can will the end without willing the means.

Notable Quotes #

“For the philosopher in the third book of the Ethics says that the will is, Voluntas is of the end, choice, Lectio, of those things which are, what, to the end.” — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III, cited by Berquist

“If, therefore, we speak of the will according as it names a power, thus it extends both to the end and to that which is to the end… But if, however, we speak of voluntate according as it names properly an act, thus properly speaking it is of the end only.” — Thomas Aquinas, cited by Berquist

“But that which is good for itself, right, and willed is always the end, right? Whence will is property of the end, right?” — Thomas Aquinas, cited by Berquist

“The will is not born towards them [the means], except insofar as it is born towards the end. Whence what it wills in them is the end.” — Thomas Aquinas, cited by Berquist

“Just as to understand properly is of those things which are what known, say, kundum se, by themselves… But of those things which are known through principia, there is not said to be what? Understanding, except insofar as they are considered… the principles themselves are considered in them.” — Thomas Aquinas, cited by Berquist

Questions Addressed #

Is the Will Directed to the End Alone, or Also to the Means? #

Resolution:

• Speaking of voluntas as a power, it extends to both the end and the means, since all goods fall under its object.
• Speaking of voluntas as an act properly, it is of the end alone, because a simple act concerns what is good in itself.
• The means are willed, but not as simple acts of willing—they are willed insofar as the will is moved toward the end.

How Do Different Kinds of Good (End vs. Means) Relate to One Power? #

Resolution:

• The end and the means are not in a relation of equality (ex equo se habentia). Rather, the end is that-for-the-sake-of-which, while the means are ordered to another.
• When objects are not equally related to the power but are related as “for itself” and “for another,” they pertain to the same power (as with vision, which sees both color and light, though light is the reason for seeing color).
• Therefore, a single power (the will) can will both, though by different acts in some cases.

Is There One Act or Multiple Acts in Willing the End and the Means? #

Resolution:

• When the will wills the means, it wills them insofar as it is moved toward the end. In this respect, it is one and the same act by which the will is moved toward the end (as the reason for the means) and toward the means.
• The act by which the will is moved toward the end absolutely (for itself) is a distinct act.
• In time, the absolute willing of the end may precede the willing of the means.
• Analogy: Just as the understanding sometimes understands principles by themselves, and then understands conclusions through those principles, so the will sometimes wills the end absolutely, and then wills the means through the end.

Key Logical Principles #

The Principle of Non-Equivocal Diversity #

When objects differ not in an equal or coordinate way but as that-which-is-per-se and that-which-is-per-alterum (for itself and for another), they do not require different powers—they can be ordered to the same power. This is what Thomas calls “ex equo non se habentia” (not equally related).

The Parallel Structure: Intellect and Will #

The relationship between the end and the means in the will mirrors the relationship between principles and conclusions in the intellect:

• The intellect knows principles per se; conclusions are known through principles.
• The will wills the end per se; the means are willed through the end.
• Just as the intellect sometimes knows the principles without knowing the conclusions, the will can will the end without willing the means.
• But one cannot understand conclusions without understanding (at least implicitly) the principles; similarly, one cannot will the means (as means) without willing the end.