92. Equivocal Words and the Nature of Badness

Summary

This lecture explores the distinction between equivocal by reason and equivocal by chance, using the word ‘bad’ as the primary example of an equivocal by reason term. Berquist demonstrates that ‘bad’ has three interconnected meanings—lack, what has the lack, and what causes the lack—all of which must be understood in relation to nature. The fundamental principle developed is that nature (what a thing is) is the measure of what is good or bad for that thing.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Equivocal Words and Their Meanings #

Equivocal by Reason vs. Equivocal by Chance

Words equivocal by reason have multiple meanings connected through a rational principle (λόγος)
Words equivocal by chance have meanings that happen to share a name without any rational connection
Example of equivocal by reason: the word “reason” itself—(1) the power of discourse (ability to look before and after), and (2) the cause of thinking something is true. These are connected because reason (power) gives reasons (causes)
Example of equivocal by chance: “bat” (the animal and the baseball bat) have no rational connection

The Word ‘Many’ as Equivocal by Reason

“Many” is itself equivocal by reason, meaning “more than one” not “few”
This distinction is important for understanding how words function in definition

The Three Meanings of ‘Bad’ #

The word ‘bad’ (malum) is fundamentally equivocal by reason with three basic meanings that must be understood in reference to one another:

First Meaning—Lack in Strict Sense: Badness as privation (privatio). Example: blindness is bad as a lack of sight
Second Meaning—What Has the Lack: A subject that possesses the lack. Example: a blind man is bad because he has the lack of sight
Third Meaning—What Causes the Lack: An agent that produces the lack. Example: what blinds a man (poking out an eye, torture causing blindness) is bad because it causes the lack

All three meanings are ordered hierarchically, with the first being primary and the others defined in reference to it.

Nature as the Measure of Good and Bad #

Fundamental Principle: A thing is bad if and only if it lacks something that it is by nature apt to have and should have

Definition of Lack (Privatio):

The non-presence of something in a subject
In a subject that is able to have it
In a subject that is by nature apt to have it
When (at the time) it should have it

Critical Insight: To understand what is bad, one must understand what nature is. Nature itself is interior to the thing—the beginning and cause of motion and rest in that which it is.

Key Arguments #

The Connection Between Nature and Badness #

If something is bad in the strict sense, it is a lack
A lack is always relative to nature—what counts as a lack depends on what the thing is by nature
Therefore, badness is necessarily connected to nature
Nature (what a thing is) is the measure of what is good or bad

Implication for Philosophy: Those who criticize the Augustinian and Thomistic doctrine that evil is a lack without understanding that “bad” is equivocal by reason misunderstand the position. Augustine and Thomas speak about the first meaning of bad, to which all other meanings must be referred.

Nature and Natural Aptitude #

Examples of What Is Bad by Nature:

For a man or dog not to see: bad (they are by nature apt to have sight)
For a cat that hunts to lack sight: bad (hunting cats need eyes by their nature)
For a chair not to see: not bad (chairs are not by nature apt to have sight)
For a stone not to see: not bad (stones have no natural aptitude for sight)
For trees not to see: not bad (trees do not move from place to place)
For sedentary sea creatures (clams, etc.) not to see: not bad (they are affixed to the ocean floor; their meal comes to them; they work by touch)

Important Definitions #

Equivocal (ἀνώνυμος/aequivocum)

A term having multiple meanings (more than one)
Distinguished from univocal (entirely the same meaning) and purely equivocal/equivocal by chance (entirely different meanings with no rational connection)

Equivocal by Reason (ἀνώνυμος κατὰ λόγον)

Multiple meanings connected through a rational principle or cause
The meanings are ordered, with one being primary and others defined in reference to it
There is a reason (cause) why these different things share the same name

Equivocal by Chance (ἀνώνυμος κατὰ συμβεβηκός)

Meanings that happen to share the same name without rational connection
No cause or reason explains the shared naming

Analogous Name (ὄνομα ἀναλογικόν)

Sometimes used to denote equivocal by reason, but Berquist cautions against this usage
The Greek word for proportion (ἀναλογία) can mislead, as not all equivocal by reason names are cases of proportion/analogy
Berquist prefers “equivocal by reason” as the broader, more accurate term

Lack/Privation (privatio)

The non-presence of something in a subject able to have it, by nature apt to have it, and when it should have it
The fundamental first meaning of bad

Nature (natura)

The beginning and cause of motion and rest in that which it is (Aristotelian definition from Physics)
What a thing is (its essence or definition)
Always interior to the thing

Examples & Illustrations #

The Three Meanings of ‘Bad’ Applied #

Blindness Example:

Blindness (the lack) is bad in the first sense
A blind man is bad in the second sense (he has the lack)
What causes blindness is bad in the third sense (e.g., poking out an eye, the Spanish Civil War torture of shining light into eyes until blindness results)

King Lear Reference: The blinding of Gloucester is presented as horrific precisely because sight is something humans are by nature apt to have. The victim’s eyes are propped open with toothpicks while light is shined in them.

The Distinction Between Univocal and Equivocal by Reason #

Man and Animal Example: When one says “man is an animal,” the word “animal” is equivocal by reason. Man is an animal, but not just an animal—man has reason. Beast is the univocal name in the primary sense; man receives its own name. We contrast man against the animals precisely because of this equivocation.

The Word ‘Political’ (πολιτικός) #

Three Meanings Ordered by Reference:

First Meaning (Primary): Political refers to the polis (city)
Second Meaning: Political refers to government (not the polis itself, but what rules and directs the polis)
Third Meaning: Political refers to revolution (a change of government, which is further removed from the polis)

Each meaning is defined in reference to the one before it, with the polis being the primary reference point.

Questions Addressed #

All three must be understood in reference to the first meaning (lack). The second meaning (what has the lack) is defined by reference to the first, as is the third meaning (what causes the lack). This is the structure characteristic of equivocal by reason.

Why is understanding the equivocity of ‘bad’ important for theology? #

Those who claim evil is not a lack (citing concrete examples like Hitler’s tanks and bullets) misunderstand Augustine and Thomas. Augustine and Thomas speak of the first, primary meaning of bad (lack), to which all other meanings must be referred. The concrete examples concern the second and third meanings of bad, not the first.

Why does a word equivocal by reason keep its common name rather than receive a new name? #

The meaning that adds nothing beyond the common meaning keeps the common name. The meaning that adds something noteworthy receives a new name. Example: “animal” is the common name for beasts; “man” receives its own name because it adds reason to animality.

How does nature function as the measure of good and bad? #

What counts as a lack (and therefore as bad) depends entirely on what the thing is by nature. For a human or hunting cat, lack of sight is bad because they are by nature apt to have sight. For a stone or chair, lack of sight is not bad because they are not by nature apt to have sight. Nature determines what constitutes a lack for any particular thing.