7. The End as First in Intention and Last in Execution

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Order of Intention vs. Execution #

• The end is first in intention but last in execution - this is a fundamental distinction for understanding human action
• Example: Going to a restaurant comes before eating dinner in time, but intending to eat dinner comes before intending to go to the restaurant
• The chair is the last thing completed in its making, but it is first in the carpenter’s intention
• This distinction applies to moral, spiritual, and practical orders: the Psalms (penance → good deeds → rest in God) reverse the order of the Our Father (honor God → do God’s will → avoid sin), because the Psalms follow execution order while the Our Father follows intentional order

Are All Human Acts for an End? #

• Objection: Some human actions seem to have no end (actions done without thinking)
• Response: Actions done without deliberation are not properly human acts. Only deliberate acts proceeding from the will are fully human. Scratching oneself without thinking is not a fully human act because it lacks the revelation of reason that characterizes human action
• The will’s object is always the good/end, so every truly human act necessarily has an end
• The act of the will itself cannot be the first end intended, just as the first thing understood cannot be understanding itself
• Analogy: A letter cannot be about what is in the letter; the first letter must be about something external to it. Similarly, the first thing willed cannot be the act of willing itself

Does Acting for an End Belong Only to Rational Nature? #

• Objection: Only rational creatures act for an end, because irrational things lack knowledge of the end
• Response: All agents (rational and irrational) act for an end. The difference lies in how they are directed to the end, not whether they are
• Rational creatures move themselves to the end through choice and free judgment (the will commanding deliberate acts)
• Irrational creatures are moved toward an end by natural inclination, as if directed by another
• Nothing reduces itself from potency to act; therefore, an agent must be determined to some effect (the end) by its own nature or by another’s direction
• Example: Plants act for an end (seeking water and sunlight) through natural inclination, not conscious intention
• Example: Snow peas grow up trellises and pull themselves toward sunlight for hours, demonstrating purposive action without rational mind

The Problem of Modern Science and Final Causes #

• Modern scientists resist admitting that nature acts for an end because it suggests a mind behind nature
• Aristotle’s approach in the Physics (Book II) is methodologically important: he does not argue from creatures having a mind to their acting for an end
• Rather, he observes that creatures act for an end and then asks whether this requires a mind
• The fact that people wonder whether insects have minds is because they see such intelligent-looking purposive action
• Example: Fabre’s wasp experiments show parasitizing behavior with remarkable precision (paralyzing prey without killing it, dragging by antenna to dig a hole) that looks intelligent but may not require rational mind

How the End Specifies Human Acts #

• Human acts receive their species (moral character) from the end, not merely from their natural form
• Objection: The end is extrinsic, but species comes from intrinsic principles (form)
• Response: The end gives species to human acts in a unique way because man moves himself to the end. The end is both the beginning (source) and the limit (terminus) of the act
• In natural things: form is the end of generation, and form gives the species to the thing generated
• In human acts: the end is the beginning (in intention) and limit (in execution), and it gives species to the act
• Example: Killing is the same physical act but becomes an act of justice or injustice depending on its end
• The end functions as the form or act that specifies the motion from act to act

Moral Virtue and Custom (Mores) #

• Moral virtue is properly a habit with choice, determined by right reason
• The term mores (from Latin) and moralis fundamentally refer to custom and habitual behavior
• Why is moral philosophy called “customary philosophy” (moral or ethical) rather than philosophy of choice? Because moral virtues are acquired through repeated acts, making habit/custom central to their formation
• Virtue is what makes a thing good and enables it to perform its own act well (using the knife analogy: sharpness makes a knife good at cutting)
• Moral acts properly obtain their species from the end because they are human acts, and human acts are specified by the end of the will

Key Arguments #

Argument 1: The End is the First Among Causes #

• Among causes ordered to each other, if the first is removed, all others must be removed
• The end is the first among all causes in the order of intention
• Therefore, the end is necessary for any action to occur
• Without an end, nothing would move (matter would not be reduced from potency to act)

Argument 2: The First Thing Intended Cannot Be the Act of Intending Itself #

• The object of the will is the end (just as the object of sight is color)
• It is impossible that what is first desirable should be the will itself
• Therefore, the first thing willed must be something other than the act of willing
• This parallels: The first thing understood cannot be understanding itself

Argument 3: All Agents Are Determined by an End #

• Matter does not achieve form unless moved by an agent
• Nothing reduces itself from potency to act
• If an agent were not determined to some effect, it would no more produce one effect than another
• Therefore, the agent must be determined to something certain, which has the notion of an end
• In rational creatures, this determination comes through the will (rational desire)
• In irrational creatures, this determination comes through natural inclination (natural desire)

Argument 4: Rational vs. Irrational Direction to Ends #

• Rational creatures have lordship over their acts through free judgment and the will
• Irrational creatures lack reason and cannot order anything to an end themselves
• Therefore, irrational creatures are ordered to an end by another
• The whole of irrational nature is compared to God as a tool to the chief agent

Important Definitions #

Finis (End) #

• That for the sake of which something is done
• First in intention (ordo intentionis), last in execution (ordo exsecutionis)
• The object of the will
• What moves and determines the agent to action

Human Act (Actus Humanus) #

• An act proceeding from deliberate will (ex voluntate deliberata)
• Distinguished from acts of a human being that lack deliberation
• Must have reason as its source to be properly human
• Subject to moral evaluation

Natural Inclination (Inclinatio Naturalis) / Natural Desire (Desiderium Naturale) #

• The way irrational creatures are directed toward an end
• An inclination built into the nature of a thing by God
• Not conscious or chosen, but purposive and ordered

Rational Desire (Desiderium Rationale) #

• What Thomas calls the will when it is the source of human action
• The way rational creatures are determined to ends
• Involves choice and deliberation

Examples & Illustrations #

Marriage and Choice #

• The priest asks the couple “Do you choose to marry?” not “Do you feel love?”
• Marriage is at a “dead end” - there is no way out
• This shows that choice, not emotion, is what truly specifies a human act
• One can be tempted to infidelity but remain true to the marriage through fidelity to one’s choice

Going to the Restaurant to Eat Dinner #

• You intend to eat dinner before intending to go to the restaurant
• In temporal order, you go to the restaurant first
• In intentional order, eating dinner comes first
• The end (eating) causes the means (going to the restaurant) to be pursued

The Snow Peas #

• Pea plants climb trellises, pulling themselves up toward the sun for hours
• They stretch lines to grow upward
• This demonstrates purposive action for an end without rational mind
• Nature acts for an end through inclination

The Wasp and Fabre’s Experiments #

• The wasp paralyzes its prey with precise pressure - enough to paralyze, not kill
• It drags the prey by the antenna to a hole
• When the antenna is cut off, the wasp fills the hole without the victim
• This shows intelligent-looking purposive action without rational deliberation
• Unlike a human who could figure out alternative ways to drag the prey, the wasp cannot adapt when the antenna is gone

Learning Greek #

• Berquist was told to take Greek but didn’t know why at the time
• He was moved toward an end (learning Greek) without knowing the end
• This shows that human acts can be for an end even when the actor doesn’t know the end
• Later, studying the original languages revealed nuances in Thomas that translation misses

Teaching as Father Peter Did #

• A teacher who knows Greek acts upon a student (like fire heating water)
• The teacher’s knowledge (form/act) is the source of his ability to teach
• The student undergoes the passion of being taught, acquiring knowledge
• Both the acting upon and the undergoing are specified by an act

Shaving While Thinking vs. Not Thinking #

• One can shave carefully while thinking about it, or shave on habit without thinking
• When not thinking, the shaving goes faster
• Yet the act of shaving is the same whether one is deliberating or not
• However, only when deliberate does it become a fully human act

Military Service and Habituation #

• Berquist’s brother-in-law had to shave three times a day due to a heavy beard
• In the Marines, men are trained through repeated acts to habitually respond
• A fearful recruit shaving in chaos might cut himself, but the habit makes the act second nature
• This illustrates how custom and habit shape human behavior

Questions Addressed #

Does Every Human Act Necessarily Have an End? #

• Yes. All human acts (acts proceeding from deliberate will) necessarily have an end
• Acts without deliberation are not properly human acts
• The will’s object is always the good/end
• Therefore, every truly human act is for the sake of some end

Can Some Human Acts Proceed Without an End? #

• No, not for properly human acts. If an action lacks deliberation and proceeds without the will being involved, it is not a fully human act
• Examples: reflexive scratching, digestion, involuntary movements
• These are acts of a human being, not human acts

Is Acting for an End Unique to Rational Nature? #

• No. Acting for an end is universal to all agents
• But ordering oneself to the end is unique to rational nature
• Irrational creatures act for an end but are ordered to it by another
• Rational creatures act for an end and order themselves to it through choice

How Does the End Specify the Moral Character of an Act? #

• The end is the beginning of the human act in the order of intention
• Just as the object of an action specifies its nature in natural philosophy, the end specifies the nature of a human act
• The same physical deed (killing) becomes different moral acts (justice or murder) based on its end
• Therefore, moral philosophy is properly concerned with the ends for which we act

Why Is Moral Philosophy Called “Customary” or “Ethical” Philosophy? #

• Because moral virtues are acquired through custom and repeated acts
• Habit (habitus) is second nature
• The term mores (custom) is central to understanding moral virtue
• Yet this raises the question: shouldn’t it be called philosophy of choice, since choice is essential to virtue?
• Berquist suggests that custom is prominent because it shapes and forms our choices over time

Notable Quotes #

“What is the reason why he didn’t study philosophy. He said, you take Greek.” - Kasari to Berquist (on being moved toward an end without knowing it)

“The end, although it is last in execution, is nevertheless first in the intention of the agent.” - Thomas Aquinas (summarizing a key principle of the lecture)

“You wouldn’t ask her unless you intended to marry her.” - Berquist (illustrating the priority of intention over execution)