Prima Secundae #

A study of St. Thomas Aquinas’s Prima Secundae (First Part of the Second Part of the Summa Theologiae). These lectures examine human acts, happiness, virtue, law, and grace—analyzing the foundations of moral theology from beatitude through the passions, habits, virtues, sin, and divine law.

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Lectures #

1. The Four Orders of Reason and Division of Sciences #

This lecture establishes the fundamental framework for understanding all human knowledge through the lens of order, which is the proper concern of reason. Berquist, following Thomas Aquinas’s premium to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, systematically divides all sciences and arts according to the type of order they consider: order not made by reason (natural philosophy and metaphysics), order made by reason in its own acts (logic), order made by reason in voluntary acts (practical philosophy), and order made by reason in exterior matter (mechanical arts). The lecture then focuses on practical philosophy, explaining why it divides into ethics, domestic philosophy, and political philosophy based on man’s natural need for community at different levels.

2. The Good as What All Desire: First Principles of Ethics #

This lecture explores Aristotle’s opening argument in the Nicomachean Ethics that every art, science, action, and choice aims at some good, culminating in the definition that “the good is what all desire.” Berquist examines this as the first and foundational definition of the good, demonstrates how we arrive at it through inductive reasoning from particular examples, and addresses the critical Socratic question of whether desire causes goodness or goodness causes desire. The lecture also introduces the hierarchical ordering of goods and arts through their ends or purposes.

3. The Hierarchy of Goods and the Supreme End of Man #

This lecture explores Aristotle’s theory of subordinate and commanding arts through the lens of their corresponding goods and ends. Berquist demonstrates why there must be a supreme end desired for its own sake (not as a means to further ends) and argues that the political art, which commands all other arts, must therefore aim at the highest good of man. The lecture establishes the necessity of a final end and connects this to the role of government in directing human action toward the ultimate purpose of man.

4. The Good, the End, and Man’s Own Act #

This lecture explores Aristotle’s definition of the good as what all desire and its essential connection to the concept of end (telos). Berquist develops the argument for a supreme end through the problem of infinite regress, then establishes that man’s own act is the act with reason through an extended induction from tools, organs, and occupations. The lecture concludes by introducing the refinement that man’s end is not merely to act with reason, but to act with reason well, which is the basis for understanding human virtue.

5. Man’s End, Virtue, and the Act with Reason #

This lecture explores how man’s distinctive end (ultimate purpose) is the act with reason done well throughout a complete life, and how virtue—understood as the quality enabling a thing to perform its own act well—is equivalent to acting well. Berquist presents three methods of reasoning to this conclusion (induction, proportion, and either-or argument) and distinguishes between the act of reason itself and acts ordered or measured by reason, drawing on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and examples from Shakespeare.

6. Editorial vs. Logical Division and Man’s Last End #

This lecture distinguishes between editorial/reference divisions and logical/understandable divisions of texts, using biblical and philosophical examples to illustrate how true understanding requires grasping logical structure rather than arbitrary numerical divisions. Berquist then introduces the Prologue to the Second Part of Aquinas’s Summa, exploring how man as made in God’s image possesses reason, free judgment, and self-movement, establishing the framework for ethics as the study of human acts ordered toward an end.

7. The End as First in Intention and Last in Execution #

This lecture explores the relationship between intention and execution in human action, specifically how the end (finis) is first in the order of intention but last in the order of carrying out. Berquist examines whether all human acts necessarily proceed from an end, whether acting for an end is unique to rational nature, and how the end specifies the moral character of human acts. The discussion draws heavily on Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of these questions in the Summa Theologiae, using concrete examples to illustrate the distinction between logical/intentional order and temporal/executive order.

8. The Last End and the Infinity Problem in Human Action #

This lecture addresses the fourth objection to whether there exists a last end of human life. Berquist explores the tension between the diffusiveness of the good, the infinity of reason’s capacity, and the will’s ability to reflect upon itself infinitely. Through careful analysis of per se versus accidental ordering, he demonstrates why ends cannot proceed infinitely and must terminate in a single ultimate end, using examples from geometry, daily human action, and the nature of demonstration.

9. The Unity of the Last End and Its Perfection #

This lecture examines whether one person can have multiple ultimate ends simultaneously, focusing on Thomas Aquinas’s Fifth Article. Berquist explores the nature of a perfect good, the relationship between happiness and its constituent elements, and why the will must be ordered to a single final end. The discussion includes the distinction between diverse goods that can be desired together versus multiple ultimate ends, with practical examples from human experience and classical literature.

10. Whether Man Wills All Things for the Last End #

This lecture examines whether every human action and desire is ultimately ordered toward the last end, and how this universal ordering is compatible with apparent diversity in human motivation. Berquist explores objections based on common experience (people often don’t know why they act, or seem to pursue things for their own sake), and presents Thomas Aquinas’s argument that all desires are intrinsically ordered to the final end either as complete good or as tending toward complete good. The lecture also addresses how laughable/recreational actions fit within this framework and why explicit conscious reflection on the last end is not always necessary for actions to be so ordered.

11. The Unity of the Last End and the Taste of Beatitude #

This lecture addresses whether all human beings share a common ultimate end despite pursuing apparently different goods. Berquist develops Thomas Aquinas’s distinction between the notion of the last end (what beatitude is in concept) and that in which the notion is found (what specific thing constitutes it), arguing that all men desire to fulfill their own perfection but may erroneously seek it in lesser goods. The lecture emphasizes that one’s judgment about the true ultimate good should be based on refined, well-disposed faculties—illustrated through the analogy of taste—and that what is common to humanity (reason) is superior to what is individual and private to each person.

12. Beatitude and False Happiness: Riches and Honor #

This lecture examines whether beatitude (supreme human happiness) consists in riches or honor, following Thomas Aquinas’s systematic refutation of false candidates for the ultimate human end. Berquist presents Thomas’s arguments distinguishing natural from artificial riches, explains why honor as an extrinsic sign cannot constitute beatitude, and illustrates how the infinite desire for temporal goods reveals their insufficiency. The lecture employs Boethius’s pedagogical method of addressing false happiness before true happiness.

13. Honor as Sign of Excellence, Not Beatitude #

This lecture examines whether beatitude (true happiness) consists in honor, following Thomas Aquinas’s systematic refutation of false happiness based on Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy. Berquist argues that honor is a sign and testimony of pre-existing excellence rather than excellence itself, and therefore cannot constitute the perfect good that is beatitude. The lecture explores the relationship between virtue, honor, and true happiness through philosophical analysis and literary examples from Shakespeare.

14. False Happiness: Glory, Fame, and Power #

This lecture continues Thomas Aquinas’s examination of false happiness by analyzing whether beatitude consists in glory, fame, or power. Berquist presents the objections and counterarguments for each, demonstrating how these exterior goods, while sought by men, cannot constitute true beatitude. The lecture emphasizes the distinction between human knowledge (which is caused by things known) and divine knowledge (which causes things known), and shows how power, like other exterior goods, is indifferent to good and evil.

15. Beatitude: Bodily Goods and Pleasure as False Ends #

This lecture addresses Articles 5 and 6 of Aquinas’s treatment of beatitude, systematically refuting the claims that beatitude consists in bodily goods or in pleasure. Berquist explores the metaphysical ordering of goods (exterior to bodily to spiritual), the relationship between matter and form, and the nature of pleasure as a consequence rather than essence of happiness. The lecture demonstrates why man’s superiority over animals necessitates that beatitude must consist in goods of the soul rather than what humans share with beasts.

16. Beatitude Cannot Consist in Created Goods #

This lecture addresses whether human beatitude can consist in any created good—whether in created beings (angels, creatures) or in the universe as a whole. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s counterarguments to establish that beatitude must consist in God alone, the universal good, through an analysis of the will’s object, the distinction between parts and wholes, and the ordering of all creatures to God as their ultimate end.

17. Beatitude as Uncreated and Created: Nature and Operation #

This lecture examines the first two articles of Thomas Aquinas’s Question 3 on beatitude, establishing that beatitude is uncreated as regards its object (God) but created as regards its essence (the human act of vision), and that beatitude must necessarily be an operation rather than a mere state or possession. Berquist works through the objections systematically, distinguishing between the end as the thing desired and the end as the possession/enjoyment of that thing, and clarifies how beatitude relates to eternal life.

18. Beatitude: Whether It Consists in the Act of Will or Intellect #

This lecture examines whether beatitude (human happiness) consists essentially in an act of the will or the intellect. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of five objections arguing for the will, then presents Aquinas’s resolution that beatitude consists essentially in the intellect’s act of understanding God, while delight in the will follows as a consequent property. The lecture explores the relationship between achieving an end and delighting in it, the three acts of appetite (love, desire, and pleasure), and the logical priority of knowledge over willing.

19. Beatitude, Intellect, and the Vision of God #

This lecture explores whether beatitude (human happiness) consists primarily in acts of the will or the intellect, and specifically whether it is achieved through practical intellect, speculative sciences, or knowledge of angels. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of these objections, establishing that perfect beatitude consists in the speculative intellect’s contemplation of God Himself, while explaining how all creatures—even angels—maintain an infinite distance from God’s knowledge of Himself. The lecture develops the principle that only God can know God as God is knowable and love God as God is lovable, with all creatures participating imperfectly in this knowledge through proportion.

20. Beatitude in Speculative Sciences and Knowledge of Angels #

This lecture examines whether perfect human beatitude can consist in the contemplation of speculative sciences (such as geometry, arithmetic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics) and whether it might instead consist in knowledge of the separated substances (angels). Berquist presents Aristotelian arguments supporting these positions, then develops Thomas Aquinas’s response, distinguishing between perfect and imperfect beatitude and establishing that while speculative sciences and knowledge of angels provide imperfect beatitude, they cannot constitute the perfect beatitude that is man’s ultimate end.

21. Beatitude as Vision of God’s Divine Essence #

This lecture examines whether human beatitude consists in the vision of God’s divine essence. Berquist explores Thomas Aquinas’s argument that perfect beatitude requires knowing God’s essence (the ‘what it is’), not merely that God exists. The lecture clarifies how the natural human desire to know causes harmonizes with the supernatural gift of beatific vision, and addresses objections from Dionysius and others regarding whether creatures can attain such knowledge.

22. Vision and Pleasure in Beatitude; The Trinity and Reason #

This lecture explores the relationship between vision and pleasure as components of beatitude, arguing that vision is primary and pleasure is secondary. Berquist also develops a profound connection between Shakespeare’s definition of reason as ’looking before and after’ and understanding the Trinity through its footprints in creatures, its image in the soul, and direct theological understanding. The lecture examines how language—particularly the article in Greek and English versus Latin—affects philosophical precision in understanding Scripture and theology.

23. Comprehension, Rectitude of Will, and Perfect Beatitude #

This lecture explores two central questions in Thomistic theology: whether comprehension (in the sense of exhaustive knowledge) is required for beatitude, and whether rectitude of the will is necessary for achieving perfect happiness. Berquist clarifies the distinction between two meanings of comprehension—the including of the comprehended in the comprehender versus the holding or possession of something present—showing how only the latter is required for beatitude. The lecture emphasizes that beatitude consists in the vision of God accompanied by the right ordering of the will toward God as the ultimate end.

24. Beatitude, the Soul, and the Body’s Role #

This lecture examines whether the separated soul can achieve beatitude without the body, and distinguishes between imperfect beatitude (in this life) and perfect beatitude (the vision of God). Berquist explores Thomas Aquinas’s responses to six objections claiming the body is necessary for blessedness, arguing that the soul’s subsistence in its own being and its capacity for understanding—which transcends bodily organs—allows it to be truly blessed even when separated from the body. The discussion illustrates how the intellect receives universals rather than singulars, proving it is not a bodily organ.

25. Beatitude, the Soul, and the Resurrection Body #

This lecture examines whether beatitude (perfect happiness) requires the perfection of the body, and how the separated soul can achieve beatitude while remaining in that state or after resurrection. Berquist develops Thomas Aquinas’s responses to objections about the body’s necessity for perfect beatitude, distinguishing between beatitude achieved in the soul alone and beatitude extended to include the restored body. The discussion addresses the relationship between the soul’s essential beatitude in the vision of God and the body’s role as part of the complete reward of the saints.

26. Man’s Attainment of Beatitude and Its Degrees #

This lecture examines whether man can attain beatitude (perfect happiness) and whether degrees of beatitude are possible among the blessed. Berquist addresses the apparent paradox that rational creatures might seem incapable of achieving an intellectual end, then explores how man’s understanding and will enable beatitude despite his lower nature. The lecture also discusses imperfect beatitude in this life versus perfect beatitude in the next, and how individuals can enjoy God with differing degrees of perfection.

27. Beatitude: Whether It Can Be Lost and Its Permanence #

This lecture examines whether beatitude (perfect happiness in the vision of God) can be lost once attained in eternal life. Berquist presents Origen’s error that even the blessed could fall back into misery, then develops Thomas Aquinas’s refutation using both the definition of beatitude as a perfect and sufficient good and the nature of the beatific vision itself. The lecture explores how the blessed participate in God’s eternity, transcending temporal change, and why no force—neither human will, divine justice, nor creature—can remove beatitude once perfectly achieved.

28. The Immortality of the Human Soul and Beatitude #

This lecture addresses the metaphysical question of the human soul’s immortality—why it has a beginning but no end—and examines whether man can achieve beatitude (perfect happiness) through natural powers alone or requires divine grace. Berquist explores Aristotle’s position on the soul’s nature, contrasts it with Platonic views, and works through Thomas Aquinas’s analysis of whether beatitude is attainable by human effort or depends entirely on God’s action.

29. Beatitude, Divine Illumination, and Human Merit #

This lecture explores how beatitude is communicated and achieved, examining the limitations of creatures in sharing divine beatitude, the role of angelic illumination, and whether human works are required for achieving beatitude. Berquist discusses the distinction between God’s infinite power and created natures, Christ’s unique beatitude, and the universal human desire for happiness understood in general versus particular terms.

30. The Voluntary in Human Acts #

Berquist examines whether the voluntary (voluntarium) is found in human acts by resolving objections that external causation prevents true voluntariness. He explains that voluntary action requires both an intrinsic principle and knowledge of the end, distinguishing this from involuntary motion caused by external forces, violence, or ignorance. The lecture establishes the foundational framework for understanding human moral responsibility within Thomas’s systematic treatment of how acts lead to or impede beatitude.

31. The Voluntary in Animals and Acts of Omission #

This lecture examines Article 2 and Article 3 of Aquinas’s treatment of the voluntary, focusing on whether brute animals possess voluntary action and whether the voluntary can exist without an external act. Berquist clarifies the distinction between perfect and imperfect knowledge of the end, arguing that animals possess voluntary action in an imperfect sense through sensory and instinctive knowledge. He further explores how omission—not acting when one is able and obligated to act—can itself be voluntary, introducing the critical distinction between direct and indirect causation from the will.

32. Violence, Fear, and the Will’s Involuntariness #

This lecture examines whether violence can be imposed upon the will, whether violence causes involuntariness, and whether fear causes involuntariness. Through careful Thomistic analysis, Berquist demonstrates that violence cannot directly affect the will’s own acts (elicited acts) but only commanded acts performed through other powers. The lecture resolves apparent contradictions between Thomas Aquinas and Augustine by distinguishing between the will’s intrinsic principle of motion and external force, and clarifies how fear makes acts more voluntary than involuntary when considered in their actual circumstances rather than in abstraction.

33. Circumstances of Human Acts: Definition and Nature #

This lecture addresses the nature of circumstances as they pertain to human acts, beginning with the question of whether circumstances are accidents. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s response to objections from Cicero and Aristotle, establishing that circumstances are indeed accidents of acts in a secondary sense—existing together with the act in the same subject rather than in it. The lecture emphasizes how circumstances relate to the substance of acts and derives the concept of circumstance from spatial language, showing how names pertaining to place are transferred to describe conditions surrounding human actions.

34. Circumstances of Human Acts and Their Theological Necessity #

This lecture explores whether and why theologians must consider circumstances—the conditions outside an act’s substance that nevertheless affect it—when evaluating human actions. Berquist presents and resolves objections to considering circumstances, establishes three reasons why theology must account for them, explains the seven or eight enumerated circumstances derived from Cicero and Aristotle, and demonstrates how circumstances affect the moral quality and voluntariness of acts.

35. Circumstances of Human Acts and the Will’s Object #

This lecture continues the examination of circumstances as accidents of human acts, specifically addressing which circumstances are chief and whether the will extends only to ends or also to means. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s systematic treatment of how the end (the final cause) is the principal circumstance because it moves the will, and explores the nature of willing as rational desire oriented toward the good—whether real or merely apparent.

36. The Will and Its Acts: End Versus Means #

This lecture examines whether the will (voluntas) is directed toward the end alone or also toward the means to the end. Through systematic objections and Thomas Aquinas’s responses, Berquist explores how a single power (the will) can be ordered to both end and means, drawing parallels between the intellect’s relationship to principles and conclusions and the will’s relationship to ends and means. The lecture clarifies the distinction between the power of the will and its acts, and establishes that while the end is willed absolutely, the means are willed only insofar as they are ordered to the end.

37. What Moves the Will: Understanding and Sense Appetite #

Berquist explores Question 9 of the Summa Theologiae concerning the movers of the will. The lecture examines whether the understanding moves the will, whether sense appetite can move the will, and whether the will can move itself. Through careful analysis of Aristotelian causality and Thomas Aquinas’s distinctions between exercise and determination of acts, Berquist clarifies how the end as cause operates and how multiple interior powers can influence human choice without denying human freedom.

38. The Movement of the Will by Sense Appetite and Self-Movement #

This lecture addresses whether the will can be moved by sense desire (concupiscence) and whether the will can move itself. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of objections to both propositions, explaining how sense appetite influences the will despite being inferior, and how the will moves itself through counsel while remaining dependent on an exterior first principle. The lecture emphasizes the distinction between universal principles and singular actions, and how disposition affects perception of the good.

39. The Will’s Motion: Exterior Principles and Divine Causality #

This lecture examines whether and how the will can be moved by exterior principles, specifically addressing the apparent tension between the will’s nature as voluntary (self-originating) and its dependence on exterior causes. Berquist covers Thomas Aquinas’s arguments that while the will’s proximate motion is intrinsic, its first motion must come from an exterior principle—ultimately God alone—drawing parallels with natural motion and addressing objections from celestial influence and angelic causation.

40. Nature and the Natural Motion of the Will #

This lecture explores whether the will is moved naturally toward something, examining the relationship between nature and voluntary action. Berquist discusses how the will, though founded on nature, transcends mere natural determination, and how particular goods fall short of necessarily moving the will. The lecture establishes the foundational principle that nature (what a thing is) must be prior to and the basis of all accidental properties and operations.

41. The Will’s Motion by God and Necessity #

This lecture examines Question 10 of the Summa, specifically whether the will is moved necessarily by God. Berquist explores the relationship between divine causality and human freedom, demonstrating how God moves the will according to its nature as a contingent power rather than determining it to necessity. The lecture clarifies distinctions between the exercise of the act (to will or not to will) and the specification of the act (what is willed), establishing that while God is the ultimate mover of all things, the will’s freedom and contingency are preserved.

42. Fruition and the Appetitive Power #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of fruition (frui) or enjoyment, exploring whether fruition is an act of the appetitive power or the intellect, and how the will and understanding relate to the experience of the good. Berquist clarifies the distinction between the act of understanding (vision) and the act of willing (enjoyment), and demonstrates how sensible fruits provide the linguistic foundation for understanding spiritual fruition. The lecture also explores gratitude and thanksgiving as natural human responses to goods received, connecting the analysis to practical monastic concerns about recognizing dependence on God.

43. Fruition and Intention: Acts of the Will #

This lecture examines two key acts of the will directed toward the end: fruition (fruitio) and intention (intentio). Berquist explores whether fruition belongs only to rational creatures or also to brute animals, whether it requires actual possession of the end or can occur through intention alone, and whether intention is an act of the will or understanding. The discussion draws heavily on Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae and Augustine’s distinctions between enjoying (frui) and using (uti).

44. Intention as an Act of the Will #

This lecture examines the nature of intention (intentio) as a distinct act of the will, clarifying how intention differs from other acts of the will like volition and fruition. Berquist explores Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of intention through three articles: whether intention is an act of understanding or will, whether intention regards only the last end or also intermediate ends, and whether one can intend multiple things simultaneously. The lecture emphasizes that intention, while presupposing knowledge and the ordering of reason, is fundamentally an act of the will that tends toward an end as the term of motion.

45. Intention, Choice, and the Acts of Will #

This lecture explores the nature of intention (intentio) and its relationship to choice (electio) as acts of the will. Berquist distinguishes between intending an end and willing the means toward that end, arguing that these can be understood as one act in subject but differentiated by reason. The lecture also addresses whether brute animals possess intention and examines how multiple intentions can be unified under common aspects or ordered hierarchically.

46. Choice as an Act of Will and Reason #

This lecture examines the nature of choice (electio) as a human act, establishing that choice is materially an act of the will but formally an act of reason. Berquist works through the first two of six questions about choice from Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae II-II, Q. 13, addressing whether choice is an act of the will or reason, and whether brute animals possess the capacity to choose. The analysis draws heavily on Aristotle’s Ethics and Physics, with particular attention to how choice differs from both simple willing and animal appetite.

47. Choice, Freedom, and the Will’s Determination #

This lecture examines whether human choice concerns ends or only means to ends, whether choice applies only to human acts, whether choice is limited to possible things, and crucially whether human beings choose necessarily or freely. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s systematic treatment of choice (electio), distinguishing it from simple willing and demonstrating that choice is an act of the will formally ordered by reason.

48. The Nature of Counsel and Its Structure #

This lecture explores Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of counsel (consilium) from Summa Theologiae II-II, Question 14, examining whether counsel is an inquiry, whether it concerns ends or only means, and the proper scope and procedure of deliberation. Berquist presents the six articles of the question while emphasizing the distinction between formal and material aspects of counsel, the relationship between reason and will in deliberation, and how counsel achieves practical certitude in contingent matters.

49. Counsel, Deliberation, and the Order of Practical Reasoning #

This lecture explores the nature of counsel (consilium) as a form of practical inquiry distinct from theoretical knowledge. Berquist examines whether counsel is properly about contingent human actions, whether it proceeds in a resolutive or compositive manner, and whether the inquiry of counsel proceeds to infinity or reaches definite conclusions. Through analysis of Thomistic and Aristotelian texts, the lecture clarifies how counsel relates to ends, means, and the structure of practical deliberation.

50. Consent as an Act of the Will #

This lecture examines the nature of consent (consentire) as an act of the will rather than reason, exploring how consent differs from other acts of the will and clarifying Augustine’s attribution of consent to ‘higher reason.’ Berquist addresses whether brute animals possess consent, establishes that consent concerns means rather than ends, and distinguishes between the active application of appetite (in rational beings) and the passive determination of appetite (in animals). The lecture emphasizes the word ‘consent’ carries over from sensation to appetite through analogy, illustrating how the will ’tastes’ or experiences delight in things.

51. Consent and Use: Acts of the Will and Reason #

This lecture examines two related acts of the rational appetite: consent (consensus) and use (uti). Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of whether consent concerns the end or means toward the end, and whether use is an act of the will or reason. The discussion establishes that consent and use are distinctive to rational animals and properly concern things ordered toward an end, not the end itself.

52. Command as an Act of Reason and Its Nature in Animals #

This lecture examines whether command (imperium) is an act of reason or the will, and whether brute animals possess the capacity to command. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of command as essentially an act of reason that presupposes an act of the will, and argues that command requires the ordering power of reason, which only rational animals possess. The lecture uses examples from animal behavior to illustrate the difference between natural instinct and rational ordering.

53. Command, Use, and the Order of Voluntary Acts #

This lecture explores the relationship between command and use as acts of the will and reason, with focus on their proper ordering and whether acts of reason and will can command themselves. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s analysis of these voluntary operations, clarifying how command (an act of reason) relates temporally and causally to use (primarily an act of will), and addressing the apparent paradox that the will sometimes commands itself to will but does not obey.

54. Command of Reason Over Sensitive and Vegetative Powers #

This lecture explores which human powers and bodily functions are subject to the command of reason. Berquist examines whether the sensitive appetite (emotions like anger and fear) can be commanded, whether the vegetative powers (digestion, growth, reproduction) obey reason, and whether bodily members and the heart respond to rational command. Drawing on Thomistic psychology, the discussion distinguishes between acts that depend on apprehension (which reason can order) and bodily dispositions (which resist rational command), using St. Paul’s struggle with concupiscence and examples of emotional control to illustrate the limits of reason’s dominion.

55. Good and Bad in Human Actions #

Berquist explores the metaphysical and moral foundations of good and bad in human acts, drawing on Thomistic principles that good and being are convertible. The lecture establishes that badness is a privation (lack of something that ought to be present) rather than positive non-being, and examines how human actions derive their moral quality primarily from their object—which gives them species—while circumstances and the end provide secondary determination of goodness or badness.

56. Object, Circumstances, and End as Sources of Moral Goodness #

This lecture examines the four sources of moral goodness in human acts according to Thomas Aquinas: genus (as action), species (from object), circumstances (as accidents), and end (as formal cause). Berquist explores how the object determines the primary species of an act, how circumstances—though accidents—can be per se determinative when referred to reason, and how the end serves as a cause of goodness. The lecture addresses whether good and bad diversify moral species and clarifies that bad is not simple non-being but a deficiency in order and measure that reason should impose.

57. Species of Moral Acts: Object, End, and Their Hierarchical Relation #

This lecture examines Article 6 of Aquinas’s treatment of human acts, specifically whether goodness and badness from the end diversify the species of acts. Berquist develops Thomas’s distinction between the interior act of the will (whose object is the end) and the exterior act (whose object is the external thing acted upon), arguing that the end formally determines moral species while the object materially determines it. The lecture also addresses Article 7’s question of whether the species from the end is contained under the species from the object as a more particular species under a subalternate genus, clarifying the logical relationship through principles of per se and per accidens division.

58. Indifferent Acts and Circumstances in Moral Species #

This lecture explores whether human acts can be morally indifferent in their species and in individual instances, examining how circumstances relate to moral classification. Berquist discusses Thomas Aquinas’s resolution of apparent contradictions between the necessity of acts being good or bad and the possibility of indifferent acts, emphasizing the role of reason as the principle determining moral character and how circumstances can become essential to an act’s object.

59. Circumstances, Species, and the Goodness of the Will #

This lecture examines whether circumstances can constitute new moral species of acts (Articles 10-11) and introduces the question of what determines the goodness of the interior act of the will (Question 19). Berquist explores the distinction between circumstances that remain accidents versus those that become principal conditions of the object, and argues that the goodness of the will depends primarily on its object as understood by reason, not merely on quantitative increases or decreases in badness.

60. The Goodness of the Will: Object, Reason, and Eternal Law #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s analysis of how the will’s goodness is determined, focusing on four key dependencies: the object of the will, reason as the proximate measure, and the eternal law as the ultimate standard. Berquist works through Aquinas’s treatment of whether the will’s goodness depends solely on its object, whether circumstances affect this determination, and how both human reason and divine reason govern moral acts. The lecture includes critical discussions of apparent goods, the role of reason in proposing objects to the will, and how the eternal law as divine reason underlies all human moral measurement.

61. Erroneous Conscience and the Moral Will #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of whether a will in discord with or in agreement with erroneous reason constitutes a bad or good will (Articles 5-6 of Summa Theologiae II-II, Question 19). Berquist explores the distinction between voluntary and involuntary ignorance, the binding force of erroneous conscience, and the principle that moral goodness requires integral causation while evil arises from any singular defect. The lecture addresses the apparent paradox that a person seems perplexed no matter whether they follow or reject erroneous reason, and how Thomas resolves this through careful analysis of different types of errors.

62. The Goodness of the Will: Object, Intention, and Merit #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s teaching on how the will becomes good, focusing on the relationship between the object of the will, the intention of the end, and the quantity of merit. Berquist explores Article 7 and Article 8 of Aquinas’s treatment, discussing how intention can precede and cause willing versus following it, why evil results from any singular defect while good requires integral causation, and why the quantity of merit depends on the intensity of the act rather than the magnitude of one’s intention.

63. Conformity of Human Will to Divine Will #

This lecture explores Articles 9 and 10 of Aquinas’s treatment of whether the human will must conform to the divine will, and if so, in what manner. Berquist develops the crucial distinction between conformity by equality (equiparentia) versus conformity by imitation, arguing that humans cannot achieve equality with God but can imitate divine willing through reason. The lecture addresses how the will is ordered to the highest good (God) and how particular goods must be ordered to the common good, using examples such as the judge and the thief’s wife, St. Paul’s thorn in the flesh, and the structure of the Our Father.

64. Interior and Exterior Acts: Goodness and Dependence #

This lecture examines the relationship between interior acts of the will and exterior acts in terms of moral goodness and badness. Berquist works through Aquinas’s analysis of whether goodness resides primarily in interior or exterior acts, whether exterior act goodness depends entirely on the will, and whether interior and exterior acts share the same goodness. The discussion integrates arguments from Scripture, Augustine, Aristotle, and Pseudo-Dionysius to establish how the will’s intention relates to the moral quality of external deeds.

65. Interior and Exterior Acts, Events, and Moral Culpability #

This lecture examines whether exterior acts add moral significance beyond the interior act of the will, whether unforeseen consequences affect moral character, and how to distinguish between badness (malum), sin (peccatum), and culpability (culpa). Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of these distinctions in the Summa Theologiae II-II, Questions 20-22, emphasizing the importance of precise terminology for moral theology.

66. Malum, Peccatum, and Culpa: The Hierarchy of Evil and Sin #

This lecture explores the precise distinctions between malum (evil/bad), peccatum (sin), and culpa (guilt) in Thomistic moral theology. Berquist examines how these terms relate hierarchically, with special attention to the voluntary nature of acts, the role of reason and eternal law in determining rectitude, and how only voluntary acts can be culpable. The discussion includes the linguistic and conceptual differences between these Latin terms and their English translations, drawing on Thomas Aquinas’s De Malo and examples from both natural and artificial acts.

67. Merit, Demerit, and the Common Good #

This lecture addresses whether human acts possess the character of merit or demerit, particularly in relation to the common good and to God. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of how acts ordered to individuals, to communities, and to God himself all bear the aspect of merit or demerit through retribution according to justice. The discussion establishes that merit and demerit arise not only from acts directly affecting another person but fundamentally from acts affecting the common good of which each person is a part.

68. Passion in the Soul: Nature and Equivocal Meanings #

This lecture examines whether passion (passio) exists in the immaterial soul and explores the equivocal nature of the term across three distinct meanings: general reception (communiter), proper reception with change, and most proper reception with loss or harm (propriissimus modus). Berquist demonstrates how the word ‘passion’ is carried over from sensible experience to spiritual realities while dropping certain aspects of its original meaning, drawing on Aristotle’s analysis of ‘before’ as an equivocal term to illuminate the logical structure of this linguistic transference.

69. Passion and Undergoing in the Appetitive Powers #

This lecture examines whether passion (passio) as undergoing is more properly found in the appetitive (desiring) power than in the apprehensive (knowing) power, and whether it belongs more to the sensitive appetite than the intellectual appetite. Berquist explores the distinction between spiritual and bodily changes, the difference between how the appetitive power relates to things in themselves versus how the apprehensive power receives intentions of things in the mind, and the equivocal nature of the term ‘passion’ itself.

70. Dialectic, Quotations, and the Learning of Philosophy #

This lecture explores how Thomas Aquinas employs dialectical reasoning and citations from Church Fathers to develop philosophical and theological arguments. Berquist discusses the role of probable opinions in dialectic, the importance of learning from authoritative minds, and how the intellect gradually assimilates foreign concepts—using the analogy of digestion. The lecture emphasizes that philosophical knowledge develops through a discursive process of thinking out definitions, distinctions, and conclusions, and illustrates this with examples from Mozart’s music and the Thomistic treatment of the passions.

71. Contrariety of Passions and the Eleven Emotions #

This lecture examines Article 2 of Aquinas’s treatment of passions, focusing on whether irascible passions have contrariety only according to good and bad. Berquist explores two types of contrariety in motion (excess/recess and contrariety of terms), demonstrates how the irascible passions differ from concupiscible passions by exhibiting both types, and resolves the apparent paradox that anger has no contrary by explaining it as a privation rather than a true contrary. The lecture establishes the framework of eleven distinct passions (six concupiscible, five irascible) that serve as the matter for the virtues.

72. Moral Good and Evil in the Passions of the Soul #

This lecture examines whether passions of the soul can possess moral good or evil character, addressing the Stoic claim that all passions are vices and the Peripatetic claim that moderated passions are virtuous. Berquist explores how passions relate to reason and the will, distinguishing between passions considered in themselves and passions subject to rational command, and clarifies that the perfection of human moral action requires the regulation—not elimination—of emotional responses through reason.

73. Moral Character of Passions and the Order of Concupiscible Appetites #

This lecture explores whether passions possess intrinsic moral goodness or badness according to their species, and establishes love as the first passion of the concupiscible appetite. Berquist discusses how passions are considered in two ways—according to nature and according to morality (as subject to reason)—and argues that certain passions like shame and envy can be good or bad by their very nature. The lecture culminates in defending Augustine’s thesis that all passions of the concupiscible appetite flow from love as their foundational source.

74. Hope as First of the Irascible Passions #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s argument that hope is the first passion of the irascible appetite, exploring the distinction between passions whose objects are good versus bad, and establishing the natural priority of hope over despair and fear over boldness. Berquist explains why the good is naturally prior to the bad and how this ordering reflects the fundamental structure of human appetitive response, connecting the passions to theological virtues and illustrating the principles with practical examples.

75. The Four Principal Passions: Joy, Sadness, Hope, and Fear #

This lecture examines Article 4 of Aquinas’s treatment of the passions, defending why joy, sadness, hope, and fear are considered the chief passions of the soul. Berquist addresses objections from Augustine and others, establishes the distinction between completing passions (joy and sadness) and moving passions (hope and fear), and illustrates how these four passions apply across different contexts, including literary theory and contemporary Church teaching.

76. Love as Passion: Nature, Distinctions, and Definitions #

This lecture examines whether amor (love) is a passion and explores the distinctions between amor, dilectio (chosen love), caritas (charity), and amicitia (friendship). Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s systematic treatment of love, clarifying how the desirable object acts upon the appetitive power, how love involves both a change in the appetite and a resulting motion toward the object, and how different names for love reflect different aspects of this fundamental reality. The lecture also addresses the philosophical problem of the circular motion of appetite and the relationship between passion and virtue.

77. The Good as the Cause of Love #

This lecture examines whether the good is the proper and fundamental cause of love, and addresses objections that the bad can also be loved. Berquist clarifies that the bad is never loved except insofar as it appears good in some respect (secundum quid), and that love requires connaturality between the lover and the beloved. The discussion centers on Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of love’s causes and the distinction between absolute and qualified goodness.

78. Beauty, Goodness, Knowledge, and Likeness as Causes of Love #

This lecture explores the distinction between beauty and goodness, examines whether knowledge is a cause of love, and analyzes how likeness functions as a cause of love. Berquist works through Thomistic arguments showing that beauty adds to goodness a reference to the knowing power, that knowledge is required for love but need not be perfect, and that likeness—both in act and in potency—operates as a genuine cause of love while also explaining how hatred can arise from likeness when goods compete.

79. The Effects of Love: Union, Indwelling, Ecstasy, and Zeal #

This lecture examines the four principal effects of love according to Thomas Aquinas: union, mutual indwelling, ecstasy, and zeal. Berquist explores how love causes real union through the pursuit of presence and union of affection through an internal bond, discusses the distinction between love of concupiscence and love of friendship, and clarifies that true ecstasy belongs to the love of friendship, not the love of wanting. The lecture addresses classical objections and demonstrates how love operates differently on the knowing and desiring powers of the soul.

80. Mutual Indwelling and Zeal as Effects of Love #

This lecture explores the second and fourth major effects of love according to Thomistic theology: mutual indwelling (mutua inhaesio) and zeal (zelus). Berquist distinguishes between mutual indwelling as it operates through the knowing power and the desiring power, examines objections regarding how lover and beloved can be in one another simultaneously, and clarifies the distinction between virtuous zeal (defending the beloved’s good) and vicious envy. The lecture demonstrates how these effects operate differently in the love of wanting versus the love of friendship.

81. Love as Passion: Injury, Melting, and Universal Cause #

This lecture examines whether love injures the lover and whether love is the universal cause of all actions. Berquist explores the distinction between love’s formal effects (melting, languor, fruition) and its accidental bodily consequences, and argues that love perfects or injures the lover depending on whether the loved object is a true good or an apparent good. The lecture concludes that every agent acts from some love understood universally—including intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love—not merely passionate emotion.

82. The Nature and Causation of Hatred #

This lecture examines St. Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of hatred (odium) as a passion contrary to love. Berquist analyzes whether the bad is the proper object of hate, explores the relationship between love and hate through the principle that all hatred proceeds from love, and addresses the paradoxical question of whether hate can be stronger than love. The lecture employs careful distinctions between per se and per accidens, and between things being together (simul) in reason versus in reality.

83. Self-Hatred and the Distinctions of the Self #

This lecture explores Article 4 of Aquinas on whether someone can hate himself, using careful philosophical distinctions to resolve the apparent contradiction between the natural law that each thing loves itself and the scriptural assertion that those who love iniquity hate their own souls. Berquist emphasizes the crucial distinctions between per se and per accidens, simpliciter and secundum quid, and the distinction between the true self (the rational soul) and the bodily self, illustrating these principles through Shakespeare’s Richard III and contemporary examples.

84. Distinctions in Being: Per Se and Per Accidens #

This lecture explores the fundamental Thomistic distinction between per se (as such, essentially) and per accidens (accidentally) predication—a distinction critical for avoiding logical fallacies and understanding both metaphysics and theology. Berquist demonstrates how this distinction applies to concrete examples (sickness and health, ignorance and learning, matter and form) and shows how philosophical errors from Plato through Sartre to Berkeley arise from confusing these categories. The lecture emphasizes that recognizing this distinction is essential for philosophical reasoning and extends to theological matters like the Trinity and divine attributes.

85. Concupiscence: Nature and Distinction of Appetite #

This lecture examines the nature of concupiscence as desire for sensible pleasure, exploring whether it belongs exclusively to the sensitive appetite or can extend to rational powers. Berquist analyzes the distinction between concupiscence and related passions (love, pleasure, aversion), explains why the concupiscible power is named from concupiscence rather than other passions, and discusses how concupiscence differs formally based on the presence or absence of its good object.

86. Concupiscence as a Special Passion of the Concupiscible Appetite #

This lecture examines whether concupiscence (desire for pleasant goods) constitutes a distinct passion of the concupiscible appetite, or whether it is merely identical to love or pleasure. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s response to objections, establishing that concupiscence is formally distinguished from both its cause (love) and its effect (pleasure) by the presence or absence of the desired good. The lecture explores the relationship between the concupiscible and irascible appetites, and discusses how the pleasant good acts upon the desiring power differently depending on whether it is present or absent.

87. Concupiscence, Pleasure, and the Infinite Desire #

This lecture explores the distinction between natural and non-natural concupiscence (desire), examining how reason elevates and diversifies human appetitive desires beyond mere animal instinct. Berquist discusses whether desires can be infinite, distinguishing between natural desires limited by what nature requires and non-natural desires that can proceed infinitely through reason. The lecture concludes by introducing pleasure (delectatio) as a passion and motion of the soul, examining whether pleasure is itself a passion and how it relates to the operations that cause it.

88. Pleasure as Passion and Its Relation to Time #

This lecture examines whether pleasure constitutes a true passion (passio) and whether it exists in time. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s resolution of apparent contradictions between Aristotle’s treatment of pleasure as operation and Augustine’s classification of pleasure among the passions. The lecture emphasizes that pleasure is a passion of the sensitive appetite that perfects rather than corrupts, and explores the distinction between pleasure existing in time per se versus per accidens.

89. Pleasure, Joy, and Motion in the Soul #

This lecture explores the nature of pleasure (delectatio) and joy (gaudium) as passions of the soul, distinguishing them from motion and operation. Berquist examines whether pleasure exists in time, how joy differs from pleasure as a species following upon reason, and clarifies that both operate according to different principles—bodily pleasure being successive and in time, while spiritual pleasure and the beatific vision participate in eternity.

90. Bodily vs. Spiritual Pleasures: Article 5, Question 31 #

This lecture addresses whether bodily pleasures are greater than spiritual pleasures. Berquist examines the apparent superiority of bodily pleasures (more widely pursued, more physically dramatic, requiring restraint) against Thomas Aquinas’s argument that spiritual pleasures are actually greater in themselves. The analysis considers three factors that determine pleasure’s magnitude: the good itself, that to which it is joined, and the joining itself.

91. Imitation in Art, Pleasures of Sense, and Natural vs. Unnatural Desires #

This lecture explores art as imitation of nature, the comparative greatness of sensory pleasures (particularly sight versus touch), and the crucial distinction between natural and unnatural pleasures in human life. Berquist examines how Shakespeare and other artists hold up mirrors to nature, analyzes why certain pleasures appear greater than others, and resolves the question of whether corrupted desires can be considered natural to a depraved individual.

92. Pleasure, Contrariety, and the Proper Enjoyment of Goods #

This lecture examines whether pleasure can be contrary to pleasure, drawing on Aristotelian principles of contrariety and Thomistic analysis of the passions. Berquist explores how different pleasures can impede one another (like enjoying Mozart versus reading simultaneously), how the proper pleasure of a form must be understood according to its own nature (tragedy versus comedy), and how different goods have their own appropriate modes of enjoyment. The discussion ranges from sensory pleasures (eating, drinking wine) to intellectual and aesthetic pleasures (reading literature, appreciating drama), illustrating the principle that one must approach each kind of good according to its proper nature to attain its corresponding pleasure.

93. The Causes of Pleasure: Operation, Motion, and Knowledge #

Berquist explores Thomas Aquinas’s systematic treatment of pleasure’s causes, focusing on the first two of eight questions: whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure, and whether motion can cause pleasure. The lecture emphasizes the crucial distinction between operation (perfect act) and motion (imperfect act), and examines how knowledge, variety, and the removal of contrary states contribute to pleasure. The analysis reveals why God, being immutable, cannot experience pleasure from motion or change.

94. Pleasure: Causes, Memory, Hope, and Sadness #

This lecture continues Aquinas’s analysis of the causes of pleasure, examining whether hope and memory are proper causes of pleasure, how sadness can paradoxically cause pleasure, and whether the actions of others can produce pleasure in us. Berquist explores these questions through Aquinas’s systematic method, introducing key distinctions about presence (by knowledge vs. in reality) and the principle of per accidens causation, while demonstrating how seemingly contrary things can work together through proper understanding.

95. Causes of Pleasure: Liberality, Benefaction, Likeness, and Wonder #

In this lecture, Berquist examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of multiple causes of pleasure, focusing particularly on benefaction (doing good to others), likeness as a cause of pleasure, and wonder as both a philosophical principle and source of delight. The lecture systematically works through Aquinas’s responses to objections regarding why giving away one’s own good can cause pleasure, how likeness can be delightful despite apparent competition, and how ignorance (wonder) can paradoxically produce pleasure when it involves the desire to know truth.

96. The Effects of Pleasure: Dilation, Desire, and Reason #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of pleasure’s four main effects: dilation (expansion of the soul), the renewed desire or thirst it produces, its relationship to the use of reason, and how it perfects operation. Berquist works through the objections and responses to each article, clarifying how pleasure operates through both the knowing and desiring powers of the soul, distinguishing bodily from spiritual pleasures, and exploring how pleasure can both aid and impede the exercise of reason.

97. The Natural Beginning and Pleasure in Ethics #

This lecture explores Aristotle’s principle of beginning from the ’natural beginning’ (arxasai katafusim) and applies it to ethical inquiry, particularly examining the question of whether pleasure is fundamentally good or bad. Berquist discusses how Plato and Aristotle establish that the natural beginning of ethics is understanding what all humans desire—the good—and how this principle guides subsequent philosophical investigation. The lecture culminates in addressing the objection that pleasure inherently corrupts reason and virtue.

98. Pleasure: Its Goodness, Nature, and Moral Significance #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of pleasure (laetitia, delectatio) in the Summa Theologiae, exploring whether pleasure is inherently good or bad, how it relates to reason and virtue, and whether some pleasures constitute the highest human good. Berquist presents Thomas’s middle position between Stoic and Epicurean extremes, emphasizing the moral significance of what the will takes pleasure in and the distinction between bodily pleasures (which can impede reason) and intellectual pleasures (which perfect reason).

99. Pain and Sadness as Passions of the Soul #

This lecture explores whether pain (dolor) is a passion of the soul, distinguishing it from sadness (tristitia) and examining how both relate to pleasure. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of pain, addressing objections about whether pain belongs to the body rather than the soul, and clarifying the role of apprehension and appetite in constituting these passions. The lecture emphasizes reason’s temporal dimension as foundational to understanding how humans experience and judge good and bad.

100. Pain, Sadness, and Their Contrariety to Pleasure #

This lecture examines the distinction between pain (dolor) and sadness (tristitia), arguing that sadness is a species of pain caused by interior apprehension rather than exterior sensation. Berquist and Thomas Aquinas explore whether pain and sadness are contrary to pleasure, how sadness can accidentally cause pleasure, and the role of objects in determining contrariety. The discussion emphasizes how reason’s ability to perceive past, present, and future enables emotional complexity beyond mere bodily sensation.

101. Pleasure, Sadness, and Contrariety in the Passions #

This lecture explores the metaphysical question of whether every sadness is contrary to every pleasure, examining how passions are specified by their objects rather than absolute forms. Berquist analyzes the distinction between contraries according to genus versus species, and demonstrates through Thomistic reasoning and literary examples from Shakespeare and Homer how reason operates through seeing distinctions and relationships in time (before and after). The lecture culminates in understanding how sadness and pleasure can have affinity rather than opposition when their objects are themselves contrary.

102. Sadness and Contemplation: Articles 5-6 #

This lecture examines whether sadness is opposed to the pleasure of contemplation (Article 5) and whether pain should be fled more than pleasure desired (Article 6). Berquist explores the distinction between contemplation as cause versus object of pleasure, the immateriality of intellectual knowledge, and the fundamental principle that what is per se is stronger than what is per accidens. The lecture demonstrates how the mind’s lack of bodily organs allows contemplative pleasure to avoid certain impediments that affect sensory pleasures.

103. Interior vs. Exterior Pain and Species of Sadness #

This lecture examines whether interior sorrow is greater than exterior pain, defending the position that interior pain is preeminent because it pertains per se to the appetite rather than per accidens through the body. Berquist then introduces Damascene’s division of sadness into four species—acedia, anxiety, envy, and misericordia—and defends this division against objections by distinguishing between species proper and species taken through application of a notion to extraneous matter.

104. Sadness and Its Causes: Loss of Good vs. Presence of Evil #

Berquist explores Thomas Aquinas’s investigation into the causes of sadness, specifically whether sadness is caused primarily by the loss of a good thing or the presence of an evil thing. The lecture examines how sadness operates as a flight or withdrawal from evil rather than merely a privation of good, and discusses important forms of sadness—particularly melancholy and loneliness—that Thomas’s enumeration does not exhaustively cover. Through analysis of natural motions and the role of love as a universal cause, Berquist clarifies the distinction between apprehending loss of good and apprehending present evil.

105. The Causes of Sadness: Evil, Desire, and Unity #

Berquist examines Thomas Aquinas’s analysis of the four primary causes of sadness: the evil joined to one versus the good lost, concupiscence (desire) as a cause, the desire for unity, and the imposition of a greater power. Through careful distinction between per se and per alia causation, the lecture explores how sadness fundamentally relates to the appetite’s recoil from evil rather than mere loss of good, while emphasizing love as the more fundamental cause underlying all emotional motion.

106. Causes of Sadness: Unity, Desire, and Greater Power #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s analysis of what causes sadness (tristitia), focusing on three primary questions: whether the desire for unity is a universal cause of pain, whether greater power is a cause of sadness, and how sadness affects the soul’s capacity for learning. Berquist explores the relationship between love, unity, and goodness as transcendental properties, and clarifies that sadness requires not merely the presence of evil but the resistance of the will to a greater power.

107. Effects of Sadness: Weighing Down, Operations, and Bodily Harm #

This lecture examines Articles 2-4 on the effects of sadness (tristitia), exploring how sadness metaphorically ‘weighs down’ or depresses the soul, how it affects human operations and solicitude, and why sadness uniquely harms the body more than other passions. Berquist demonstrates Thomas’s method of distinguishing apparent contradictions and applies the discussion to understanding emotions as they relate to God’s attributes.

108. Remedies of Sadness: Pleasure, Weeping, and Friendship #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s analysis of five remedies for sadness and pain, drawing from the Summa Contra Gentiles. Berquist explores how pleasure mitigates sadness through contrary disposition rather than specific opposition, why weeping and emotional expression paradoxically relieve sorrow through catharsis and suitable operation, and how the compassion of friends consoles through shared burden and the perception of being loved. The discussion involves subtle philosophical distinctions about emotions, the will, the appetitive powers, and their proper ordering according to reason.

109. The Goodness and Badness of Sadness #

This lecture examines whether sadness is intrinsically evil or whether it can be good depending on its object and the disposition of the will. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s analysis of sadness (tristitia) as a passion that can be bad in itself (secundum se) but good from supposition (ex suppositione) when directed toward genuine evil. The discussion addresses whether sadness can be an honorable good and a useful good, ultimately concluding that sadness is never the greatest evil because it always contains some mixture of good judgment and proper will.

110. Sadness as Good and Evil: Utility and Hierarchy #

This lecture examines whether sadness can be a useful good and whether it constitutes the greatest evil of man. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of sadness in the Summa Theologiae, distinguishing between moderate and immoderate sadness, exploring how sadness about sin differs from sadness about temporal goods, and establishing that sin itself is a greater evil than the pain or sadness that follows it. The lecture concludes with an introduction to the irascible passions, particularly hope and fear.

111. Hope, Desire, and the Irascible Appetite #

This lecture examines whether hope is identical to desire (cupidity) and establishes that hope properly belongs to the irascible appetite rather than the concupiscible. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s systematic treatment of hope’s four essential conditions—that it concerns a future, difficult, possible good—and addresses whether hope pertains to the knowing or desiring power. The lecture concludes by investigating whether brute animals possess hope through natural instinct.

112. Despair as Contrary to Hope #

This lecture examines whether despair is contrary to hope, focusing on the nature of contrariety in the irascible passions. Berquist explores how despair and hope relate to the same object (a difficult good) but differ in judgment of possibility versus impossibility. Through Platonic, Shakespearean, and personal examples, the lecture illustrates how hope and despair function in human cognition, teaching, and spiritual life.

113. Experience, Youth, and Hope as Cause of Love #

This lecture examines the causes of hope, particularly experience and youth, and explores the relationship between hope and love. Berquist demonstrates how experience can both cause hope (by increasing power and making things seem possible) and cause the defect of hope (by making things seem impossible). The lecture culminates in analyzing how hope can be a cause of love, particularly through the mediation of a benefactor or teacher, connecting this to Augustine’s teaching that faith begets hope and hope begets charity.

114. Hope and Fear: The Irascible Passions #

This lecture examines hope and fear as the principal passions of the irascible appetite, exploring their nature as passions of the soul, their objects, and their effects on human operation. Berquist analyzes Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of hope in Question 40, Article 8 of the Summa Theologiae, addressing objections about how hope can aid rather than impede operation, and then transitions to introducing fear as a distinct irascible passion with its own character and importance.

115. Fear as a Special Passion of the Soul #

This lecture examines whether fear constitutes a special passion of the soul with its own distinct object, or merely a general condition of other passions. Berquist guides students through Thomas Aquinas’s systematic treatment of fear, establishing the four-part definition of fear’s object (future evil, difficult, not easily avoided), distinguishing fear from related passions like sadness and aversion, and addressing objections from Augustine, Aristotle, and John Damascene regarding fear’s nature and species.

116. The Object of Fear: Evil, Nature, and Guilt #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s analysis of fear (timor) as a passion, focusing on Question 42 of the Summa Theologiæ. Berquist explores what fear properly regards as its object—whether evil or good, natural evil or guilt—and distinguishes fear from sadness through their different temporal orientations (future vs. present evil). The lecture demonstrates how precise Thomistic definitions resolve apparent contradictions in authorities like Augustine and Aristotle.

117. Fear, Love, and the Causes of Fear #

This lecture examines whether fear can itself be feared, explores the relationship between sudden/unforeseen things and fear intensity, and addresses irremediable evils and their connection to perpetual suffering. The lecture then transitions to analyzing the causes of fear, particularly investigating whether love is a cause of fear and how defect relates to the genesis of fearful passions.

118. Effects of Fear: Contraction, Counsel, and Trembling #

This lecture examines the effects of fear on both body and soul, specifically addressing whether fear causes contraction, whether it induces deliberation and counsel, and whether it produces trembling. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of these questions, analyzing the distinction between the formal (appetitive) and material (bodily) aspects of fear, and illustrating how moderate fear can aid reason while excessive fear impedes it.

119. Fear, Boldness, and the Irascible Passions #

This lecture continues the Thomistic analysis of fear as a passion of the irascible appetite, examining its bodily effects, its relationship to reason and counsel, and its distinction from boldness (audacity). Berquist explores how moderate fear aids deliberation while excessive fear impedes operation, and clarifies the relationship between boldness and hope as contrary and principal passions respectively.

120. Boldness and Drunkenness: Causes and False Estimation #

This lecture examines Question 45, Article 3 of Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, specifically whether defects cause boldness. Berquist analyzes three apparent defects—drunkenness, inexperience of dangers, and suffering unjust treatment—and shows how each appears to cause boldness despite being a defect. Through careful distinction between per se and per accidens causation, he demonstrates that boldness is caused not by defect itself but by the excellence (true or false estimation) that accompanies it.

121. Boldness and Courage: Analysis of Audacity in Danger #

This lecture examines whether the bold are more prompt at the beginning of dangers or within dangers themselves, exploring the distinction between boldness as a sudden sense-judgment and courage as reasoned virtue. Berquist analyzes how boldness arises from hope, how anger provokes boldness, and why the bold may tremble at the outset while faltering in actual danger, contrasting this with the brave who deliberate carefully and persist through virtue. The lecture includes extended discussions on logical fallacies (secundum quid to simpliciter), the role of reason in moderating passions, and the philosophical importance of logic and careful reasoning in recognizing and avoiding errors.

122. Anger as a Special Passion: Nature and Composition #

Berquist examines whether anger is a distinct passion or merely a combination of other passions, drawing on Thomas Aquinas’s analysis. The lecture explores anger’s composition from sadness, hope, and desire; its distinction from the concupiscible appetite; its relationship to reason; and why it uniquely lacks a simple contrary. Key concepts include the two senses of ‘general’ (per predicationem and per causationem) and the necessity of hope for anger to arise.

123. The Nature of Anger: Objects, Powers, and Reason #

This lecture examines anger as a distinct passion within Thomistic psychology, exploring whether anger is a special passion or merely a combination of other passions, what objects anger regards (good, bad, or both), whether anger belongs to the irascible or concupiscible appetite, and how anger relates to reason. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s systematic treatment of these questions, emphasizing the distinction between anger’s two-fold objects (revenge as good, and the person against whom revenge is sought as bad/harmful) and anger’s imperfect but real relationship to reason.

124. Anger Compared to Concupiscence and Hate #

This lecture covers Articles 5-7 of Question 46, examining whether anger is more natural than concupiscence, whether anger is more grave than hate, and whether anger properly applies only to those toward whom there is justice. Berquist presents Thomas Aquinas’s nuanced distinctions between these passions, particularly emphasizing how anger involves reason in a way concupiscence does not, and how hate is ultimately worse than anger despite appearing less intense.

125. Anger and Its Causes: Contempt as the Universal Motive #

This lecture explores the causes of anger within Thomas Aquinas’s framework, focusing on whether injury to oneself is necessary for anger and whether thinking little of someone (parvipensio) is the universal cause. Berquist discusses how anger differs from hatred, examines anger directed at God, at third parties, and at oneself, and clarifies how contempt and perceived injustice trigger anger across different contexts. The lecture draws extensively on Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Thomas’s Summa Theologiae to establish the necessary conditions for anger.

126. The Causes and Effects of Anger #

This lecture continues Berquist’s examination of anger through Articles 2-4 of Question 47 and the beginning of Question 48. The discussion focuses on what causes anger (primarily thinking little of someone/contempt), how different circumstances affect anger’s intensity, and the paradoxical effects of anger—particularly how it produces both pleasure and fervor. Berquist draws extensively on Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Thomas Aquinas’s systematic analysis of the passion.

127. The Effects of Anger: Fervor, Reason, and Speech #

This lecture examines the principal effects of anger according to Thomas Aquinas, focusing on whether anger causes fervor (bodily heat), impedes the use of reason, and produces taciturnity (silence). Berquist works through Thomas’s distinctions between the formal (rational) and material (bodily) aspects of anger, showing how anger can simultaneously arise from reason while impairing its perfect operation through bodily disturbance.

128. Habit as Quality and the Category of Having #

This lecture addresses whether habit (habitus) belongs to the category of quality or stands as a separate category. Through analysis of Aristotle’s Categories, Thomas Aquinas distinguishes multiple senses of the word “to have” (habere) and explains how habit functions as a stable quality that perfects human powers, as opposed to temporary dispositions. The discussion clarifies the equivocal nature of key philosophical terms and establishes the proper framework for understanding habits as principles of human action.

129. The Ten Highest Genera and Categories of Being #

Berquist explores Aristotle’s doctrine of the ten highest genera (categories or predicaments), examining how they are distinguished by the ways something can be predicated of individual substances. The lecture traces the logical structure underlying Aristotle’s categorical scheme, explains Thomas Aquinas’s threefold division of accidental being, and illustrates how each category relates to individual substances either by existing in them or being said of them.

130. Habit as the First Species of Quality #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s resolution of whether habit (habitus) is truly a quality, and more specifically, whether it constitutes a determined species of quality distinct from others. Berquist walks through the objections drawn from Augustine and Aristotle’s Categories, demonstrates how the equivocal term ’to have’ creates apparent contradictions, and shows how Thomas clarifies that habit is the first species of quality by virtue of its relation to nature as the measure of good and bad disposition.

131. The Four Species of Quality and the Priority of Habit #

This lecture examines Aristotle’s four species of quality as presented in the Categories, with particular focus on why habit must be understood as the first and primary species. Berquist explores Thomas Aquinas’s refinement of Aristotle’s doctrine, emphasizing that habit pertains to the nature of a thing and thus enjoys metaphysical priority. The lecture demonstrates how to properly distinguish habit from disposition, and how other species of quality relate to habit through their reference (or lack thereof) to the natural end of a thing.

132. Habit, Order to Act, and Bodily Dispositions #

This lecture covers three major questions from Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of habit: whether habit necessarily implies an order to action (Article 3), whether habit is necessary for creatures (Article 4), and whether bodily dispositions can constitute true habits (Article 5). Berquist explores how habit relates to both the nature of a thing and its operations, the three conditions required for habit to be necessary, and the distinction between habits in the soul versus dispositions in the body.

133. Bodily Dispositions, Habits, and the Soul’s Powers #

This lecture examines whether bodily dispositions like health and beauty constitute true habits, and whether habits inhere in the soul’s essence or in its powers. Berquist discusses the distinction between dispositions ordered to form versus operation, addresses the special case of sanctifying grace, and explores how the sensitive powers (emotions and sense faculties) can acquire habits through obedience to reason.

134. Intellectual Habits and the Possible Intellect #

This lecture addresses Article 4 of Aquinas’s treatment of habits, examining whether the possible intellect can be the subject of intellectual habits. Berquist systematically refutes objections claiming that because the intellect is immaterial and form-like, it cannot possess habits. He establishes that the possible intellect, though separated from matter, exists in potency with respect to intelligible forms, making it capable of receiving intellectual habits just as prime matter receives sensible forms. The discussion involves careful distinctions between types of potency, the role of phantasms in intellectual knowledge, and the proper ordering of acts to habits.

135. Habits in Angels and the Nature of Potency #

Berquist concludes the examination of where habits can exist by addressing whether angels possess habits. He argues that although angels are immaterial and simple substances, they are not pure act like God and therefore possess a kind of potency (intellectual potency) that requires habits. The lecture emphasizes the critical distinction between material potency and intellectual potency, and shows how the same term ‘habit’ applies analogically—not univocally—to human and angelic substances. He also explores the axiom that per se is before per accidens, using examples from the Manichaean heresy and Platonic forms to clarify how axioms can be misapplied.

136. Natural Habits and Their Causes #

This lecture examines whether habits can be natural to human beings and angels, exploring the distinction between habits that arise entirely from nature versus those requiring exterior principles. Berquist discusses how habits are caused by acts, whether a single act suffices to generate a habit, and how reason and will interact in habit formation. The discussion emphasizes the role of hope in pursuing difficult knowledge and clarifies how natural dispositions differ across species and individuals.

137. The Causation and Growth of Habits #

This lecture addresses fundamental questions about whether habits can be caused by human acts and whether habits can grow or increase. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s resolution of apparent contradictions between Aristotelian philosophy and theological understanding, examining how human powers that are both active and passive can generate habits through repeated acts, and how spiritual realities like faith and virtue can receive more and less despite being immaterial.

138. Linguistic Translation and the Problem of Categories #

This lecture addresses the philosophical challenges of translating Greek and Latin philosophical terminology, particularly examining how words like ’episteme’, ‘category’, and ‘predicament’ carry meanings that are often lost or obscured in English translation. Berquist explores the relationship between the Greek notion of kategoria (accusation) and the Latin predicamentum, demonstrating how the original etymologies illuminate the underlying philosophical concepts, and connects this discussion to how predicables (genus, species, difference, property, accident) function as foundational tools for logic, definition, and demonstration.

139. Growth in Habits and Spiritual Forms #

This lecture explores how immaterial realities like habits and virtues can “grow” despite growth being etymologically tied to bodily quantity. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s distinction between growth according to the form itself (extension to more objects) and growth according to participation of the subject (deeper possession of the same form). The lecture addresses four historical opinions on whether qualities and habits receive more and less, and resolves apparent contradictions by examining what admits intensity and remission and what remains fixed in species.

140. Growth of Habits: Addition vs. Participation #

This lecture addresses whether habits (especially intellectual and moral virtues) grow through the addition of new form to existing form, or through the subject’s increasingly perfect participation in the same form. Berquist explores Thomas Aquinas’s response to objections based on bodily growth and physical examples, clarifying how intensity and remission of forms work without changing species or involving literal addition.

141. Habit Increase, Corruption, and Diminution #

This lecture examines whether acts increase habits, and how habits can be corrupted or diminished. Berquist follows Thomas Aquinas’s analysis of habit growth through intensification rather than addition, discusses conditions under which habits can be lost through contrary acts or cessation, and addresses the relationship between habit stability and the corruptibility of their subjects.

142. Habits, Accidents, and the Corruption of Virtues #

This lecture explores the nature of habits as accidents and how they relate to their subjects, particularly examining whether habits can be corrupted or diminished through cessation from act. Berquist discusses the distinction between abstract and concrete forms of accidents (like whiteness versus white), analyzes objections to the view that habits diminish through inactivity, and resolves these through a careful analysis of causation (distinguishing between direct causation and causation per accidens through removal of impediments). The lecture then transitions to examining whether multiple habits can exist in a single power.

143. Whether Habits Are Distinguished by Good and Bad #

Berquist addresses whether habits can be distinguished according to good and bad qualities, engaging objections from the principle that good and bad are contraries and that good is transcendental. The lecture clarifies how virtues and vices are fundamentally distinguished as species of habits according to their conformity or disconformity with human nature, and how the same operative habit can concern both good and bad acts while itself being either good or bad. This discussion prepares the foundation for understanding virtue as a good habit in the Thomistic tradition.

144. Virtue as Habit and the Good Habit #

This lecture examines virtue as a habit that perfects a power of the soul, distinguishing it from mere power or potency. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of virtue’s nature, exploring the distinction between habits ordered to being versus operation, the necessity that virtue be good, and the comprehensive definition of virtue as a good quality of mind by which one lives rightly. The lecture emphasizes careful linguistic analysis and the importance of distinguishing multiple senses of key terms like ‘virtue,’ ‘perfect,’ and ‘good.’

145. The Subject of Virtue: Powers, Understanding, and Will #

This lecture addresses where virtue resides in the human soul—in its essence or in its powers—and explores which powers can be subjects of virtue. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s systematic treatment of intellectual virtues (science, art, understanding) versus moral virtues, examining how the understanding and will relate to virtue, and how the appetitive powers (irascible and concupiscible) can partake of reason and thus become subject to virtue.

146. Prudence, Moral Virtue, and the Irascible and Concupiscible Powers #

This lecture examines the subject of prudence (practical wisdom) and whether the irascible and concupiscible appetitive powers can be subjects of human virtue. Berquist explores the relationship between prudence and moral virtue, the distinction between despotic and political rule (body vs. emotions), and how the sensitive appetitive powers participate in reason through habituation. The discussion centers on Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of these questions and their foundation in Aristotelian ethics.

147. Will as Subject of Virtue and the Three Speculative Intellectual Virtues #

This lecture examines whether the will can be a subject of virtue, concluding that virtues like charity and justice perfect the will when directed toward goods exceeding human proportion (God and neighbor). Berquist then transitions to the three speculative intellectual virtues—understanding (intellectus), science (scientia), and wisdom (sapientia)—explaining how they perfect the intellect for contemplation of truth and constitute a beginning of beatitude, while addressing why they are virtues in an incomplete sense that lacks the appetitive perfection of moral virtues.

148. Art and Prudence as Intellectual Virtues #

This lecture explores the nature of art (ars) and prudence (prudentia/foresight) as intellectual virtues, distinguishing them from speculative virtues and from each other. Berquist examines how art perfects the ability to make good external products while prudence perfects both the ability and use of human actions, requiring moral virtue as its foundation. The lecture emphasizes the crucial distinction between making (facere) and doing (agere) and explains why prudence is essential for living well.

149. Prudence as a Necessary Virtue for Living Well #

This lecture examines whether prudence (φρόνησις/prudentia) is a virtue necessary for human flourishing. Berquist defends prudence against three objections by distinguishing it from art, clarifying that prudence perfects the agent rather than external works, and explaining how practical reason achieves truth through conformity to right appetite rather than mere conformity to things. The lecture emphasizes that prudence remains necessary throughout life, not merely for acquiring virtue but for its continuous and proper exercise in particular circumstances.

150. Prudence and Its Subordinate Virtues: Counsel, Judgment, and Command #

This lecture examines the three acts of practical reason (counsel, judgment, and command) and explains why prudence requires multiple subordinate virtues. Berquist explores the distinction between eubulia (good counsel), synesis (judgment in ordinary matters), and gnome (judgment in difficult matters), arguing that judgment requires knowledge of proper principles particular to each subject matter. The lecture demonstrates why multiple forms of judgment exist while only one virtue governs counsel, and illustrates how different sciences employ different methods of judging.

151. Moral Virtue Distinguished from Intellectual Virtue #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s distinction between moral and intellectual virtues as the fundamental division of human virtue. Berquist explores the etymological basis of ‘moral’ virtue in the Latin term ‘mos’ (custom and natural inclination), defends the sufficiency of this two-fold division against objections, and establishes why moral virtue cannot exist without intellectual virtue, particularly prudence. The discussion clarifies how reason and the appetitive power must both be perfected for virtuous human action.

152. The Division of Human Virtue: Intellectual and Moral #

This lecture addresses whether human virtue is sufficiently divided into intellectual and moral virtue, examining three main objections: the ambiguous status of prudence (φρόνησις), the problem of continence and perseverance as apparent virtues-in-between, and the status of faith, hope, and charity as theological virtues. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s responses, establishing that all human virtue necessarily perfects either reason or the appetitive power, with particular emphasis on why prudence is essential to moral virtue despite being intellectually virtuous by nature.

153. Prudence, Moral Virtue, and the Role of Passion #

This lecture examines the relationship between intellectual virtue (particularly prudence) and moral virtue, arguing that prudence cannot exist without moral virtue because right judgment about particular goods requires a well-disposed appetitive power. Berquist also addresses whether passions are compatible with virtue, contrasting the Stoic view (passions incompatible with wisdom) with the Aristotelian-Thomistic view (passions can be ordered by reason and thus compatible with virtue). The lecture includes discussion of concrete cases illustrating how intention and disposition of the will affect the validity and nature of human acts.

154. Virtue, Sadness, and the Passions #

This lecture addresses the relationship between virtue and the passions, particularly whether sadness can coexist with virtue. Berquist examines the Stoic objection that the wise person should be free from all passions and presents Thomas Aquinas’s Peripatetic response. The discussion includes whether every moral virtue concerns the passions or whether some virtues, like justice, are primarily about operations rather than emotional states.

155. Moral Virtue, Passion, and the Distinction of Virtues #

This lecture explores the relationship between moral virtue and passion, arguing against the Stoic position that virtue eliminates passions entirely. Berquist examines whether moral virtue can exist with passion, how virtues moderate rather than eliminate passions, and addresses the fundamental question of whether there is only one moral virtue or whether virtues are distinguished by their objects and the diverse appetitive powers they perfect. The discussion introduces Question 60 on the distinction of moral virtues from one another.

156. Distinction of Moral Virtues by Operations and Passions #

This lecture examines how moral virtues are distinguished from one another, particularly the division between virtues concerning operations (like justice) and virtues concerning passions (like temperance and fortitude). Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of Question 60, Article 2-4, exploring how the same virtue can have effects in both operations and passions, yet be distinguished according to different formal reasons. The lecture also addresses the unity of justice despite its diverse manifestations, and the multiplicity of virtues in the irascible appetite.

157. Moral Virtues Distinguished by Objects of Passions #

This lecture examines whether moral virtues are truly distinguished according to the objects of passions, exploring objections to this distinction and Thomas Aquinas’s resolution. Berquist analyzes how different passions and their objects relate to reason, why the concupiscible and irascible appetites generate diverse virtues despite some objects differing only in degree, and how reason’s ordering of passions determines virtue distinction. The discussion includes examination of specific virtues like temperance, fortitude, and related virtues like magnanimity, liberality, and the social virtues.

158. Cardinal Virtues: Division, Distinction, and Overflow #

This lecture examines the four cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance) through two interpretative frameworks: as general conditions found in all virtues, and as distinct special virtues. Berquist explores how these virtues are distinguished by their formal principles and subject matters, clarifies the interconnection of virtues through ‘overflow’ (redundancy), and addresses whether they are truly distinct from each other. The lecture also introduces the theological distinction between political virtues (natural), purging virtues (transitional toward divine likeness), purged soul virtues (of the blessed), and exemplar virtues (divine).

159. Theological Virtues: Their Nature and Distinction #

This lecture examines whether theological virtues exist, how they differ from intellectual and moral virtues, and why there are specifically three of them (faith, hope, and charity). Berquist explores the distinction between natural beatitude (achievable through human nature) and supernatural beatitude (requiring divine grace), arguing that theological virtues are necessary principles added to man to order him toward the supernatural end of union with God. The lecture addresses objections claiming theological virtues exceed human nature and therefore cannot perfect man, ultimately demonstrating how man participates in divine nature through grace.

160. The Three Theological Virtues: Faith, Hope, and Charity #

This lecture examines whether three theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity) exist as distinct infused virtues ordered to supernatural beatitude, and establishes their proper ordering both in generation and in perfection. Berquist addresses objections claiming there should be only one or two theological virtues, explains why faith, hope, and charity are necessary and distinct from natural intellectual and moral virtues, and clarifies how these virtues are ordered both developmentally (faith→hope→charity) and essentially (charity as form of all).

161. The Causes of Virtue: Nature, Habituation, and Infusion #

This lecture examines Question 63 of the Prima Secundae on the causes of virtues, exploring whether virtue is natural to humans, whether it arises through habituation and repeated acts, whether moral virtues are infused by God, and whether infused and acquired virtues differ in species. Berquist systematically works through Thomas Aquinas’s arguments, emphasizing the distinction between natural beginnings of virtue and the perfection of virtue, and the complementary relationship between acquired and infused virtues.

162. Infused Virtues and the Mean in Moral Virtue #

This lecture addresses Thomas Aquinas’s teaching on the necessity of infused virtues beyond acquired virtues, grounded in the principle that effects must be proportioned to their causes. It then transitions to examining whether moral virtue consists in a mean, clarifying that virtue is a middle in terms of matter but an extreme in terms of conformity to reason. The discussion includes the distinction between acquired and infused virtues and the special case of justice.

163. The Mean in Moral and Intellectual Virtue #

This lecture examines Question 64 of the Summa Theologiae, exploring whether virtue consists in a mean and how that mean operates differently across moral, intellectual, and theological virtues. Berquist focuses on the distinction between the mean of reason and the mean of the thing itself, using justice as the key exception where these coincide. He also addresses how affirmation and negation represent contraries in the intellect, establishing the foundation for understanding virtue as a conformity to right reason.

164. Kinds of Opposition and the Mean in Theological Virtues #

This lecture examines the four kinds of opposition (contradiction, contrariety, privation/lack, and relatives) and their applications to understanding the Trinity, Christology, and theological virtues. Berquist demonstrates how the truth in complex theological matters lies between contrary heresies, explaining why theological virtues cannot have excess with respect to God while still maintaining a mean from the perspective of human capacity (ex parte nostra).

165. The Connection of Moral Virtues and Charity #

This lecture explores the metaphysical and theological connections between moral virtues, intellectual virtues, and charity. Berquist distinguishes between acquired moral virtues (developed through repeated acts) and infused moral virtues (poured in by God), arguing that while acquired virtues can exist without charity, infused moral virtues necessarily require charity. The lecture examines why moral virtues are mutually connected through prudence, while intellectual virtues are not, and demonstrates that charity cannot exist without the infused moral virtues because the principal agent requires properly disposed instruments.

166. Faith, Hope, and Charity: Perfect and Imperfect Virtue #

This lecture examines whether faith and hope can exist without charity, and whether charity can exist without faith and hope. Berquist explores the distinction between perfect and imperfect virtue, arguing that while faith and hope can exist imperfectly without charity, they achieve their complete notion of virtue only when perfected by charity. Conversely, charity understood as friendship with God necessarily requires faith and hope as preconditions, even though charity surpasses them in perfection.

167. The Intensity and Equality of Virtues #

This lecture explores whether virtues can be possessed in greater or lesser degrees, whether all virtues in one person are equal in intensity, and how moral virtues compare to intellectual virtues. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of these questions, using the distinction between simpliciter (simply) and secundum quid (in a certain respect) to resolve apparent contradictions in the arguments.

168. The Hierarchy of Virtues: Justice and Wisdom #

This lecture examines which moral and intellectual virtues are greatest among their respective categories. Berquist explores why justice is the chief moral virtue (being closest to reason as it exists in the will), and why wisdom is the supreme intellectual virtue (considering the highest cause, God). The lecture employs the distinction between simply (simpliciter) and in a qualified way (secundum quid) to resolve apparent contradictions about virtue rankings.

169. Charity as the Greatest Theological Virtue #

This lecture examines whether charity is the greatest among the three theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity) through careful analysis of their objects and modes of operation. Berquist explores the apparent analogy between the relationship of faith to hope and charity, and the relationship of intellectual to moral virtues, demonstrating why this analogy is ‘slippery’ and ultimately fails. The core insight is that charity achieves union with God while faith and hope maintain a distance from their object, making charity superior despite all three virtues having the same object.

170. Intellectual Virtues and the Separated Soul #

This lecture examines whether intellectual virtues (particularly scientia, wisdom, and understanding) persist after death when the soul separates from the body. Berquist presents three main objections grounded in Scripture and Aristotle, then develops Thomas Aquinas’s sophisticated response distinguishing between the material aspect of intellectual knowledge (dependence on phantasms/images) and its formal aspect (intelligible forms in the possible intellect). The lecture explores how the separated soul will understand without bodily images, similar to angelic knowledge, and connects these themes to the relationship between faith and the beatific vision.

171. Faith and Hope in the Beatific Vision #

This lecture examines whether faith and hope remain after death in the state of glory, exploring Thomas Aquinas’s distinctions between perfect and imperfect knowledge, the definition of faith as conviction without vision, and why the beatific vision necessarily evacuates faith and hope while perfecting charity. Berquist analyzes the essential versus accidental imperfections of these virtues and defends the Thomistic position that only charity endures unchanged into glory.

172. Faith, Hope, and Charity in the Beatific Vision #

This lecture examines whether the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity persist after death in the beatific vision. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of these virtues, demonstrating that faith and hope necessarily cease when their defining characteristics are contradicted by direct vision of God, while charity uniquely remains and grows infinitely in glory. The lecture emphasizes the critical distinction between imperfections that are accidental to a virtue and imperfections that are essential to its definition.

173. The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and Their Distinction from Virtues #

This lecture addresses the fundamental distinction between the gifts of the Holy Spirit and virtues, arguing that while gifts are sometimes called virtues in Scripture and tradition, they differ in their ratio or formal definition. The gifts perfect man to be moved by divine inspiration and instinct, whereas virtues perfect man according to reason. Berquist examines whether gifts are necessary for salvation, whether they are habits, and traces the historical positions of Gregory the Great, Augustine, Albert, and Bonaventure before establishing Thomas’s resolution.

174. The Gifts of the Holy Spirit: Necessity and Nature as Habits #

This lecture covers Aquinas’s treatment of the Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit in Question 68, Articles 2-3 of the Summa Theologiae II-II. Berquist explores why the gifts are necessary for salvation despite the presence of theological and moral virtues, examining the distinction between virtue (which perfects reason) and gifts (which dispose man to follow the instinct of the Holy Spirit). The lecture also establishes that the gifts are permanent habits rather than transient acts or inspirations, using the analogy of moral virtues perfecting the appetitive power to obey reason.

175. The Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit: Enumeration and Connection #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, specifically addressing how they are enumerated and why certain gifts are included while others are not. Berquist explores the relationship between the gifts and the intellectual and moral virtues, clarifies the distinction between gifts as gratia gratis data versus gifts necessary for salvation, and explains how all seven gifts are connected through charity.

176. The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and Their Dignity #

This lecture explores the hierarchical ordering of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit according to their dignity and worth. Berquist analyzes whether the gifts should be ranked according to their enumeration in Isaiah 11 or according to other criteria such as their corresponding virtues and their matter. The lecture addresses apparent tensions between scriptural accounts and Thomas Aquinas’s resolution through distinguishing between dignity “simply” (according to their principles) and dignity “in a certain respect” (according to their matter).

177. Beatitudes: Rewards, Enumeration, and Spiritual Life #

This lecture examines whether the rewards promised in the Beatitudes pertain to present or future life, and whether the eight Beatitudes are suitably enumerated. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s reconciliation of patristic authorities (Augustine, Ambrose, Chrysostom) and explores how beatitude can exist imperfectly in this life through grace while being perfected in the life to come. The discussion demonstrates how proper distinctions—between merits and rewards, active and contemplative life, and present and future fulfillment—resolve apparent contradictions in scriptural and patristic sources.

178. The Beatitudes and Fruits of the Holy Spirit #

This lecture examines the eighth Beatitude as a confirmation of all preceding Beatitudes, and begins investigation into the fruits of the Holy Spirit. Berquist addresses objections regarding the suitable enumeration of Beatitude rewards and introduces the question of whether the fruits are acts rather than habits, using Thomas Aquinas’s framework of translatio nominis (carrying over of meaning) from bodily to spiritual realities.

179. The Trinity, Person, and Exemplar Causality in God #

This lecture explores how God can be the cause of generation in creatures while remaining unchangeable, examining the role of exemplar causality alongside efficient causality. Berquist discusses Boethius’s definition of person (individua substantia rationalis naturae) and how reason must be understood broadly to apply to God and angels. The lecture demonstrates how Thomas Aquinas uses Aristotelian causality to defend scriptural claims about divine fecundity and the processions within the Trinity.

180. Wonder, Literature, and the Fruits of the Spirit #

This lecture explores how wonder cultivated through great literature (Shakespeare, Homer, Sophocles) and metaphorical language leads us toward God and the fruits of the Holy Spirit. Berquist contrasts this with modern literary education that stunts wonder through political and reductive approaches. He then transitions into examining why there is the same knowledge of both good and evil, and establishes the framework for understanding vice as contrary to virtue and nature.

181. Vice as Contrary to Virtue and Against Nature #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of vice in Question 71 of the Summa Theologiae, focusing on how vice, sin, and malice are distinguished as different ways of opposing virtue. Berquist emphasizes that vice is fundamentally against human nature—specifically against the rational nature that defines man—and explores the relationship between virtuous disposition and accordance with nature through the lens of Aristotelian philosophy, Augustinian theology, and Shakespearean literature.

182. Vice Against Nature and the Order of Reason #

This lecture examines whether vice is contrary to virtue and whether vice is against human nature. Berquist presents Thomas Aquinas’s resolution that vice is against nature not because it opposes natural inclinations (like gravity for stones), but because it opposes the order of reason, which constitutes human nature. The lecture explores how most people follow sensitive nature against reason, and clarifies the relationship between vice as a habit and sin as an act.

183. Wisdom, Philosophy, and the Divisions of Knowledge #

Berquist explores the distinction between wisdom (sapientia) in the absolute sense versus wisdom about particular subjects like nature and geometry. He examines how Aristotle uses the term ‘philosophy’ to denote the kind of knowledge a lover of wisdom pursues, and contrasts human philosophy with divine wisdom. The lecture emphasizes that only God possesses wisdom simply; human pursuits are qualified forms of wisdom. He also discusses how natural forms necessarily produce their operations unlike habits in the soul, which depend on the will’s voluntary exercise.

184. Sin, Acts, and Omission: The Definition of Sin #

This lecture examines whether sin necessarily requires an act, addressing the apparent conflict between the principle that sin must be voluntary and Augustine’s definition of sin as contrary to eternal law, and the scriptural claim that failing to do good (omission) is sin. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s reconciliation of these positions, distinguishing between sins of commission and omission, and explores Augustine’s definition of sin by analyzing its material and formal components.

185. The Distinction of Sins by Species and Causes #

This lecture examines how sins are distinguished in species, focusing on whether they are properly distinguished by their objects, causes, or other criteria. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of sin classification, defending the thesis that sins are distinguished primarily by their objects (which include their ends), not by their material causes or the circumstances in which they occur. The lecture also addresses the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins, examining how the same sin can be found in diverse objects while maintaining unity of species.

186. The Distinction of Sins: Object, Species, and Order #

This lecture examines how sins are distinguished according to their objects, particularly focusing on Article 4 of Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of sins against God, neighbor, and self. Berquist explores the threefold order in human nature (to reason, to divine law, and to neighbor), the logical principle that divisions must be through opposites, and how these orders relate to and contain one another. The discussion establishes that sins are properly distinguished by their objects and the orders they violate, not by what is common to all sins.

187. Sin’s Division: Affirmative Precepts, Manifestation, and Species #

This lecture explores how sins are divided and distinguished according to Thomas Aquinas’s teaching. Berquist examines three major distinctions: (1) why affirmative statements are necessary to support negative conclusions in logic; (2) how affirmative and negative precepts represent stages of moral growth rather than contrary virtues; and (3) how sins manifest in three grades—heart, mouth, and deed—as progressive manifestations of a single species of sin. The discussion includes the relationship between superabundance and defect in sin, and how diverse circumstances relate to the specific character of sin.

188. The Connection and Equality of Sins #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of how sins relate to one another, specifically addressing whether all sins are connected and whether they are equal in gravity. Berquist explores the fundamental distinction between the aversion (turning away from God) and conversion (turning toward creaturely goods) aspects of sin, and discusses how sins—unlike virtues—do not necessarily connect because they scatter affection toward diverse, sometimes contrary objects. The lecture also addresses the Stoic error that all sins are equal, clarifying that sins are not pure privations but privations retaining something of the opposite habit, and thus admit of degrees.

189. The Gravity of Sins and Their Differentiation #

This lecture examines whether sins differ in gravity and what factors determine that gravity. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of how sins receive their species and gravity from their objects, the virtues they oppose, and whether spiritual sins are graver than carnal sins. The discussion resolves apparent contradictions in Scripture and the Fathers regarding the relative seriousness of different types of sin.

190. The Gravity of Sins: Causes and Circumstances #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of what makes sins more or less grave, focusing on two central questions: whether the gravity of sin is determined by its causes, and whether circumstances aggravate sin. Berquist explores the distinction between intrinsic causes (the will’s inclination to sin) and extrinsic causes (ignorance, infirmity, violence), and demonstrates how circumstances can either change the species of sin or multiply its defects within the same species.

191. Aggravating Factors in Sin: Harm, Person, and Sinner #

This lecture examines Articles 8-10 of Question 73, exploring three ways sins are aggravated: through the harm done, the condition of the person sinned against, and the condition of the person sinning. Berquist analyzes whether harm itself increases sin’s gravity or whether disorder (aversion from reason) is the primary determinant, using Thomistic distinctions between intended and unintended consequences, and examining how dignity, proximity, and virtue affect moral culpability.

192. The Will and Other Powers as Subjects of Sin #

This lecture examines whether the will alone is the subject of sin, or whether other powers of the soul (reason, sensuality) can also be subjects of sin. Berquist uses Thomistic distinction between acts that pass into external matter and acts that remain in the agent to argue that moral acts, being voluntary, have their proper subjects in the powers from which they proceed. The lecture addresses key objections from Dionysius and Aristotle while establishing that sensuality and reason, insofar as they are moved by the will, can be subjects of both venial and mortal sin.

193. Prayer, Virtue, and Emotional Life in Thomistic Philosophy #

This lecture explores three forms of prayer (petition, thanksgiving, and praise) and their relationship to spiritual progression, then transitions to examine sin in the sensitive appetites and how reason should rule the emotions. Berquist integrates Aristotelian ethics on moral virtue with Thomistic theology, emphasizing the role of proper emotional formation through art and music in disposing the soul toward virtue and ultimately toward contemplation of God.

194. Sin in Reason: Morose Delectation and Higher Reason #

This lecture examines whether sin can inhere in reason itself, particularly through morose delectation (dwelling on illicit pleasure) and through the consent of higher reason to sinful acts. Berquist explores how reason fails in directing interior passions, the distinction between higher and lower reason according to Augustine, and how the ultimate judgment about human acts pertains to higher reason consulting the eternal law. The lecture resolves apparent objections about whether pleasure (an act of the appetitive power) can be a sin of reason, and clarifies the role of higher reason in consenting to mortal sin.

195. Consent in Pleasure and the Morality of Sin #

This lecture examines whether consent in pleasure constitutes a mortal or venial sin, drawing heavily on Thomas Aquinas and Augustine. Berquist explores the distinction between pleasure in thought versus pleasure in the act itself, the role of higher and lower reason in consenting to sin, and how the object and deliberation of an act determine its moral gravity. The lecture systematically addresses objections to various positions and clarifies when sudden motions of sin (such as infidelity) can remain venial despite being mortally sinful by their nature.

196. The Causes of Sin: Act, Disorder, and Interior Motions #

This lecture examines whether sin, as a disordered act, can have a cause at all—a fundamental question in Thomistic moral theology. Berquist works through Aquinas’s distinction between sin’s act (which has a per se cause) and its disorder (which has a per accidens cause as a privation). The lecture focuses primarily on interior causes of sin, exploring how reason, will, and sense appetite cooperate in producing sinful acts, with emphasis on the will as the principal interior cause.

197. Sin as Cause of Sin: The Four Causes #

This lecture addresses the fourth article on whether sin can be a cause of sin, examining objections that sin, being imperfect and evil, cannot produce effects like other causes. Berquist presents Thomas Aquinas’s solution using the framework of Aristotle’s four causes (efficient, material, final, and formal), demonstrating how sin as an act (rather than as disorder) can cause another sin through all four types of causation. The lecture emphasizes the philosophical methodology of dividing causes into two, three, or four categories to achieve deeper understanding.

198. Ignorance as a Cause of Sin: Three Questions #

This lecture examines three foundational questions about ignorance in relation to sin: whether ignorance can be a cause of sin, whether ignorance itself constitutes a sin, and whether ignorance entirely excuses from sin. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between ignorance as a per accidens cause (through removal of impediments), invincible ignorance (which does not excuse because it is involuntary), and vincible ignorance (which can be sinful through negligence). The analysis relies on Aristotle’s account of voluntary action and the structure of practical reasoning.

199. Ignorance and Passion as Causes of Sin #

This lecture examines Articles 3-4 of Aquinas’s treatment of ignorance as a cause of sin, focusing on how ignorance diminishes or excuses sin, and how the passion of the sense-appetite can indirectly move the will. Berquist explores the distinction between invincible and vincible ignorance, the role of voluntary versus involuntary ignorance, and the two indirect mechanisms by which passion affects reason’s judgment and the will’s object.

200. Passion, Reason, and the Causes of Sin #

This lecture addresses whether passion can overcome reason against its own knowledge, examining the Socratic position that all sin is ignorance and Thomas’s refinement distinguishing universal from particular knowledge. Berquist analyzes how passion functions as an indirect cause of sin through distraction, contrariety, and bodily impediment, and explores the relationship between disordered self-love, passion, and the three concupiscences enumerated in 1 John 2:16.

201. Passion, Sin, and the Problem of Moral Culpability #

This lecture explores how passion (emotional inclination of the sense appetite) functions as a cause of sin within Thomistic moral theology. Berquist examines the three concupiscences (of the flesh, of the eyes, and pride of life) as sources of disordered desire, then addresses the critical question of whether passion can excuse from sin entirely, partially diminish sin, or conversely aggravate it. The lecture emphasizes Thomas’s distinction between antecedent passion (which diminishes voluntariness and thus sin) and consequent passion (which demonstrates the intensity of will and may increase culpability), connecting this to scriptural texts and concrete moral examples.

202. Sin from Malice: The Disorder of the Will #

This lecture examines malice (malitia) as the third and most serious cause of sin, representing a defect in the will itself. Berquist explores how one can knowingly choose spiritual evil to obtain temporal goods, how malice differs from ignorance and passion, and what relationship exists between habitual sin and malicious choice. The discussion includes Thomas Aquinas’s resolution of apparent contradictions with Aristotle and Dionysius regarding whether anyone can deliberately intend evil.

203. Sin from Malice and Its Relation to Habit #

This lecture explores the nature of sin from malice (peccatum ex malitia) and its relationship to vicious habits. Berquist examines whether sin from malice necessarily presupposes a vicious habit, distinguishing between having a habit and acting from a habit, and illustrating how habits become ‘second nature’ that shape human choices toward evil. The discussion addresses the paradox of how one can knowingly choose evil, and establishes that while not all sin from habit is from malice, all sin from malice (when acting from habit) is gravely culpable.

204. Sin from Malice versus Passion and Divine Causality #

This lecture addresses whether sin from malice (deliberate, knowing choice of evil) is more grave than sin from passion (emotional impulse), and then shifts to the complex question of whether God can be a cause of sin. Berquist works through objections that seemingly demonstrate God’s causality in sin (Romans 1, Isaiah 45) and resolves them through distinctions between direct and indirect causality, and between God causing the act versus causing the defect.

205. God’s Causality of Sin and Divine Punishment #

This lecture examines whether God is a cause of sin, focusing on the distinction between God causing the act of sin versus causing sin itself. Berquist explores how the act of sin contains both being (caused by God) and defect or privation (caused by free will), using the analogy of limping to clarify this distinction. The lecture then addresses God’s causality regarding blindness and hardness of heart as divine punishments resulting from the subtraction of grace rather than positive causation of evil.

206. Divine Providence, Blinding, Hardening, and the Devil’s Role in Sin #

This lecture examines whether God’s acts of blinding and hardening are ordered to the salvation of those affected, and explores the devil’s role as a cause of sin. Berquist discusses how apparent evils—both divine blinding and demonic temptation—serve God’s providential purposes through mercy and justice. The lecture addresses whether the devil can directly cause sin, induce sin through internal motions, or impose necessity to sin, clarifying the limits of demonic power against human free will.

207. The Transmission of Original Sin and Nature #

This lecture examines whether and how Adam’s first sin is transmitted to his posterity through generation. Berquist works through Aquinas’s responses to objections claiming original sin cannot be transmitted, establishing the distinction between guilt (which is voluntary) and the corruption of human nature (which is transmitted through generation). The key insight is that all humans are considered one body with Adam as the first principle, and original sin is a sin of nature rather than a personal sin.

208. Original Sin: Transmission and Nature Through Generation #

This lecture explores how original sin is transmitted from Adam to all humanity through the act of generation rather than through personal imitation or choice. Berquist, following Thomas Aquinas, examines why only Adam’s first sin (not his other actual sins) passes to posterity, why transmission occurs through the father as the active principle rather than the mother, and addresses the apparent contradiction that children can inherit guilt from parental sin despite God’s justice. The lecture clarifies the distinction between personal actual sins and the corruption of nature itself, using detailed arguments about the active and passive principles in generation.

209. The Essence of Original Sin: Nature, Unity, and Concupiscence #

This lecture explores the metaphysical and theological nature of original sin through Thomas Aquinas’s systematic treatment. Berquist addresses whether original sin is a habit or disposition, whether it is one or many, whether it consists in concupiscence, and how it relates to original justice. The discussion employs Aristotelian philosophical categories (habit, privation, form-matter, causality) to clarify the formal and material aspects of original sin.

210. The Subject of Original Sin: Soul vs. Flesh #

Berquist examines Thomas Aquinas’s argument that while original sin is transmitted through carnal generation (the flesh as instrumental cause), its proper subject and seat of guilt is the soul, not the flesh. The lecture distinguishes between guilt (proper to the soul) and punishment (proper to the flesh), and employs sophisticated analysis of causation using the framework of principal cause, instrumental cause, and subject. A central concern is reconciling how God can infuse the rational soul into a body corrupted by original sin without being the cause of sin.

211. Original Sin in the Essence and Powers of the Soul #

This lecture examines whether original sin resides primarily in the essence of the soul or in its powers, using Aristotle’s four senses of ‘before’ to clarify the relationship between the soul’s essence and its faculties. Berquist explores how original sin is transmitted through generation, why the will is the primary power infected, and distinguishes between sins of nature (original sin) and personal sins (actual sin).

212. Cupidity as Root and Pride as Beginning of Sin #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s analysis of cupidity (disordered desire for wealth) as the root of all sins and pride as the beginning of every sin. Berquist clarifies the distinction between these two principles by explaining different senses of ‘root’ and ‘beginning,’ and demonstrates how cupidity enables the commission of any sin by providing material faculty through wealth, while pride initiates sin in the order of intention. The discussion sets up the subsequent analysis of capital vices and their organization.

213. Pride and Cupidity as Beginnings of Sin #

This lecture examines the foundational roles of pride and cupidity in the genesis of sin, distinguishing how they function differently in the order of intention versus execution. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s careful analysis of how ‘beginning’ and ‘root’ apply analogically to sin, explaining why pride represents the formal origin of sin (as disordered desire for excellence) while cupidity provides the material means (as universal faculty to perpetrate sin). The lecture also introduces the concept of capital vices and prepares for their enumeration.

214. Capital Vices: Their Nature, Division, and Correspondence to Goods #

This lecture explores the nature of the seven capital vices, examining how they are distinguished and enumerated according to different goods that move human desire. Berquist explains why capital vices cannot be taught (as they deal with particular rather than universal dispositions), distinguishes between capital and principal passions, and addresses objections about why there are seven capital vices rather than a one-to-one correspondence with cardinal virtues. The lecture emphasizes that capital vices arise from the multiplication of changeable goods rather than the unchangeable good of God.

215. Virtues, Passions, and the Geometry of Knowledge #

This lecture weaves together three distinct but interconnected themes: the virtue of mildness and its relation to temperance and the control of anger; Plato’s Meno dialogue and the discovery of geometric truths through recollection rather than instruction; and the natural law as something innately known by the human intellect. Berquist uses geometric examples—particularly the problem of doubling a square—to illustrate how knowledge requires both natural principles and reasoning, drawing parallels to how natural law is both naturally known and requires intellectual development to be grasped.

216. Antonomasia in Scripture and the Good of Human Nature #

This lecture explores the rhetorical device of antonomasia in Scripture, examining how general names are applied to particular instances that stand out (e.g., ’the evil one’ for Satan, ’the good’ for God, ‘Christ’ as ’the Anointed One’). Berquist then transitions to Thomas Aquinas’s analysis of whether the whole good of human nature can be taken away by sin, demonstrating that while sin diminishes natural inclination to virtue through accumulated impediments, it cannot wholly consume this inclination because doing so would require the loss of reason itself, making sin impossible.

217. The Four Wounds of Nature and Their Effects #

This lecture examines whether ignorance, malice, infirmity, and concupiscence are properly identified as the four wounds of human nature resulting from original sin. Berquist works through St. Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of these wounds, their relationship to the powers of the soul, and how they function as effects rather than causes of sin. The discussion includes the role of original justice in maintaining order, the distinction between natural concupiscence and disordered concupiscence, and how sin operates as a per accidens cause of bodily defects including death.

218. Death and Natural Corruption in Human Nature #

This lecture examines whether death and bodily defects are natural to human beings, exploring the distinction between particular nature (matter) and universal nature (form). Berquist works through Aquinas’s resolution of apparent contradictions: while the human body is naturally corruptible due to its material composition, the rational soul is incorruptible, and God supplied the defect of nature through the gift of original justice before sin.

219. The Stain of Sin: Privation and Spiritual Defacement #

This lecture examines the macula peccati (stain of sin), analyzing whether sin causes a stain in the soul and whether this stain persists after the sinful act ceases. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of sin’s effects, using the analogy of physical staining to explain how the soul loses its spiritual brightness (splendor) through disordered adherence to created things. The lecture explores the nature of privation versus positive qualities, the role of the soul’s two lights (natural reason and divine grace), and how diverse sins produce diverse stains.

220. Humility, Charity, and the Love of Wisdom #

This lecture explores the intrinsic connection between humility and charity, arguing that greater charity necessarily entails greater humility. Berquist traces this principle through Scripture, Thomas Aquinas’s commentary on Matthew, and philosophical reflection on the nature of wisdom and the philosopher’s calling. The lecture emphasizes that true love of wisdom (philosophy) requires both the aspiration to know truth and the humility to fear being mistaken, mirroring the spiritual balance between hope in God’s mercy and fear of divine justice.

221. Sin as Punishment for Sin and Eternal Punishment #

This lecture examines Article 2 and Article 3 of Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of sin as punishment and the debt of eternal punishment. Berquist guides students through Thomas’s distinction between per se and per accidens causation to resolve apparent contradictions: how can sin be a punishment for sin if punishment leads to virtue, and how can a temporal act merit eternal punishment if justice requires equality? The resolution centers on understanding the irreparable disorder caused by mortal sin through the loss of charity, the principle ordering the will to God.

222. Punishment, Sin, and Eternal Justice in Thomistic Theology #

This lecture explores whether sin incurs eternal punishment and whether the debt of punishment remains after sin is forgiven. Berquist examines Thomas Aquinas’s distinction between the aversion from God (infinite punishment) and disordered conversion to changeable goods (finite punishment), applies this to questions of original sin and venial sin, and discusses how satisfaction and penance relate to the restoration of justice in the soul.

223. Punishment, Guilt, and the Distinction Between Mortal and Venial Sin #

This lecture examines whether every punishment corresponds to guilt and explores the distinction between mortal and venial sin. Berquist addresses apparent contradictions in Scripture and theological tradition—such as the blind man in John 9 and Christ’s suffering—while developing Thomas Aquinas’s framework of satisfactory versus medicinal punishment. The core question concerns whether mortal and venial sin differ essentially or merely analogically, with implications for understanding how sin corrupts the soul’s order to God.

224. Venial and Mortal Sin: Analogical Division and Distinctions #

This lecture examines the proper division between venial and mortal sin, arguing that they are distinguished not as univocal species but analogically, similar to how accident relates to substance. Berquist explores three senses in which sin can be called venial (ex eventu, ex causa, ex genere), establishes that mortal sin is defined by opposition to charity and the ultimate end, and clarifies how venial sin relates to the object and disposition of the agent in determining gravity. The lecture draws heavily on Thomas Aquinas’s analysis from the Summa Theologiae to address objections and show how the same material act can be either mortal or venial depending on circumstances.

225. Venial Sin as Disposition to Mortal Sin #

This lecture examines Article 3 of Aquinas’s treatment of venial sin, focusing on whether venial sin can serve as a disposition to mortal sin. Berquist explores two modes of disposition—direct causation and indirect causation (removing prohibitions)—and argues that while venial and mortal sins differ infinitely in their opposition to God, venial sin can dispose to mortal sin by accustoming the will to disregard proper order. The lecture emphasizes the danger of habituation to sin and connects this analysis to broader principles of virtue, habit formation, and the importance of maintaining respect for order in the moral life.

226. Circumstance, Specific Difference, and the Nature of Sin #

This lecture addresses the central question of whether circumstance can transform a venial sin into a mortal sin. Berquist develops Thomas Aquinas’s crucial distinction between a circumstance as a mere accident of a moral act and a circumstance that functions as a specific difference constituting a new species of sin. The core insight is that venial and mortal sin differ not in degree but in genus: venial sin disorders things toward the end, while mortal sin disorders the ultimate end itself. Therefore, no mere circumstantial addition can bridge this infinite gap unless the circumstance introduces a deformity of an entirely different genus.

227. Venial Sin: Stain, Wood/Hay/Straw, and Innocence #

This lecture covers Thomas Aquinas’s analysis of venial sin from Summa Theologiae II-II, Question 89, examining whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul, how venial sins are designated by the biblical symbols of wood, hay, and straw, and whether venial sin could have existed in the state of innocence. Berquist explores the distinction between habitual and actual brightness in the soul, the three grades of venial sins reflecting the universal structure of beginning-middle-end, and the necessary ordering of acts in prelapsarian human nature.

228. Venial Sin in Innocence and Angelic Sin #

This lecture examines whether Adam and Eve could commit venial sin before committing mortal sin in the state of innocence, and whether angels are capable of venial sin. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s systematic refutation of objections, establishing that the infallible order of innocence precluded venial sin, and that both good and bad angels cannot sin venially due to their non-discursive intellection. The lecture emphasizes the crucial distinction between human discursive reason and angelic understanding in explaining why the same capacity operates differently in different natures.

229. Venial Sin, the Use of Reason, and the Nature of Law #

This lecture addresses whether venial sin can exist in someone with original sin alone (Q. 89, Art. 6), establishing that the first moral act upon gaining the use of reason must be either one that removes original sin or constitutes mortal sin through omission. Berquist then transitions to the treatise on law (Q. 90, Art. 1), arguing that law is fundamentally something of reason, not will, and establishing law as a rule and measure of human acts. The lecture emphasizes the importance of distinguishing equivocal terms—particularly in axioms and fundamental philosophical vocabulary—as essential to defending rational foundations against sophistic arguments.

230. Law as a Rule of Reason and Its Ordering to the Common Good #

This lecture examines the nature of law through a detailed analysis of Thomas Aquinas’s treatment in the Summa Theologiae. Berquist works through objections claiming law pertains to will or sensuality rather than reason, establishing that law is fundamentally a rule and measure of human acts that obligates through reason’s ordering to an end. The discussion emphasizes that reason is the first principle of human acts and that law must be ordered to the common good, not private goods, with particular attention to the linguistic and philosophical problem of how ‘beginning’ (principium/ἀρχή) operates across different domains.

231. Law as Ordered to the Common Good #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine that law must be ordered to the common good as its primary end, not to private goods or the good of rulers. Berquist explores how particular precepts participate in the character of law only insofar as they serve the common good, using examples from military justice and household governance. The discussion connects the common good to beatitude (happiness) as the ultimate end of human life and demonstrates why law must regard order to this end rather than partial or private interests.

232. The Definition and Elements of Law #

Berquist presents Thomas Aquinas’s complete definition of law as comprising four essential elements: an act of reason, ordered to the common good, made by proper authority, and promulgated. The lecture explores each element in detail, distinguishes between common goods in the fullest sense versus merely shared goods, and addresses objections concerning whether promulgation is truly necessary for law’s essential nature.

233. Human Law, Divine Law, and the Necessity of Three Laws #

This lecture examines whether human law is necessary beyond natural law (Article 3) and whether divine law is necessary beyond eternal and natural laws (Article 4). Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s arguments for why three distinct types of law are required to govern human acts: natural law provides only general principles, human law applies these to particular circumstances, and divine law directs humans to their supernatural end of eternal beatitude. The discussion includes the distinction between practical and speculative reason, the limitations of human judgment, and the need for divine law to regulate interior acts of the soul.

234. Divine Law, Old Law, and New Law: Distinctions and Unity #

This lecture explores Thomas Aquinas’s account of divine law as distinct from natural and human law, focusing on why divine law is necessary and how the Old Law and New Law relate to one another. Berquist examines the fourfold structure of law through Psalm 18, demonstrates the distinction between Old and New Law as perfect and imperfect species rather than entirely different kinds, and addresses the paradoxical Pauline notion of the ’law of sin’ (lex peccati) as a participation in law through punishment rather than proper legal obligation.

235. The Effects of Law: Command, Prohibition, Permission, and Punishment #

This lecture examines whether law’s proper effect is to make men good, and analyzes the four acts of law: commanding, prohibiting, permitting, and punishing. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of these effects, distinguishing between how law directs acts that are good, bad, or indifferent by nature, and how punishment serves as the enforcement mechanism. The discussion includes the relationship between law and virtue, the role of habituation in developing genuine goodness, and how even fear-based obedience can eventually lead to true virtue.

236. The Eternal Law as Divine Wisdom and Governance #

This lecture addresses the nature of the eternal law as the reason of divine wisdom directing all acts and motions toward their proper ends. Berquist explores how the eternal law differs from divine art by distinguishing God’s role as maker from His role as mover/governor, and addresses the apparent contradiction between the unity of eternal law and the multiplicity of divine ideas. The lecture also examines how all rational creatures participate in the eternal law through knowledge of truth.

237. Divine Ideas, Eternal Law, and Knowledge of God’s Governance #

This lecture explores the relationship between divine ideas and the eternal law, examining how God understands the multiple ways creatures can imitate Him while maintaining the simplicity of divine thought. Berquist addresses how the eternal law, as the ordering principle of all things to the common good, differs from the multiplicity of divine ideas, and demonstrates that all rational creatures can know the eternal law through its effects or ‘radiation’ rather than in itself. The discussion emphasizes how distinctions in understanding (looking before and after) enable comprehension of these subtle theological concepts, particularly regarding necessity, contingency, and the problem of first and last instants in change.

238. Derivation of All Laws from Eternal Law #

This lecture addresses whether every law is derived from the eternal law, examining objections concerning unjust laws, the law of the flesh, and the nature of lawfulness. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s systematic responses, establishing that all laws partaking of right reason are derived from eternal law, while unjust laws have only a diminished sense of law and are more properly called violence. The lecture also explores the relationship between divine authority, natural law, and human legislation.

239. The Eternal Law and Natural Things #

This lecture addresses Article 5 and the beginning of Article 6 of Question 93, examining whether natural contingent things and human beings are subject to the eternal law. Berquist explores how the eternal law operates through different modes—through promulgation for rational creatures and through divine providence for irrational creatures—and defends the position that all creation, including irrational nature and even sinful humans, remains subject to God’s eternal law.

240. Natural Law Precepts: Unity and Multiplicity #

This lecture explores whether natural law contains one precept or many, using the proportion between speculative reason’s axioms and practical reason’s precepts. Berquist examines how the first precept (’the good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided’) serves as the foundation for all other precepts of natural law, and discusses the three orders of natural human inclinations that ground these precepts.

241. Natural Law: Universality and Changeability #

This lecture examines two central questions about natural law in Thomistic philosophy: whether the law of nature is one and the same for all peoples, and whether it can be changed. Berquist develops Thomas Aquinas’s distinction between universal first principles of natural law and particular precepts that admit exceptions, using examples from divine commands, human customs, and practical cases. The lecture also explores how human law relates to natural law through conclusions and determinations.

242. Natural Law and Human Law: Necessity and Derivation #

This lecture addresses whether human law is necessary for society and how human positive law derives from natural law. Berquist examines objections that admonition or judges’ discretion might suffice, then presents Thomas Aquinas’s response grounding the necessity of law in human discipline and social order. The lecture distinguishes two modes of derivation from natural law: by conclusion (universal principles) and by determination (particular specifications like traffic laws), explaining why human laws legitimately vary between communities.

243. The Qualities and Divisions of Human Law #

This lecture examines Isidore of Seville’s enumeration of the qualities of human law and Thomas Aquinas’s reduction of these qualities to three fundamental conditions. Berquist explores how human law is properly divided according to its derivation from natural law, its ordering to the common good, the type of regime that produces it, and the subject matter it addresses. The discussion demonstrates Thomas’s method of per se division and shows how apparently diverse conditions reduce to essential principles.

244. Human Law: Generality, Virtue, and Conscience #

This lecture examines six key questions about human law: whether it should be laid down in general or particular form, whether it should command all virtuous acts, whether it binds conscience, and the scope of its authority. Berquist works through Aquinas’s treatment of these questions, discussing the relationship between universal legal precepts and singular acts, the distinction between acts of virtue and virtuous acts, and the critical distinction between just laws (which bind conscience) and unjust laws (which do not). Contemporary examples regarding drug trafficking, speed limits, taxation, and abortion illustrate these principles.

245. Law, Necessity, and Subjection in Thomistic Philosophy #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of whether all persons are subject to human law, exploring the distinction between being ruled by law and being coerced by law. Berquist analyzes how necessity functions in philosophical reasoning, distinguishing absolute necessity from conditional necessity, and applies these distinctions to understand civil law, divine law, and the relationship between human and higher authorities. The lecture also addresses foundational questions about reason, equivocation, and the nature of necessity itself.

246. The Mutability of Human Law and Custom #

This lecture explores whether human law can be justly changed and how custom obtains the force of law. Berquist examines Thomas Aquinas’s arguments distinguishing between immutable natural law (derived from divine reason) and mutable human law (derived from human reason). The discussion covers conditions under which laws may be changed, the role of necessity in dispensing from laws, and how custom—through repeated acts—can both establish and abolish laws.

247. The Mutability of Human Law and the Force of Custom #

This lecture examines whether human law should be changed when something better occurs, exploring the relationship between law, custom, and reason. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of law’s mutability, demonstrating that while human law can be changed, such change requires either great utility or necessity because the law’s power derives primarily from custom rather than reason alone. The discussion includes objections about how custom can obtain the force of law and concludes with an extended excursus on the immateriality of reason through three arguments: reception, universality, and self-knowledge.

248. The Goodness of the Old Law and Divine Dispensation #

This lecture addresses Thomas Aquinas’s defense of the Old Law’s goodness despite scriptural objections that it was harmful or impossible to observe. Berquist explores the distinction between perfect and imperfect goodness, the difference between human and divine law, and the pedagogical role of the Old Law in preparing for Christ. The lecture also includes a substantial digression on the simplicity and goodness of God, examining Christ’s statements to the young man and to Saint Catherine of Siena.

249. The Word ‘To Have’ and Divine Simplicity #

This lecture explores the multiple senses of the word ’to have’ (habere) as fundamental to understanding Aristotle’s Categories and, more importantly, to grasping the metaphysical difference between God and creatures. Berquist demonstrates how creatures never are what they have, while God alone is identical with his attributes, and explains how this distinction resolves apparent contradictions in speaking of God as both ‘wise’ and ‘wisdom itself.’ The lecture also examines whether the Old Law was given by God, using this as an occasion to explore divine providence and the pedagogy of law.

250. The Old Law: Its Goodness, Origin, and Promulgation Through Angels #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of the Old Law’s nature and administration. Berquist focuses on how the Old Law, though imperfect, is genuinely good as proceeding from God; how God promulgated it through angelic intermediaries rather than giving it directly; and why it was given specifically to the Jewish people as preparation for Christ’s coming. The discussion reconciles apparent scriptural contradictions about the law’s efficacy and explores the hierarchical principle that higher powers perform principal acts while lower powers handle preparatory functions.

251. Definition, Demonstration, and the Causes of Things #

This lecture explores the relationship between definition and demonstration through the lens of Aristotelian logic and Thomistic philosophy. Berquist examines how definition and demonstration both involve knowledge of causes, differ only in position, and can be converted between one another. The lecture analyzes Augustine’s definition of infused virtue as a complete definition containing all four causes, and contrasts Albert the Great’s two-part division of logic (defining and reasoning) with Thomas Aquinas’s three-part division based on Aristotle’s acts of reason.

252. The Timing and Unity of the Old Law #

This lecture addresses why God gave the Old Law specifically at the time of Moses rather than immediately after sin or during Abraham’s time, and argues that while the Old Law contains many diverse precepts, they are all unified according to a single end: friendship with God. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of these questions, emphasizing how man’s pride and ignorance necessitated a written law at a particular historical moment, and how the law’s multiplicity of precepts—moral, ceremonial, and judicial—all serve the single purpose of ordering man to God.

253. The Threefold Division of the Old Law’s Precepts #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s analysis of the Old Law through the lens of its three kinds of precepts: moral, ceremonial, and judicial. Berquist walks through the scholastic arguments defending the necessity of each type and their relationship to natural law, divine worship, and justice among men. The discussion centers on how the Old Law presupposes natural law while adding determinations specific to the divine law’s purpose of ordering men to God.

254. Precepts of the Old Law: Moral, Judicial, and Ceremonial #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of the precepts contained in the Old Law, specifically addressing whether there are only three categories (moral, judicial, ceremonial) or additional ones. Berquist works through Question 99 of the Summa Theologiae, analyzing objections that propose additional precepts such as testimonies, mandates, and justifications, and demonstrates how all precepts reduce to the three principal divisions. The lecture includes discussion of how the Old Law pedagogically leads an imperfect people toward God through temporal rewards and punishments, and concludes with contemporary applications regarding rights language, duties, and marriage.

255. Moral Precepts, Natural Law, and the Decalogue #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of the moral precepts of the Old Law, focusing on four central questions: whether all moral precepts pertain to natural law, whether moral precepts concern all virtues or only justice, whether all moral precepts reduce to the Ten Commandments, and how the Decalogue is suitably distinguished. Berquist walks through Aquinas’s responses, emphasizing that moral precepts are grounded in natural law but admit of different modes of knowledge, that the divine law orders all virtues toward communion with God, and that the Decalogue contains both immediate and remote conclusions from the two great commandments.

256. The Distinction and Enumeration of the Decalogue #

This lecture explores Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of how the Ten Commandments are properly distinguished and enumerated, addressing objections about whether there should be precepts ordering man to himself, why certain precepts are included or excluded, and how the precepts are rationally ordered. Berquist works through Article 5 of Question 100 in the Summa, examining the three-fold division (three precepts to God, seven to neighbor) and defending this enumeration against six major objections by appealing to natural law, the manifestness of certain duties, and the structure of human community under divine rule.

257. The Order and Suitability of the Decalogue #

This lecture examines the rational ordering of the Ten Commandments according to Thomistic analysis. Berquist explains why the Decalogue places precepts concerning God before precepts concerning neighbor, and why precepts are ordered from most grave sins (murder) to least grave (desire). The lecture explores how the commandments reflect the natural order of reason itself, with God as the ultimate end and common good.

258. Two Definitions of Reason and the Decalogue #

This lecture explores two complementary definitions of reason: the ability to understand order and direct itself, and Shakespeare’s definition emphasizing discourse and foresight. Berquist argues these definitions are in harmony. The lecture then examines whether the precepts of the Decalogue are dispensable, concluding that they are entirely indispensable because they contain the intention of the divine lawgiver and express God’s justice itself.

259. The Mode of Virtue and Charity in Divine Law #

This lecture examines whether the manner of performing virtuous acts—doing things justly, courageously, or charitably—falls under the precepts of divine law. Berquist explores Thomas Aquinas’s nuanced distinction between the act commanded (honoring parents) and the virtue from which the act proceeds (having the habit of piety). The central tension is resolved by showing that while the mode of virtue does not strictly fall under precept, the mode of charity presents a more complex case requiring distinction between charity as its own act versus charity as the formal mode of other virtuous acts.

260. Moral Precepts, Charity, and Justification in the Old Law #

This lecture examines how moral precepts of the Old Law relate to charity and justification, with particular focus on Thomas Aquinas’s resolution of apparent tensions between the two great commandments and the decalogue. Berquist discusses the distinction between the act of charity falling under precept versus the mode of charity, explores how love of oneself is implicit in the commandment to love God, and analyzes the equivocal nature of justification—distinguishing between properly understood justification (infused justice from God) and improperly understood justification (the disposition toward or signification of justice through observing precepts).

261. The Nature and Figurative Character of Ceremonial Precepts #

This lecture explores the definition and nature of ceremonial precepts in the Old Law, arguing that they pertain to the worship of God and determine moral precepts in relation to God. Berquist examines whether ceremonial precepts are figurative (figuralia), establishing that they represent both future beatific truth and Christ as the via to that truth. The lecture emphasizes the necessity of sensible figures in divine revelation and the distinction between interior and exterior worship, with extended discussion on how the imagination and body must be subject to God through metaphorical and figurative representations.

262. Division of Ceremonial Precepts and Their Causes #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s division of ceremonial precepts into four categories (sacrifices, sacraments, sacred things, and observances) and addresses objections to this classification. Berquist discusses how ceremonial precepts, though apparently unreasonable in themselves, possess genuine causes derived from their order to the worship of God and their prefiguration of Christ. The lecture emphasizes the wisdom of the divine lawgiver in structuring these precepts to serve both immediate purposes (preventing idolatry, instructing the faithful) and ultimate purposes (signifying Christ’s mysteries).

263. Rational Causes of Ceremonial Precepts and Sacrifices #

This lecture examines whether the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law possess rational causes, and specifically investigates the causes of sacrificial practices. Berquist demonstrates that ceremonial precepts have a twofold cause: literal causes derived from their ordering toward the worship of God in that time, and figurative or mystical causes derived from their prefiguration of Christ. The discussion progresses from the general principle that divine wisdom necessarily orders all things, through the distinction between literal and figurative senses, to detailed analysis of why specific animals, parts, and procedures were prescribed in Old Testament sacrifice.

264. Sacrifices in the Old Law: Types, Animals, and Figurative Meaning #

This lecture explores the three types of Old Testament sacrifices (holocaust, sin offering, and peace offering), explaining why specific animals were prescribed and why blood and fat were prohibited. Berquist analyzes the literal causes (exclusion of idolatry, proper ordering of the mind to God) and figurative causes (prefiguring Christ’s sacrifice) of these ceremonial precepts through a careful reading of Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of ceremonial law.

265. Ceremonial Precepts and Divine Reverence in the Old Law #

This lecture examines the reasonableness of ceremonial precepts in the Old Law, particularly sacrifices and the structure of the tabernacle. Berquist explores both literal causes (ordered to present worship and excluding idolatry) and figurative causes (prefiguring Christ and redemption), addressing ten major objections to understand why God commanded specific ceremonies, animals, offerings, and temple arrangements. The discussion incorporates Thomistic principles about the role of distinction and reverence in worship, divine simplicity, and the symbolic significance of liturgical elements.

266. The Tabernacle Furnishings and Their Spiritual Significance #

This lecture explores the contents and arrangement of the Old Testament tabernacle, specifically examining the ark of the covenant, the propitiatory (mercy seat), the candelabra, the altar of incense, and the table of showbread. Berquist discusses both the literal reasons for these furnishings (related to worship practices and exclusion of idolatry) and their figurative meanings as prefigurations of Christ. The lecture emphasizes how these physical objects were ordained to lead the human mind to God through sensible signs and to signify divine mysteries.

267. Tabernacle Furnishings and the Seven Feasts of Israel #

This lecture explores Thomas Aquinas’s exposition of the tabernacle’s interior furnishings (candelabra, table of proposition, altar of incense) and the seven temporal solemnities of the Old Law, examining both their literal purposes and their figurative prefiguration of Christ and the Church. Berquist emphasizes how the ceremonial law’s external elements were ordered to inspire reverence and how the feasts commemorate both universal benefits (creation and divine governance) and particular benefits to Israel, culminating in understanding the three final feasts as corresponding to the three stages of Christian spiritual life.

268. Rational Causes of Old Law Sacraments #

This lecture addresses objections claiming that the sacraments of the Old Law were irrational or arbitrary, demonstrating instead that each practice has both literal (historical/practical) and figurative (typological/prophetic) reasons ordered to the worship of God. Berquist works through Aquinas’s systematic response to ten objections, establishing how Old Law sacraments correspond to New Law sacraments and how their external forms signify spiritual realities prefiguring Christ.

269. Purifications of the Old Law: Spiritual and Bodily Uncleanness #

This lecture explores Thomas Aquinas’s analysis of the purifications prescribed in the Old Law, distinguishing between spiritual uncleanness (arising from sin) and bodily uncleanness (arising from contact with sources of corruption). Berquist examines the literal reasons for these purifications—reverence for sacred things, avoidance of idolatry, health considerations—and their figurative meanings as signs of spiritual realities. Special attention is given to the red heifer sacrifice and the Day of Atonement, with detailed exposition of how these Old Law practices prefigure Christ’s passion and the sacraments of the New Law.

270. Old Law Ceremonies: Figurative and Literal Reasons #

This lecture examines the rational foundations of Old Law ceremonial observances through both literal (practical) and figurative (prefigurative) reasons. Berquist explores how Old Law practices—including animal sacrifices, purification rites, leprosy ceremonies, and priestly vestments—serve immediate purposes in worship while prefiguring Christ and New Law sacraments. The lecture demonstrates the unity of God’s plan across covenants and addresses how bodily observances relate to spiritual realities.

271. Priestly Vestments, Dietary Laws, and Ceremonial Observances #

This lecture examines the eight ornaments of the Jewish high priest and the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, particularly dietary restrictions and priestly purity requirements. Berquist explores both literal reasons (bodily corruption and suitability for divine worship) and figurative reasons (prefiguration of Christ and Christian virtues) for these observances, addressing objections that such laws are irrational given that all creatures of God are good.

272. Dietary Laws, Animal Symbolism, and Figurative Interpretation #

This lecture examines the Old Testament dietary laws and prohibitions on eating certain animals, exploring both their literal reasons (relating to health, cruelty, and idolatry) and their figurative meanings as prefigurations of spiritual truths. Berquist analyzes how various unclean animals symbolize specific vices and sins, and discusses the principle that external observances of the law were designed to cultivate interior dispositions of mercy and piety. The lecture includes extensive discussion of animal symbolism drawn from Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, demonstrating how the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law ordered themselves both to the worship of God and to signifying Christ.

273. Ceremonial Precepts Before the Mosaic Law #

This lecture addresses whether ceremonial precepts existed before the Mosaic Law and, if so, in what sense. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of six objections concerning sacrifices, altars, circumcision, priesthood, and the distinction of clean and unclean animals in the pre-Mosaic period. The resolution distinguishes between ceremonial precepts as acts of private devotion inspired by the prophetic spirit versus those instituted by divine law-giving authority.

274. Cessation of Ceremonial Precepts in Christ #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of why the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law ceased with Christ’s advent. Berquist explores three temporal statuses of interior worship (Old Law, New Law, and the beatific vision), demonstrates how exterior worship must correspond to interior worship, and addresses objections to the cessation of ceremonies through Augustine’s distinction of periods and the Timothy/Titus example from apostolic practice.

275. Know Thyself and Nothing Too Much: Reason, Wisdom, and Divine Likeness #

This lecture explores the ancient Delphic maxims ‘Know thyself’ and ‘Nothing too much’ as a foundation for understanding human reason and its relationship to divine wisdom. Berquist analyzes to whom the exhortation to self-knowledge is directed, arguing it is specifically to human reason as the highest faculty capable of knowing itself. He then examines the danger of mistaking reason’s self-knowledge for its highest end, showing how likeness to God in knowing can paradoxically become a source of deception if pursued as an ultimate goal rather than as a means to knowledge of God himself.

276. Judicial Precepts: Definition, Nature, and Division #

This lecture explores the nature of judicial precepts in the Old Law, distinguishing them from moral and ceremonial precepts. Berquist examines four main questions: the definition of judicial precepts as precepts ordering men to one another through divine institution rather than natural reason alone; whether they possess a figurative character (answering affirmatively but with an important distinction from ceremonial precepts); their cessation after Christ’s advent; and their four-fold division according to orders within any people. The lecture emphasizes that judicial precepts are figurative only ex consequente (consequently), not primo et per se (primarily), and that they lose obligatory force with Christ’s coming while remaining permissible for princes to observe.

277. Christ’s Resurrection and the Old Law’s Judicial Precepts #

This lecture addresses two primary questions: first, the three reasons Thomas Aquinas provides for the necessity of Christ’s resurrection (wholeness of body-soul union, glorification from humiliation, and Christ’s role as head of the Church); and second, the purpose and structure of the Old Law’s judicial precepts concerning rulers, property regulation, contracts, and interpersonal justice. The lecture demonstrates how Thomas uses Aristotelian philosophy to justify the particular laws given to Israel, arguing that they were designed to habituate the people to virtue and the common good.

278. Judicial Precepts and the Order of Society #

This lecture addresses objections to the judicial precepts of the Old Law, focusing on how these precepts properly order human society despite apparent contradictions. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s responses to eight objections concerning witnesses, punishment proportionality, animal punishment, and the regulation of property and domestic relations. The discussion demonstrates how judicial precepts serve both practical and mystical purposes in the ordering of the Jewish people.

279. Judicial Precepts Concerning Foreigners, Warfare, and Domestic Life #

This lecture examines Question 105, Article 3 of Aquinas’s treatment of the Old Law’s judicial precepts, focusing on how the law regulates relations with foreigners (aliens and extraneous peoples), military conduct in warfare, and domestic relations among servants, wives, and children. Berquist explores the distinction between peaceful and hostile relations with foreigners, the principles governing just warfare, exclusions from military service, and the regulation of servitude and filial obedience, demonstrating how these precepts are rationally ordered toward the common good and the cultivation of virtue.

280. The New Law as Instilled Grace and Written Precepts #

This lecture examines the nature of the New Law (lex nova), arguing that it is principally the grace of the Holy Spirit instilled in the hearts of the faithful, and only secondarily a written law. Berquist and Aquinas address the apparent paradox of how the New Law can be both instilled (like natural law) and written (in the gospels), resolving this through a distinction between what is primary (grace) and what is secondary (written precepts that dispose for or order the use of grace). The lecture covers the relationship between faith, grace, and law, drawing on Pauline theology and Augustinian distinctions between letter and spirit.

281. The New Law: Grace, Justification, and Timing #

This lecture examines the nature of the New Law as principally the grace of the Holy Spirit given inwardly to believers, contrasting it with the Old Law’s external written precepts. Berquist explores why the New Law justifies through grace rather than external observance, why it was not given from the beginning of the world (through three key reasons), and why it will endure until the end of the world. The discussion addresses objections regarding whether the New Law truly justifies and whether an ‘Age of the Holy Spirit’ should be expected in the future.

282. Hope as a Theological Virtue and the Old and New Law #

This lecture explores the theological virtue of hope through a detailed examination of Thomas Aquinas’s treatment in the Sentences (Distinction 26), using Shakespeare’s All’s Well That Ends Well as a literary illustration. Berquist explains why three theological virtues are necessary (faith, hope, and charity) by first analyzing hope as an emotion in the irascible appetite, then showing how the virtue of hope perfects this emotion. The lecture then transitions to Thomas’s discussion of the relationship between the Old and New Law, establishing that both laws share the same ultimate end but differ in their mode of operation—the Old Law as a law of fear and external observance, the New Law as a law of love and interior grace.

283. The Fulfillment and Containment of Old Law in New Law #

This lecture examines how the New Law fulfills the Old Law through the distinction between perfect and imperfect, exploring whether the New Law is contained in the Old and how Christ’s teaching perfects the precepts of the Law. Berquist analyzes three primary questions: whether the New Law fulfills the Old, whether the New Law is contained within the Old as a seed contains a tree, and how apparent contradictions between the laws are resolved through careful theological distinctions.

284. Exterior Works and the New Law #

This lecture examines whether the New Law should command or prohibit exterior works, and whether it does so sufficiently. Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of these questions, addressing objections that the New Law should concern only interior acts and showing how exterior works—particularly the sacraments and moral acts—necessarily flow from and lead to grace. The discussion clarifies the relationship between interior grace and exterior expression, and distinguishes between works necessary to salvation and those left to human discretion.

285. Interior Acts and the New Law: Precepts and Counsels #

This lecture examines how the New Law (Gospel) orders the interior acts of human beings through precepts and counsels. Berquist analyzes objections that the Gospel insufficiently addresses the Ten Commandments, judicial precepts, and ceremonial precepts, then explains how Christ’s teaching in the Sermon on the Mount perfects and completes the Mosaic Law by directing the will and intention toward proper ends. The lecture concludes by distinguishing between precepts (which command necessity) and counsels (which invite to greater perfection), showing how the three evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience constitute the religious state.

286. Motion, Act, and God as First Mover #

This lecture examines how the concept of motion originates from bodily change but is extended analogically to spiritual acts like understanding and loving. Berquist traces the argument that all motion—both bodily and spiritual—must ultimately be reduced to God as the first mover without qualification, establishing that nothing can act without being moved by God. The lecture also addresses why creatures are more capable of falling into nothingness (sin) than of achieving positive being (good), grounding this in the metaphysical principle that creatures are nothing in themselves.

287. Grace, Human Nature, and Merit in Thomistic Theology #

This lecture continues Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of grace through five articles examining whether man can love God above all things without grace, observe the precepts of the law without grace, and merit eternal life without grace. Berquist works through the objections and Thomas’s responses, emphasizing the distinction between integral and corrupted human nature, the supernatural character of charity, and the principle that acts must be proportioned to their end. The lecture explores how grace heals corrupted nature and elevates human action to merit eternal reward.

288. Grace, Sin, and the Three Effects of Corruption #

This lecture examines Articles 5-7 of Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of grace, focusing on whether humans can prepare themselves for grace, rise from sin, and achieve supernatural ends through their own power. Berquist explores the relationship between human free will and divine motion, the three-fold damage caused by sin (stain, corruption of nature, and guilt of punishment), and why only God can repair these effects. The discussion integrates Aristotelian causality with Christian theology to demonstrate the absolute necessity of grace for all supernatural action.

289. Grace, Sin, and the Need for Divine Aid #

This lecture covers Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of whether man can avoid sin and act rightly without grace, and whether grace alone suffices or continuous divine motion is necessary. Berquist explores Articles 8-10 of Summa Theologiae II-II, Question 109, examining the relationship between habitual grace, divine motion, and human perseverance in avoiding sin. The discussion centers on the corrupted state of human nature and why both God’s gift of grace and God’s continuous movement of the will are essential for right action.

290. Grace as a Quality in the Soul #

Berquist examines whether grace places something in the soul, beginning with an analysis of three senses of the word ‘grace’ and then defending the position that grace is an accidental quality, not a substance. Through careful distinctions between efficient and formal causation, and drawing on Aristotle’s categories, the lecture establishes that grace acts in the soul as a form that beautifies and perfects it, while God’s love (which causes grace) operates as an efficient cause in a manner fundamentally different from human love.

291. Grace as Quality and the Five Predicables #

This lecture examines whether grace is a quality in Aristotle’s ten categories and applies the five predicables (genus, difference, species, property, accident) from Porphyry’s Isagoge to understand grace’s metaphysical status. Berquist explores how grace, though more noble than human nature, must be understood as an accidental form rather than a substantial one, and how it relates to the soul’s powers through the analogy of properties flowing from essence.

292. Grace as Quality and Its Distinction from Virtue #

This lecture completes Thomas Aquinas’s analysis of grace by examining whether grace is a quality (Article 3) and determining its proper subject as the essence rather than the powers of the soul (Article 4). Berquist explains how grace differs fundamentally from virtue through proportional reasoning, showing that grace is to infused virtue as the natural light of reason is to acquired virtue. The lecture emphasizes that grace is a supernatural disposition presupposed to the virtues, not identical with them, and resides in the soul’s essence because it precedes virtue as cause precedes effect.

293. The Soul’s Essence and Grace: Species, Powers, and Properties #

This lecture examines whether grace resides in the essence of the soul or in its powers, drawing on Thomistic metaphysics and Aristotelian philosophy of nature. Berquist analyzes the distinction between a thing’s essential nature and its natural properties (powers), using the predicables from Porphyry’s Isagoge and examples from mathematics and natural observation. The discussion clarifies how the soul differs in species from animal and plant souls, and why grace can belong to the human soul specifically because of its rational nature.

294. The Division of Grace: Gratum Faciens and Gratis Datum #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s division of grace into two types: gratia gratum faciens (grace making us acceptable to God) and gratia gratis data (freely given grace for the benefit of others). Berquist explores how this division follows logical principles of naming and differentiation, clarifies the relationship between grace and virtue, and addresses objections about whether all grace is gratuitous. The lecture demonstrates how grace operates as a formal cause rather than an efficient cause, and how different types of grace serve different purposes in the economy of salvation.

295. Wisdom, Discourse, and the Divine Attributes #

This lecture explores the connection between reason, wisdom, and discourse through Aristotle’s framework, examining how wisdom represents the highest perfection of reason by considering universal and primary things. Berquist analyzes the six senses in which discourse can be called “large” and applies this analysis to understanding how God, as pure act and first cause, possesses all perfections corresponding to the categories of being (substance, quantity, quality, relation), while transcending all genera. The lecture culminates in examining why Thomas Aquinas orders the divine attributes differently in the Summa Contra Gentiles and Summa Theologiae, resolving the apparent problem of five attributes through the principle that unity can be attached to simplicity and infinity to perfection.

296. Operating and Cooperating Grace: Division and Distinction #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s division of grace into operating grace (gratia operans) and cooperating grace (gratia cooperans), drawing primarily from Question 111 of the Summa Theologiae. Berquist clarifies how the same grace can be distinguished according to diverse effects—operating when God moves the will from evil to good, and cooperating when God perfects the will already inclined toward good. The lecture addresses four objections to this division and demonstrates how both forms of grace respect human freedom while maintaining God’s primacy as the principal cause of justification.

297. Gratuitous Grace and Sanctifying Grace Distinguished #

This lecture examines the distinction between gratia gratis data (gratuitous grace) and gratia gratum faciens (sanctifying grace), exploring how both types of grace operate in the Christian life. Berquist walks through St. Thomas Aquinas’s systematic division of gratuitous graces into nine specific types and addresses objections concerning the relative dignity of these two grace categories, ultimately establishing that sanctifying grace is more worthy because it directly orders the soul to God as the ultimate end.

298. God as Sole Principal Cause of Grace #

This lecture examines whether God alone is the efficient cause of grace, addressing three objections that suggest creatures (Christ’s humanity, sacraments, and angels) might also be causes of grace. Berquist explores the distinction between principal and instrumental causality, drawing on Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysical principle that no creature can act beyond its own species, and establishes that grace as a partaking of divine nature can only be caused by God, with creatures serving as instrumental causes at most.

299. Grace, Disposition, and Divine Causality in Justification #

This lecture examines Aquinas’s treatment of preparation and disposition for grace, the necessity of grace given human preparation, and the equality or inequality of grace among recipients. Berquist works through the objections and replies in Questions 112-113 of the Summa Theologiae, clarifying the distinction between grace as habitual gift and grace as divine motion, and resolving apparent tensions between divine causality and human free will.

300. Justification of the Impious and the Remission of Sins #

This lecture explores Thomas Aquinas’s understanding of justification as an effect of operating grace, specifically examining the justification of the impious through the remission of sins. Berquist clarifies the equivocation in the term ‘justice’ and explains how justification implies a motion from the state of injustice to the state of justice, grounded in the proper ordering of the soul to God. The lecture concludes by introducing the ten articles of Question 113, which will systematically examine the nature, requirements, and effects of justification.

301. Justification of the Impious: Grace, Faith, and Free Will #

This lecture examines the justification of the impious through a detailed analysis of Aquinas’s treatment of the four essential components: the infusion of grace, the motion of free will toward God, the motion of free will against sin, and the remission of guilt. Berquist works through objections concerning whether grace alone is sufficient for remission of sin, whether the motion of free will is necessary, and what role faith plays in justification. The lecture emphasizes how divine grace and human free will work together instantaneously rather than in succession.

302. Justification of the Impious: Elements and Instantaneity #

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of the justification of the impious (iustificatio impii), specifically Articles 5-7 of Question 113 in the Summa Theologiae. Berquist focuses on whether the motion of free will against sin is required for justification, whether remission of sins should be numbered among the required elements, and the critical question of whether justification occurs instantaneously or successively. The lecture emphasizes the metaphysical structure of justification as a motion from injustice to justice and defends Thomas’s position that justification occurs in an indivisible instant through God’s infinite power.

303. Instantaneous Justification and the Order of Nature #

This lecture examines whether justification of the impious occurs instantaneously or successively, exploring the metaphysical problem of how contrary states can transition without contradiction. Berquist presents Thomas Aquinas’s resolution through the Aristotelian doctrine of continuous time and the distinction between the order of nature and the order of time, demonstrating that justification is instantaneous in time but ordered by nature through four distinct elements: infusion of grace, motion of free will toward God, motion of free will against sin, and remission of guilt.

304. Human Merit Before God and Divine Justice #

This lecture examines whether humans can merit rewards from God and the nature of that merit. Berquist explores the apparent paradox that humans owe God everything yet God rewards their works, introducing the crucial distinction between merit ex condigno (by strict justice) and merit ex congruo (by fittingness). The discussion centers on how divine ordering, rather than human debt, grounds the possibility of merit, and how the infinity gap between God and creation requires a proportional rather than absolute justice.

305. Merit, Grace, and the Holy Spirit in Justification #

This lecture examines whether humans can merit eternal life from God, focusing on the distinction between condign merit (merit that is strictly worthy) and congruous merit (merit that is fitting). Berquist explores how grace and the Holy Spirit are necessary for merit, why eternal life exceeds human natural powers, and how the seed analogy illuminates the relationship between present grace and future glory. The discussion resolves apparent tensions between human merit and divine justice through careful distinctions between agent and patient perspectives.

306. Charity as the Principal Source of Merit #

This lecture addresses Article 4 of Thomas Aquinas’s treatise on merit, examining whether charity is the chief source of merit in relation to other virtues. Berquist explores how charity, as the virtue directed toward the ultimate end (God), commands all other virtues and makes their acts meritorious. The lecture integrates Aristotelian principles about virtues aiming at ends with Thomistic theology on grace and merit.

307. Merit, Grace, and Reparation After Lapse #

This lecture examines whether humans can merit first grace, whether they can merit grace for others, and whether one can merit reparation after falling into sin. Berquist walks through Articles 5-7 of Question 114 in Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, clarifying the distinctions between merit ex condigno (by worthiness) and merit ex congruo (by fittingness), and establishing that grace is always the beginning of merit, never its result.

308. Merit, Grace, and Perseverance in Thomistic Theology #

This lecture examines Articles 8 and 9 of Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of merit, focusing on whether the growth of grace and perseverance fall under merit. Berquist analyzes the distinction between merit simpliciter and merit secundum quid, explores the two-fold limit of motion in grace (progress and term), and clarifies the critical difference between perseverance in via (on the way) and perseverance in patria (in glory). The discussion culminates in examining temporal goods and their qualified relationship to merit.