Lecture 56

56. Defining Motion: Aristotle's Definition and Modern Errors

Summary
This lecture examines Aristotle’s definition of motion as ’the act of what is able to be, insofar as it is able to be,’ and critiques modern philosophers (Descartes and Locke) who claim motion cannot be defined. Berquist demonstrates that motion, while not simple to define, can be understood through the relationship between act and ability, and that motion is always ‘something of another’ (like health is of the body), providing the necessary multiplicity for definition.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

  • The Definability of Motion: Whether motion can be defined, and how modern philosophers wrongly rejected this possibility
  • Aristotle’s Definition of Motion: Understanding the precise formulation and its three essential components
  • The Problem of Circular Definition: How to avoid defining motion through itself
  • Motion as “Something of Another”: Why motion, like health, always belongs to something other than itself
  • Act and Ability (δύναμις and ἐνέργεια): The foundational concepts needed to understand motion
  • Incomplete vs. Complete Actualization: The distinction between partial acts that are on the way to further acts (motion) and partial acts that are not

Key Arguments #

Why Not Everything Can Be Defined #

  • If every part of every definition needed to be defined, infinite regress would make all definition impossible
  • Some things must be known without definition (like act itself)
  • This principle applies equally to definitions, statements, and words
  • Words learned: The first words cannot be learned through other words; they are learned by associating a sensed sound with a sensed object
  • Aristotle recognized this principle long before Descartes and Locke, though they do not acknowledge it

The Circularity Problem #

  • “Motion is the act of the movable” is true but circular (defines motion by itself)
  • “Motion is the act of what is able to be in the room” (rather than “coming into the room”) avoids using the same word but is false
  • The challenge: find a speech that is both true and non-circular

Motion as “Something of Another” #

  • Motion never exists by itself; it is always the motion of something
  • The falling stone is in motion, not the falling itself
  • The walking man is in motion, not walking itself
  • Therefore, motion is always “something of another,” like health is of the body
  • This provides a multiplicity that can serve as the basis for a true definition

The Three Components of Aristotle’s Definition #

Motion is: “The act of what is able to be, insofar as it is able to be”

  1. An Act (ἐνέργεια): Motion is an actualization of potential
  2. An Imperfect Act: The ability is not fully actualized (e.g., when coming into the room, one is only partly in the room)
  3. Ordered to Further Actualization: Motion is essentially on the way to a complete act; further actualization is essential, not accidental

The Critical Distinction: Motion vs. Partial States #

  • Standing in the doorway checking IDs: Partly in the room, but it is accidental whether one ever goes further
  • Coming through the doorway: Partly in the room, but it is essential that one will be further in if motion continues
  • The Difference: Motion requires that further actualization is ordered to the nature of what is moving; a mere partial state does not

Important Definitions #

Motion (κίνησις) #

The act of what is able to be, insofar as it is able to be.

This captures: (1) actualization of potential, (2) incomplete actualization, (3) orientation toward further actualization.

Act (ἐνέργεια) #

  • The realization or actualization of a potential
  • Not itself definable, but foundational for defining motion
  • Known without definition

Ability / Potentiality (δύναμις) #

  • The capacity to be or do something
  • Not yet actualized, but ordered to actualization

Movable (κινητόν) #

  • That which is capable of being in motion
  • Not itself motion, but the subject of motion

Examples & Illustrations #

Coming Into the Room #

  • Outside the room: Able to be in the room, but not actually in it
  • Coming through the doorway: Partly in the room; the ability is being actualized
  • Fully inside: The ability is completely actualized (no longer motion)
  • Standing in the doorway checking IDs: Partly in the room, but not essentially on the way further (accidental)
  • Key distinction: Motion requires that further actualization is essential to it

Heating Water #

  • Cold water: Able to be hot, but not actually hot
  • Becoming hot: Some heat is actualized, but more will come (motion)
  • Warm water (removed from heat): Partially hot, but no further actualization is essential (not motion)
  • Boiling water: Fully hot (complete actualization, no longer motion)

Learning #

  • Definition: The act of the ability to know (not the ability to learn, which would be circular)
  • Student in class: Imperfectly knows, but will know more (motion toward knowledge)
  • Student who drops out: Imperfectly knows, but is no longer learning (no essential orientation to further knowledge)
  • The difference: Whether further actualization is ordered to the subject’s nature or merely accidental

Growing #

  • Height is an example of motion from ability to act
  • A person was once not actually 5'10" but was able to be, and is now actually 5'10"
  • Growing is the motion by which this transition occurs

Notable Quotes #

“Motion is never the thing in motion. It’s not the falling that is falling, it’s a stone that’s falling. It’s not walking that goes for a walk, it’s the man that went for a walk.” — Berquist, illustrating that motion is always “something of another”

“Not everything can be defined, and not everything should be defined.” — Aristotle (cited by Berquist)

“The fact that we’re sure about motion might, if anything, be a sign that maybe we don’t know too clearly what it is.” — Berquist, responding to Descartes’ assumption

“They speak as if wisdom began with them… they speak as if… Aristotle hadn’t seen that.” — Berquist, on Descartes and Locke’s failure to acknowledge Aristotle’s prior insight

Questions Addressed #

Can Motion Be Defined? #

  • Modern Answer (Descartes, Locke): No—motion is too simple/obvious to define
  • Aristotelian Answer: Yes, through reference to act and ability
  • Resolution: Understanding that not all things need be defined; act is known without definition, but motion can be defined in relation to act and ability

How Can We Define Motion Without Circularity? #

  • Avoid using the same word (motion, moving, movable in the sense of actively moving)
  • Instead, use “what is able to be” (the movable as potential)
  • Add the qualifier “insofar as it is able to be” to distinguish motion from complete actualization

What Is the Essential Difference Between Motion and a Partial State? #

  • Partial State: Imperfect actualization, but further actualization is accidental (may or may not happen)
  • Motion: Imperfect actualization, but further actualization is essential and ordered to the nature of what moves (will happen as long as motion continues)

Why Do Modern Philosophers Fail to Define Motion? #

  • They do not read Aristotle carefully enough
  • They do not recognize that Aristotle already established the principle that not everything can be defined
  • They overlook what Aristotle identified as undefined: act, not motion
  • They fail to see that motion, being “something of another,” has the multiplicity necessary for definition