4. The Nature and Division of Love: Friendship and Wanting

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Two Fundamental Kinds of Love #

• Love of Friendship (Dilectio): Wishing good to another for their own sake; the object of love is the person loved
• Love of Wanting (Amor Concupiscentia): Desiring something as a good for oneself; the object of love is the good desired
• These distinctions apply to both emotional love and volitional love (acts of the will)
• The division is rooted in Aristotle’s definition: “to love is to wish good to someone”

The Two Objects of Love #

Love naturally tends toward two distinct objects:

1. The good which someone wishes (object of love of wanting)
2. The one to whom good is wished (object of love of friendship)

This means:

• For inanimate objects (wine, candy), only love of wanting is possible
• For oneself, only love of wishing well is possible
• For another person, both kinds of love are possible

The Etymology of Dilectio #

• Dilectio comes from the root electio (choice/election)
• Implies that love of friendship involves choosing the beloved for their own sake
• Distinguishes volitional love from mere emotional attraction
• Available only to rational creatures: humans, angels, and God

Relationship to Aristotle’s Three Kinds of Friendship #

• Friendship of Usefulness: The love involved is primarily love of wanting (I love you because you’re useful to me)
• Friendship of Pleasure: Also involves love of wanting (I love you because you please me)
• Friendship of Virtue: Involves true love of friendship (I love you for your own sake)
• Only the friendship based on virtue is friendship “in the full sense”

Key Arguments #

Thomas’s Response to Objections #

Objection 1: Love is a passion, but friendship is a habit, so love cannot be divided by friendship.

• Response: The division names “the love of friendship” (the kind of love appropriate to friendship), not friendship itself. This is the love proper to true friendship—wishing well to another.

Objection 2: Wanting is a different passion from love, so love cannot be divided by wanting.

• Response: “Love of wanting” does not mean the passion of wanting itself, but rather affection for something as a good one desires for oneself.

Objection 3: Aristotle says friendship has three kinds, but useful and pleasant friendships involve wanting.

• Response: In these friendships, one does wish some good to the friend, but that good is ultimately referred back to one’s own satisfaction. True friendship (based on virtue) involves genuine love of friendship.

The Philosophical Foundation #

Thomas grounds the distinction in two key points:

1. Aristotle’s Definition: “To love is to wish good to someone” reveals love has two possible objects
2. The Nature of Wishing: What one wishes (the good) and to whom one wishes it (the person) are distinct objects

From this flows the necessary division into the love of wanting and love of friendship.

Important Definitions #

Love of Friendship (Dilectio / Amor Amicitiae) #

• Wishing good to another for their own sake, not for personal benefit
• Etymologically connected to choice (electio) and election
• Requires knowledge of the beloved’s worth
• Requires mutual recognition (friend must know they are loved)
• The only form of love that constitutes true friendship
• Belongs to the will, not merely to emotion
• Can be directed toward the immaterial and the divine

Love of Wanting (Amor Concupiscentia) #

• The liking or affection for something as a good for oneself
• Can be directed toward inanimate objects (candy, wine)
• When directed toward persons, treats them primarily as means to personal satisfaction
• Often the first stage in romantic relationships
• Belongs primarily to the concupiscible passion
• Can develop into love of friendship through habituation and choice
• More general in application; can extend to more objects

Key Linguistic Distinctions #

• Amor: More general term; can mean love of wanting or emotion-based affection; in Greek often eros
• Dilectio: Specifically chosen love; love involving deliberation and will; etymologically from electio
• Caritas: Love marked by esteeming the beloved as of great worth; in Greek agape
• Philia: Friendship-love; in Greek philosophical context

Berquist emphasizes the ambiguity of the English word “love” which obscures these important distinctions.

Examples & Illustrations #

Emotional vs. Volitional Love #

• Sensible love: Limited to what is agreeable to the senses; involves bodily change; shared with animals
• Volitional love: Immaterial; can extend to immaterial objects (wisdom, God); shared with angels and God
• Example: One can love wisdom through reason (dilectio) but not through emotion (amor)

The Problem of Love in Daily Speech #

• Bookstore publishers confuse a “Love and Friendship” course with eros/sexual content
• The word “love” applied on Main Street typically means emotional/erotic love
• Yet we also speak of “lover of wisdom” without implying eros
• This illustrates how the word is used broadly for any kind of affection or narrowly for specific types

Examples of Each Kind of Love #

Only Love of Wanting Possible:

• Love of candy, wine, or other inanimate goods
• One cannot have friendship with an object

Only Love of Wishing Well Possible:

• One’s love of oneself properly understood
• God’s love of Himself

Both Kinds Possible:

• Love of another person (can be love of wanting or love of friendship or both)
• This ambiguity is why people sometimes are unaware of what kind of love they have for another

St. Bernard of Clairvaux’s Four Stages of Love #

Berquist references Bernard’s developmental framework:

1. First Stage: Man loves only himself
2. Second Stage: Man turns to God for help (loves God with love of wanting)
3. Third Stage: Man becomes acquainted with God and begins to see God’s lovability apart from benefits (begins love of friendship)
4. Fourth Stage: Man loves himself for God’s sake

Questions Addressed #

Can love be properly divided into these two kinds? #

Yes, because:

• Love has two possible objects: the good wished and the one to whom good is wished
• This division applies universally to all acts of love, emotional or volitional
• It illuminates the structure of all human relationships and affections

Is love of wanting really love? #

Yes, but in a limited sense:

• It is genuine affection or liking
• However, it is incomplete compared to love of friendship
• It treats the beloved “in some respect” rather than “simply”
• It can be a legitimate beginning point for developing true love of friendship

How does this apply to understanding friendship? #

• True friendship requires love of friendship, not merely love of wanting
• In useful and pleasant friendships, the love is fundamentally love of wanting directed back to oneself
• Only in friendship based on virtue is there genuine mutual love of friendship
• This explains why Aristotle says only virtue-friendship is worthy of the name “friendship” in the full sense

What distinguishes emotional from volitional love in this framework? #

• Emotional love (amor): Involves bodily change; limited to sensible goods; we share it with animals
• Volitional love (dilectio): Immaterial; can extend to immaterial objects; we share it with angels and God
• Both can be either love of wanting or love of friendship
• The will’s love is more properly called “love of friendship” when it truly wishes good to another

Notable Quotes #

“A man that fortunes, buffets, and rewards has stained with equal thanks.”

• Shows the virtue of responding with equal equilibrium to good and bad fortune, not being enslaved by emotional reactions

“Give me that man that is not passion-slave.”

• Emphasizes that true virtue involves not being enslaved to passions (hunger, thirst, sexual desire, fear, anger, sadness)

“Blood could refer back to the emotions, right? But judgment to the reason.”

• Berquist’s explanation of how emotions and reason work together in the virtuous person

“The philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, that to love is to wish good to someone.”

• The foundational Aristotelian definition that grounds Thomas’s entire analysis