Lecture 36

36. Being Per Se: Three Groups of Meanings

Summary
This lecture explores Aristotle’s division of being into accidental being (kata symbebekos) and being per se (kath’auto), with detailed analysis of three groups of meanings within being per se: being according to figures of predication (categories), being as true/false (including beings of reason), and being as act/potency. Berquist emphasizes how these distinctions are essential for understanding equivocation in being and how wisdom ascends from less universal to more universal senses of being.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Accidental Being (Being by Happening / Kata Symbebekos) #

  • Definition: When two or more things happen to coincide in the same subject without forming a unified reality
  • Examples: Christian geometer, white geometer, scientific man, artistic man
  • Characteristic: These combinations lack intrinsic unity—being a Christian and being a geometer happen to the same subject but don’t constitute one thing
  • Significance for creatures: Accidental being is how creatures achieve perfection; all perfections beyond basic substance must be acquired
  • Significance for God: God has no accidental being; His substance is identical with His knowledge, justice, and love—all in a simple way
  • Importance in biography and history: Accidental properties can significantly affect a person’s life (example: Senator Stiles Bridges missing vice-presidency due to unfortunate name pairing with presidential candidate Landon)
  • Philosophy’s limited interest: Philosophy focuses little on accidental being; historians are more interested in these singular, individual circumstances

Being Per Se, First Group: Being According to Figures of Predication (Modi Predicandi) #

The Categories (Greek: kategoria = predication) #

  • Definition: Ways something can be said of individual substances based on what it is or what belongs to it
  • Individual substance: Something that exists not in another subject (e.g., you, me, Lassie the dog, Champion the horse)
  • Fundamental category: Substance — what something is (e.g., “I am a man,” “Lassie is a dog”)
    • These things are said by reason of what we are
    • Possess the fullest being

Derivative Categories (said by reason of something in us or outside us): #

  1. Quantity (How much): Size, measure, extension (e.g., “I am 5'10”)

    • Said by reason of something in us that is not what we are
    • Less being than substance
  2. Quality (How): Disposition, habits, states (e.g., “Champion was beautiful,” “Champion was healthy”)

    • Thomas distinguishes these into “how much” (quantity) and actual quality
    • Less being than substance
  3. Relation (Towards what): How a thing is toward another (e.g., “I am a father,” “I am a teacher,” “I am a grandfather”)

    • Said by reason of what one is toward another
    • Less being than substance
  4. Other categories (less discussed in this lecture): Where (place), When (time), Position, State, Action, Passion

    • Said by reason of something outside of us
    • Even less being than the above

Principle: Grammatical Correspondence to Being #

  • Verbs can be resolved into “to be” (verb) + something else
  • Examples: “Man gets well” = “Man is getting well”; “Man walks” = “Man is walking”
  • The ways of being said of correspond to the ways of being (Thomas’s principle)

Hierarchy of Being: #

Substance > Quality/Quantity > Relation > External circumstances (to be in a room, to be clothed, to be in prison)

  • A man in prison truly experiences “to be in prison” as real, though less real than his being a man
  • These external circumstances can be significant for biography and history

Being Per Se, Second Group: Being as True and Non-being as False #

Definition and Nature: #

  • Being as true: A statement corresponds to reality (e.g., “Socrates is sitting” when he is sitting)
  • Non-being as false: A statement does not correspond to reality (e.g., “Socrates is standing” when he is sitting)
  • This includes beings of reason: things that exist only in the mind, not in external reality

Beings of Reason (Entia Rationis) #

  • Definition: Concepts that exist in the intellect but have no corresponding reality outside the mind
  • Examples from the lecture:
    • Blindness: Not a positive quality one has, but the absence of sight in a creature naturally apt to see. It is truly the non-being of a reality (vision)
    • Ignorance: The non-being of knowledge. Yet we truly say “this student is ignorant”
    • Nothing: When the mind thinks about nothing, it is thinking about something in the mind (a being of reason), though nothing exists outside the mind
    • Death: “To be dead” is true to say (e.g., “John Paul II is dead”), yet death is not positive being—it is cessation of being

The Problem of Nothing: #

  • Question: How can we talk about nothing if nothing is not?
  • Greeks would say: “To say what is false is to say what is not.” But what is not is nothing. Can you say nothing?
  • Resolution: When the mind thinks about nothing, it gives it a kind of being-in-reason. Outside the mind, nothing is nothing. Inside the mind, nothing is something to think about.
  • Principle: Reason can think about what has no reality outside reason
  • Illustration: As a child, Berquist would wonder, “What if there was nothing? Just nothing.” The imagination is engaged in thinking about something that is purely a being of reason.

Universality of This Division: #

  • More universal than the first group because it includes:
    • All beings according to figures of predication (which can exist in the mind)
    • Things that exist only in the mind (blindness, ignorance, nothing)
  • This group can encompass both real being and purely mental constructs

Being Per Se, Third Group: Being as Act and Potency #

Definitions: #

  • Potency (Ability/Dynamis): Something able to be something but not yet actually being it

    • Example: Something able to be a geometer (before learning geometry)
    • Example: Food able to become human flesh and blood (before digestion)
    • Example: Before I was actually 5'10", I was able to be 5'10"
  • Act (Actuality/Energeia): Something actually being something

    • Example: Actually being a geometer (after learning)
    • Example: Food actually becoming human flesh and blood (after digestion)
    • Example: Actually being 5'10"

Scope and Universality: #

  • Can be applied to real being: something’s ability to have a property vs. actually having it
  • Can be applied to beings of reason: the ability to think about something vs. actually thinking about it
  • Can extend even to understanding God as pure act (actus purus)
  • Most universal division: Encompasses all categories of being

Progression in Aristotle’s Discussion: #

  • Book 9 of Metaphysics treats act and potency more fully
  • First part discusses act and potency in relation to motion
  • Second part completes the universal consideration of act and potency

Key Arguments #

The Ascent from Less Universal to More Universal #

  • Being according to figures of predication is less universal (applies to things said of substances in specific ways)
  • Being as true/false is more universal (applies to all real beings and all beings of reason)
  • Being as act/potency is most universal (applies to all of the above)
  • This ascending order reflects the nature of wisdom, which seeks increasingly universal principles
  • This contrasts with other sciences:
    • Natural philosophy ascends toward matter
    • Mathematics ascends from simple to composed and from equal to unequal
    • Wisdom ascends toward the immaterial and toward God

The Reality of Beings of Reason #

  • Problem: How can something have being if it is not real?
  • Solution: Beings of reason have being-in-the-mind, not being-in-reality
  • Implication: The intellect has the power to consider what exists only as an object of thought
  • Application: One can truly say “this student is ignorant” or “this man is blind” even though ignorance and blindness are not positive realities but absences

Multiplication of Beings of Reason #

  • Example: In the statement “Socrates is Socrates,” Socrates appears twice, but this is multiplication only in the mind
  • In reality, there is only one Socrates
  • Berquist uses this principle to refute Bertrand Russell’s claim that part equals whole:
    • Russell: Even numbers correspond one-to-one with all numbers (1-to-2, 2-to-4, 3-to-6, etc.), so the part equals the whole
    • Berquist/Deconinck: One can say “Socrates, Socrates, Socrates, Socrates…” (multiplying Socrates in reason) or “Socrates, the same Socrates opposed to Hercules, Socrates opposed to Aristotle, etc.” This is multiplying beings of reason, not real beings

Why Some Things Are True to Say Though Not Real #

  • “He is blind”: True to say, though blindness is not a positive quality but the absence of sight
  • “He is ignorant”: True to say, though ignorance is not a positive quality but the absence of knowledge
  • “He is dead”: True to say, though death is the cessation of being, not positive being
  • Principle: We can truly predicate what the mind understands, even though what is understood may be a privation or absence rather than a positive reality

Important Definitions #

Kata Symbebekos (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) / Accidental Being / Being by Happening #

  • When two properties happen to belong to the same subject without intrinsic unity
  • Neither property constitutes the subject’s essence
  • These are secondary ways of being

Kath’auto (καθ’αὑτό) / Per Se / Being by Itself #

  • Being that belongs to something either by reason of what it is or through a definite connection
  • Divided into three groups with increasing universality

Modi Predicandi (Latin) / Figures of Predication #

  • The ways something can be said of individual substances
  • Corresponds to the ten categories (Greek: kategoria)
  • Fundamental: substance; derivative: quantity, quality, relation, etc.

Entia Rationis / Beings of Reason #

  • Things that exist as objects of thought in the intellect but have no real existence outside the mind
  • Include negations, privations, and purely mental constructs
  • Have a peculiar mode of being: being-in-the-mind

Dynamis / Potency / Ability / Power #

  • The capacity to be something or to act in a certain way
  • The ability to undergo change or to possess a property
  • Not yet actuality, but the condition for becoming actual

Energeia / Act / Actuality #

  • The realization of what is potential
  • Existing in actuality rather than merely in capacity
  • The fulfillment of a power or ability

Examples & Illustrations #

Accidental Being #

  • Christian geometer: Christianity and geometry happen to the same subject (a man), but these don’t form one unified thing. There is no single property that makes one a “Christian geometer.”
  • White geometer: Whiteness and geometry happen to the same subject, but they don’t unite into one thing.
  • Gene Autry’s horse Champion: A beautiful, magnificent horse, perfect in its kind. At the rodeo, Champion performed perfectly, stepping around the auditorium with Autry.
  • Lassie the famous movie dog: An example of an individual substance to which various accidental properties belong.

Being According to Categories #

  • Substance: “I am a man,” “Lassie is a dog,” “Champion is a horse”
  • Quantity: “I am 5'10"” (height/measure)
  • Quality: “Champion was beautiful and healthy”
  • Relation: “I am a father” (toward a child), “I am a teacher” (toward students), “I am a grandfather” (toward grandchildren)
  • Place: “I am in this room”
  • External state: “I am clothed,” “I am sitting”

Beings of Reason #

  • Nothing: The mind can think about nothing (“What if there was nothing?”) though nothing has no reality outside the mind
  • Blindness: A true predicate (“He is blind”) though blindness is not a positive quality but the absence of sight in a creature naturally apt to see
  • Ignorance: A true predicate (“The student is ignorant”) though ignorance is the absence of knowledge, not a positive reality
  • Death: “John Paul II is dead” is a true statement, though death is not positive being but cessation of being

Act and Potency #

  • Before learning geometry: I am able to be a geometer (potency)
  • After learning geometry: I am actually a geometer (act)
  • Food in digestion: Food is able to become (potency) human flesh and blood
  • Food after digestion: Food has become (act) human flesh and blood
  • Growing tall: I was able to be 5'10" (before growing), then I am actually 5'10" (after growing)

Questions Addressed #

How can we truly say “He is blind” when blindness is not a positive being? #

  • Answer: Blindness is a being of reason—a privation or absence we can think about and truly predicate. It is not positive being in reality, but the non-being of sight in something naturally apt to see. Yet our intellect can grasp this privation and truly say “he is blind.”

How can we talk about nothing when nothing is not? #

  • Answer: When the mind thinks about nothing, nothing becomes something in the intellect—a being of reason. Outside the mind, nothing is truly nothing. But inside the mind, nothing is something to think about and truly assert (“Nothing is nothing”).

Why does Aristotle discuss three different groups of meanings of being? #

  • Answer: Being is equivocal by reason, not by chance. Understanding the ordered connections among different senses of being is essential for wisdom. The three groups show an ascent from less universal to more universal meanings, appropriate to wisdom’s quest for the most universal principles.

How do the different senses of being relate to each other? #

  • Answer: All are connected through substance. Things are called being because they are substance, or because they possess substance, or because they are ordered toward substance. This ordered equivocation allows a single science (wisdom) to study being as being.

Notable Quotes #

“So to be a geometry happens to a man. But do they come together and form one thing, geometry and a man? No. But in some sense there are geometrical men around.”

“This is what three kinds of being by happening, right? Accidental being, we call it.”

“If I’m writing a biography of this black woman, I’ve got to take into account this kind of being, right? Is it?”

“Philosophy’s not going to have much interest in this kind of being, huh?”

“What does the word nothing mean there? Does it mean anything? Let’s talk about nothing, shall we?”

“When you talk about nothing, are you talking about something or not? Or not talking about anything? Well, this is a problem that Plato has in the sophist.”

“Outside of reason, nothing is nothing, right? But nothing is something to think about.”

“Being blind is not being something, right? Yeah. To be ignorant, huh?… Being ignorant is really not being. It’s not knowing, right?”

“As you go from substance along, you get less and less being, right? So to be a man, to be healthy, to be 5'10”, to be a father, to be a son. To be a geometer is not as full being as my being a man, right?"

“So when you think about nothing, are you thinking about something or not? … Reason can do that, right? Take the statement, Socrates is Socrates, right? Socrates appears twice in that statement.”

“Most beings of reason are negations of some sort or lacks. They’re kind of non-being, right? But in reason, they have a kind of being.”