13. Honor as Sign of Excellence, Not Beatitude
Summary
This lecture examines whether beatitude (true happiness) consists in honor, following Thomas Aquinas’s systematic refutation of false happiness based on Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy. Berquist argues that honor is a sign and testimony of pre-existing excellence rather than excellence itself, and therefore cannot constitute the perfect good that is beatitude. The lecture explores the relationship between virtue, honor, and true happiness through philosophical analysis and literary examples from Shakespeare.
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Lecture Notes
Main Topics #
- Honor as Sign, Not Cause: Honor is shown to someone on account of excellence already existing in them; it testifies to excellence but does not create it
- Honor’s Extrinsic Nature: Honor exists in the one honoring (showing reverence), not in the one honored; therefore it cannot be part of the beatitude of the one honored
- The Desire for Honor from the Wise: Men naturally seek honor especially from the wise because they believe wise judgment can confirm whether they truly possess excellence
- Honor as Follower of Beatitude: Honor may follow upon beatitude as a sign and witness to it, but can never be that in which beatitude itself consists
- Ambition vs. Virtue: Acting for the sake of honor is ambition (a disordered desire), not virtue; true virtue acts for beatitude itself, not for honor
Key Arguments #
Against Honor as Beatitude #
- Ontological Argument: Beatitude must be something in the one who is blessed, but honor is not in the one honored but in the one honoring
- Priority of Excellence: Excellence must precede honor; honor is a response to excellence that already exists. If honor created excellence, then those without honor could not be excellent
- The Confirmation Principle: Men desire to be honored by the wise specifically because they believe wise judgment confirms their excellence—the honor is valued for what it attests to, not for itself
- Comparison to Being Loved: Just as friendship consists more in loving than being loved (since being loved is something in the lover, not the beloved), honor cannot constitute beatitude because it is something in the one honoring
The True Reward of Virtue #
- The true reward of virtue is beatitude itself, not honor
- When one acts for honor rather than for beatitude, one acts from ambition, not virtue
- Honor is a sign that beatitude may be present, but it is not the source or substance of beatitude
Important Definitions #
- Honor (ὦ/honor): A sign and testimony of pre-existing excellence in a person; the reverential recognition shown to someone on account of their excellence
- Beatitude/Felicitas: The perfect good of man; the final end attainable through virtue and excellence; must be self-sufficient and satisfy all desires
- Ambition: Acting for the sake of honor or external recognition rather than for true beatitude; a disordered pursuit
Examples & Illustrations #
- Hotspur in Henry IV, Part I: Shakespeare’s character desires honor above all; when dying at the hands of Prince Hal, he is not grieved by his own death but by his honor passing to Prince Hal. His accumulated honors will now accrue to his conqueror.
- Mozart and Haydn: When Haydn heard Mozart’s quartets dedicated to him, he told Mozart’s father: “Before God I say that your son is the greatest composer known to me.” Haydn recognized and testified to Mozart’s excellence through his judgment.
- Politicians and “Hail to the Chief”: Berquist notes that some politicians enjoy the ceremonial honors shown them, suggesting they may confuse the external sign of honor with actual excellence
- The Priest’s Mission Work: A priest engaged in important mission work is called “like a rock star” by his community; yet such popularity does not constitute his beatitude but merely reflects his good works
- The Ceremony of Canonization: When the Church beatifies a saint, it is not making them blessed but rather recognizing and testifying to their beatitude through the ceremony of canonization
Notable Quotes #
“Honor is shown to someone on account of some excellence of him, and thus it is a sign and testimony of a certain excellence which is in the one honored.”
“The true reward of virtue is beatitude itself, on account of which the virtuous act. If however one acted on account of honor, it would not be virtue, but more ambition.”
“Honor is owed to God and to those who are most excellent as a sign or testimony of an excellence already existing in them, not that the honor itself makes them excellent.”
“Whence men seek most of all to be honored by the wise, in whose judgment they believe themselves to be confirmed, whether they are excellent or happy.”
Questions Addressed #
- Does beatitude consist in honor? No. Honor is extrinsic to the one honored and is merely a sign of pre-existing excellence, not the substance of beatitude itself.
- Why do men pursue honor so intensely? Because honor from the wise serves as a confirmation of their excellence; men naturally desire recognition from those capable of true judgment.
- How does honor relate to beatitude? Honor may follow upon and testify to beatitude, but it cannot constitute beatitude.
- What is the difference between acting for honor and acting for beatitude? Acting for honor is ambition; acting for beatitude is virtue. True virtue seeks the perfect good itself, not its external signs.
Structural Notes #
- This lecture covers Article 2 of Question 2 of Thomas Aquinas’s *Summa Theologiae II-I, on whether beatitude consists in honors
- The lecture follows Boethius’s systematic order of examining false happiness before turning to true happiness
- The argument employs the scholastic method: presenting objections (reasons why one might think honor constitutes beatitude) and then responding with philosophical analysis
- Berquist emphasizes the Aristotelian distinction that the one honored is passive in receiving honor, while the one honoring is active; therefore the good of honor belongs more to the honorer than the honored