35. Circumstances of Human Acts and the Will's Object

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Chief Circumstances (Question 7, Article 4) #

• The fundamental question: Are time and place truly the chief circumstances, or is this conclusion misguided?
• The answer: The end (propter quid—the “for the sake of which”) is the chiefest circumstance
• Reason: Acts are properly human insofar as they are voluntary, and the will is chiefly moved by the end
• Secondary chief circumstance: The act itself (what was done—quid) because it touches the substance of the act
• Other circumstances: Ranked according to how closely they approach these two principal circumstances
• Objection addressed: Though time and place seem extrinsic to the act (e.g., “it doesn’t matter where or when I kill you”), this misunderstands the term “in which there is operation”
• Clarification from Gregory/Nemesius: The chief circumstances are cuyas gratia (for the sake of which = end) and quid (what is done)

The Nature of Wanting and Desire (Question 8, Introduction) #

• Structure of Q8: Examines acts immediately of the will itself, divided by whether the will moves toward ends or toward means
• Acts toward the end: Will (voluntas), enjoyment (frui), and intention (intentio)
• Question 8 specifically: Addresses the first act—willing or wishing itself
• Three sub-inquiries:
  1. Of what things is the will? (What is its object?)
  2. By what is it moved?
  3. In what way is it moved?

The Will and the Good (Question 8, Article 1) #

• Central thesis: The will is a rational (or reasonable) desire, and all desire tends only toward what is good
• Why this is so: Desire is the inclination of one desiring toward something suitable to itself. Nothing is inclined except toward what is fitting (convenient, harmonious) to it. Since everything that is a being and substance is in some way good, an inclination to what is like oneself or suitable to oneself must be an inclination toward the good
• Application across powers:
  • Natural appetite tends toward real good existing in the thing (e.g., plant growing toward sun and water)
  • Sense appetite tends toward good as apprehended by the senses
  • Rational appetite (will) tends toward good as apprehended by reason
• Crucial distinction: It is not required that something be good in reality (in re veritate) for the will to tend toward it; it need only be apprehended under the notion of good (sub ratione boni)
• Philosophical principle (from Aristotle’s Physics): The end is described as either “a good or an apparent good”
• The converse power of opposites:
  • The same power relates to opposites, but not in the same way
  • The will relates to good by desiring it and to bad by fleeing it (fugiendo)
  • Desire of good = voluntas; flight from bad = noluntas
  • In both cases, the object is grasped under the notion of good (speaking vs. being silent—both can be willed as good depending on circumstances)

Being and Non-Being in Relation to the Good #

• Objection: Good and being are convertible, so the will cannot be of non-beings (yet we will “not to walk,” “not to speak,” future things not yet actual)
• Response: Non-beings and lacks are called beings of reason (entia rationis)
• Examples of beings of reason:
  • Ignorance (a privation/lack)
  • Negations (like “not speaking”)
  • Future things insofar as they are apprehended (dinner tonight that doesn’t yet exist in reality)
• Principle: Insofar as these have the notion of good (apprehended as suitable), the will tends toward them
• Aristotelian principle: “The lack of evil has the notion of good”

Key Arguments #

Objection 1: Power of Opposites #

Objection: Just as sight perceives sweet and bitter (contraries), the will should relate to good and bad as opposites

Response:

• The same power can relate to opposites, but not in the same manner
• The will desires the good (as good) and flees the bad (as bad)
• Both acts, however, are oriented toward good: speaking and remaining silent are both good under different circumstances

Objection 2: Non-Being and Convertibility #

Objection: Good and being are convertible, but the will extends to non-beings and future things

Response: Non-beings are “beings of reason”—they exist intentionally in the mind and can be apprehended under the notion of good, thus the will can tend toward them

Objection 3: The End as Extrinsic #

Objection: The end is extrinsic to the act, so it should not be the chief circumstance. Rather, what is chief in anything is its cause and form—the agent and the mode of acting

Response:

• Though the end is not the substance of the act, it is nonetheless the chief cause (causa causarum)
• The end moves one to act
• The moral species of an act derives chiefly from its object and end, not from the agent or mode
• The person acting is a cause of the act insofar as they are moved by the end

Important Definitions #

Voluntas (Willing/Desire) #

“The will is a rational or reasonable desire” (appetitus rationalis)—a power of the soul that tends toward what is apprehended as good

Noluntas #

The flight from evil; the rejection of what is apprehended as bad (fugiendo)—the converse act to willing

The Good (Bonum) #

That toward which a thing is naturally inclined as suitable to itself; what is apprehended under the notion of good (sub ratione boni). The good is what all desire and want.

Beings of Reason (Entia Rationis) #

Non-beings and privations that exist intentionally in the mind: ignorance, negations (not speaking), future things insofar as apprehended. These can be objects of the will because they are grasped under the notion of good.

Chief Circumstances #

1. The end (cuyas gratia—for the sake of which): Chiefest because it moves the will
2. The act itself (quid—what was done): Secondarily chief because it touches the substance of the act

Examples & Illustrations #

Circumstances Making Acts Worse/Better #

• Time and place in killing: Killing someone during the consecration of the Mass adds sacrilege to the crime, making it worse—though time and place are extrinsic, they remain circumstances to be considered
• Location of killing: It is worse to kill someone in a church than on the street, though both are the same fundamental act

The Will and Different Objects #

• Speaking or remaining silent: Both can be willed as good—in court one might choose to speak or remain silent (forever hold your peace), yet both are willed as good depending on the circumstances
• Willing the good vs. willing means: One wills health absolutely; one wills medicine insofar as one wills health. One wills to be awake; one wills the act of rising as means to wakefulness.
• Getting up in the morning: A monk gets up bored if he stays in bed, so he gets up—willing awakeness. But he wills the rising insofar as he wills to be awake.

The Mind’s Analogy to the Will #

• Knowing truth vs. knowing falsity: The mind can know the true, but can it know the false as false? Yes—if one knows the false is false, that knowledge itself is true. One cannot know that “two is half of five,” but one might opine it or be mistaken about it.
• Error vs. ignorance: “The only thing worse than ignorance is error”—men don’t get in trouble so much by what they don’t know as by what they know that ain’t so

Directedness of the Will #

• Recommendation for a position: If asked to recommend someone for a position, one might have to reveal their lack of qualifications—one wills the good of just hiring while also willing the good of honest testimony

Notable Quotes #

“The will is a rational or reasonable desire, and all desire is nothing other than the inclination of the one desiring toward something suitable to itself.”

“The good is what all want” (Aristotle, Ethics I; also Dionysius, Divine Names IV)

“The end is a good or an apparent good” (Aristotle, Physics)

“Nothing is inclined except toward something suitable to itself.”

“In order that the will tend toward something, it is not required that it be good in fact and in reality (in re veritate), but that it be apprehended under the notion of the good (sub ratione boni).”

“The lack of evil has the notion of good” (Aristotle, Ethics V)

Questions Addressed #

Q7 Art. 4: Which Circumstances Are Chief? #

Answer: The end (propter quid) is the chiefest circumstance because the will is chiefly moved by the end. The act itself (quid) is secondarily chief because it touches the substance of the act. Other circumstances rank according to their proximity to these two.

Q8 Art. 1: Is the Will Only of the Good? #

Answer: Yes. The will is rational desire, and all desire is inclination toward what is suitable. Everything that is a being is in some way good. Therefore all willing is of the good—whether real good or apparent good. The will flees the bad insofar as it is bad, but this flight is still directed toward the good (toward what is good to flee the bad).

Secondary: Can the Will Relate to Non-Beings and Future Things? #

Answer: Yes, insofar as these are apprehended under the notion of good. Non-beings are “beings of reason”—they exist intentionally in the mind. Future things are beings of reason insofar as apprehended. Thus the will can tend toward them as good.