Lecture 8

8. Likeness as a Cause of Love: Thomistic Analysis

Summary
This lecture examines whether likeness (similitudo) is a cause of love, addressing the apparent paradox that similar people often compete and hate one another while maintaining that Thomistic philosophy reconciles this through careful distinctions. Berquist explores two types of likeness—actual (act to act) and potential (ability to act)—and explains how likeness per se causes love while competition per accidens may cause hate. The discussion integrates literary examples, philosophical objections, and the theological implications of loving God versus neighbor.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Problem: Likeness and Enmity #

  • Objection: If likeness causes love, why do similar people often hate each other?
  • Examples: potters competing with potters, two ambitious politicians, academics in the same field
  • The solution requires distinguishing between likeness as such (per se) and accidental competition (per accidens)

Two Types of Likeness #

Type 1: Likeness of Act to Act

  • Both parties have the same actual quality or form
  • Examples: two men sharing human nature, two white things sharing whiteness
  • Causes the love of friendship (wishing well to the other as another self)
  • This is more immediate and stronger likeness

Type 2: Likeness of Ability to Act

  • One party has an ability while the other has the actual exercise of that ability
  • Examples: the sick person who can become healthy (ability) loves the healthy person (act); the poor person who can gain wealth loves the wealthy person; the ignorant person who can know loves the wise person
  • Causes the love of wanting (desire for usefulness or benefit)
  • This is more distant likeness

Likeness as Cause of Friendship vs. Wanting #

  • Love of friendship (δικaía): arises from likeness where we see another as “another self,” desiring their good as we desire our own
  • Love of wanting (concupiscentia): arises from potential likeness, where we are drawn to what we lack but can obtain
  • The first is disinterested; the second involves self-interest

The Per Se / Per Accidens Distinction #

  • Per se (as such): Likeness itself, as a quality, naturally attracts and unites
  • Per accidens (accidentally): When likeness happens to place two people in competition for the same finite good (position, prize, marriage partner), conflict results
  • The hate is not caused by likeness but by the impediment to one’s own good
  • Example: Two painters seeking the same commission hate each other not because they are alike painters, but because they block each other’s profit
  • Contrast: A painter and poet, though similar in artistic sensibility, can be sincere friends because they don’t compete

Proportional Likeness (ἀναλογία) #

  • Even when opposites appear to attract, there is proportional likeness
  • Example: A masculine man loves a feminine woman—not despite the difference, but because femininity in a woman is proportionally like masculinity in a man
  • Each possesses excellence in their own domain according to their nature
  • Example: A good singer loving a good writer—each has excellence in his art
  • Shakespeare and Mozart (had they been contemporaries) would have recognized likeness: as Mozart is to music, so Shakespeare is to drama

Identity as Stronger Than Likeness #

  • One loves oneself more than another who is merely like oneself
  • Reason: I am identical with myself; I am only similar to another
  • Danger for Christians: We may love ourselves more than God, or love our neighbors (who are more like us) more than God (who is infinitely different)
  • Augustine’s distinction: Amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei (self-love unto contempt of God = the earthly city) vs. Amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui (love of God unto contempt of self = the heavenly city)

Distant Likeness: The Likeness of Seed or Potentiality #

  • Even the coward loves the courageous man because reason contains the seeds (σπέρματα) of virtue in all people
  • The stingy person loves the generous person because natural reason tells him generosity is what should be, even though he is not yet generous
  • The uninformed person loves the wise person through the likeness of ability to know
  • This extends theologically: We have a very distant likeness to God as rational beings (reason itself is “godlike”)

Key Arguments #

Main Argument in Support of Likeness as Cause #

  1. Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 13:19: “Every animal loves what is like itself”
  2. Plato and Aristotle (Ethics VIII, beginning) discuss this
  3. The axiom: “A friend is another self” (Aristotle)
  4. When two are alike in form, they are “in some way one” in that form, so love naturally flows from one to the other as if loving itself

Responses to Objections #

Objection 1: Potters quarrel with each other; the proud dispute—yet they are alike

  • Response: Likeness as such causes love, but competition per accidens causes hate
  • The hate arises not from likeness but from mutual impediment to the good each pursues
  • This is not a problem for the theory because the per accidens cause (competition) overrides the per se cause (likeness)

Objection 2: A man loves an actor whom he would not wish to be (Augustine)

  • Response: There is proportional likeness
  • Just as one man is excellent in his art, another may be excellent in a different art
  • The forms are different, but the relation is the same: excellence to practitioner
  • A man’s masculinity is like a woman’s femininity; a singer’s excellence in singing is like a writer’s excellence in writing

Objection 3: The sick love health; the poor love wealth—yet they lack these things

  • Response: There is likeness of ability to act
  • The sick person has the ability to become healthy, and loves the actual health of a healthy person
  • The poor has the ability to become wealthy and loves the actual wealth of the wealthy
  • This is a more distant likeness but still a genuine likeness

Objection 4: We love virtuous people we ourselves lack (cowardly man loves courageous man)

  • Response (first solution): Same as Objection 3—likeness of ability to act
  • Response (second solution): All humans have virtues in seed-like form through reason (ratione)
  • The coward loves the courageous man because natural reason tells him he should be courageous
  • Though the coward is not yet courageous in act, he has the seed of courage in his rational nature

Important Definitions #

Similitudo (Likeness): A quality shared between two things, manifested either as (1) both possessing the same act or form, or (2) one possessing an ability while the other possesses the act

Per se (As such): Essential causation; likeness per se causes love by nature

Per accidens (Accidentally): Incidental causation; competition or impediment arising alongside likeness, causing hate accidentally rather than essentially

Amicitia (Friendship): The love arising from likeness of act to act, wherein one wishes the good of the other as another self

Concupiscentia (Wanting): The love arising from likeness of ability to act, wherein one desires to obtain for oneself something the other actually has

Proportio (Proportionality): Likeness not of the same kind but in relation; as masculinity is to man, so femininity is to woman; as excellence is to one artist, so excellence is to another artist

Semina virtutum (Seeds of virtue): The potential for virtue inherent in human reason itself, explaining why one lacking a virtue can still love and respect one who possesses it

Examples & Illustrations #

Literary Examples #

  • Washington Irving on Goldsmith and Sir Joshua Reynolds: A poet and painter can be sincere friends because they are alike in taste and aesthetic principles but do not compete in the same art
  • Irving’s observation: Two poets or two novelists competing for acclaim tend toward enmity; but if they are in different arts, they support each other
  • Jane Austen: Characters recognize that “temperaments better be unlike”—a lively husband will support a serious wife; opposites can contribute to matrimonial happiness through proportional likeness
  • Jane Austen again: Two people “so totally dissimilar as to make mutual affection incompatible” have nothing in common and would be miserable together
  • Emily Brontë, Wuthering Heights (Cathy): “He’s more myself than I am”—she loves Heathcliff because he is so like her (identity), while she cannot love Linton even though he is good, because they lack likeness. Her love for Linton is like “foliage in the woods” (temporary, changeable), while her love for Heathcliff is like “eternal rocks beneath” (unchanging)
  • James Boswell on Samuel Johnson: Johnson disliked Boswell’s bustling energy, as the gloomy dislike the merry (Oderant Hilarem Tristes—the sad hate the cheerful). Yet sometimes a gloomy person seeks out a humorous person because there is a deeper likeness in reason or purpose

Practical Examples #

  • Competing for the same woman: If two men have identical taste and both are attracted to the same woman, they become competitors and enemies—not because of likeness per se, but because of impediment per accidens
  • Competing for office: Two equally ambitious politicians are alike in ambition but become enemies because only one can be elected
  • Academics in the same field: Professors compete for the same position and may become rivals, whereas a philosopher and political scientist might be allies (no competition for the same chair)
  • The rare book: Two book collectors with identical taste see a rare edition; only one can own it, leading to conflict despite perfect likeness in taste
  • Physicians and competence: One should choose a doctor for medical competence, not for personality likeness to oneself—a practical warning against preferring the personally similar to the truly good
  • Voting and leadership: People often vote for candidates who are like themselves rather than most qualified, with terrible consequences
  • The poor and the wealthy: A poor man loves the wealthy man through the likeness of ability to act (he can become wealthy) and the expectation of benefit (friendship of usefulness)
  • The scientist’s motivation: Competing scientists race to be the first discoverer; they cannot both have the honor of discovery (though both can know the same truth), so they compete despite sharing similar expertise

Questions Addressed #

Q: Why do similar people often hate each other if likeness causes love? A: Likeness as such causes love, but when it leads to competition for the same finite good, hate results per accidens. The impediment to one’s own good, not the likeness itself, causes the hate. Two painters competing for a commission hate each other over the commission, not over being painters.

Q: How can opposites attract if likeness is the cause of love? A: Apparent opposites often have proportional likeness. A man’s masculinity is proportionally like a woman’s femininity. A singer’s excellence is proportionally like a writer’s excellence. The difference in manifestation masks the underlying likeness in form and relation.

Q: Can a coward love a courageous man if they lack likeness? A: Yes, through two mechanisms: (1) The likeness of ability to act—the coward can become courageous; and (2) The seeds of virtue in reason—natural reason tells every person that courage is how one should be, so the coward recognizes and loves the actualization of what his reason already contains in seed form.

Q: Why does a person love what he lacks (health, wealth, wisdom)? A: Through the likeness of ability to act. The poor person has the ability to become wealthy; the sick has the ability to become healthy; the ignorant has the ability to know. This potential likeness draws them to love the actual possession in another.

Q: Is friendship the same in all cases? A: No. Likeness of act to act produces the love of friendship (wishing well to the other as another self, disinterested). Likeness of ability to act produces the love of wanting (desiring benefit for oneself, interested). Augustine distinguishes true friendship from mere utility.

Q: What is the theological danger of preferring the like over the good? A: Since our neighbor is more like us than God is, we may naturally love our neighbor more than God. Since we are ourselves (not merely like ourselves), we may love ourselves even more than our neighbor or God. But Christian charity requires loving God above all and our neighbor as ourselves—the opposite order of our natural affections. This is the distinction between the earthly city (amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei) and the heavenly city (amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui).

Practical Warnings #

  • In education: A student may attach to a professor who is personally like him rather than one who is wiser, to his detriment
  • In leadership: People often prefer leaders who resemble them rather than those most qualified
  • In marriage: While some opposition is favorable (complementarity), total dissimilarity in taste and disposition leads to unhappiness
  • In professional choice: Choosing a doctor for personality rather than competence is dangerous
  • In the spiritual life: The Christian must resist the natural tendency to love himself, his neighbor, or creatures more than God