47. The Four Kinds of Causes and Their Corollaries

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• The Four Kinds of Causes: Material (that from which), Formal (the shape/order), Efficient (the mover/maker), and Final (that for the sake of which)
• Cause as Equivocal Term: The word ‘cause’ has four distinct meanings, none univocal
• The Order of Causation: Historical and logical order in which reason is forced to admit each cause
• Three Corollaries to the Doctrine of Causes: Multiple causes as such, reciprocal causation, and one cause of contraries
• Application Beyond Physical Things: Extension of the four causes to immaterial sciences like logic

Key Arguments #

The Progressive Recognition of Causes #

Material Cause (Most Obvious)

• The word ‘cat’ depends on C, A, and T; remove these letters and nothing remains
• Remove all wood and metal from a wooden chair and nothing is left
• The material is the most undeniable and known dependence

Formal Cause (Order/Shape)

• The same letters C, A, T can form ‘cat’ or ‘act’—difference lies in order, not material
• The same wood can form a chair or a table—the form, not the matter, distinguishes them
• Form is the ordering principle that makes matter into a particular thing

Efficient Cause (Mover/Maker)

• If the same material (letters or wood) can receive different forms, it must be acted upon by something external
• Letters don’t arrange themselves into different orders; the writer does
• Wood doesn’t shape itself into different forms; the carpenter does
• The ability to order material doesn’t fully explain why it was ordered this way rather than another

Final Cause (That for the Sake of Which)

• The carpenter’s ability to shape wood doesn’t explain why he made an obtuse angle rather than acute: it’s for the sake of sitting
• The writer arranges letters A-C-T not because of the letters themselves, but for the sake of discussing act and ability in relation to God
• Every choice among possibilities points to an end or purpose

The Three Corollaries #

First Corollary: Multiple Causes As Such

• The wooden chair depends on wood (material), shape (formal), carpenter (efficient), and sitting (final)—all four are genuine causes, not accidental
• Mistake: trying to choose one cause rather than recognizing all four operate simultaneously
• Example of false dichotomy: “Is the student’s motion caused by nerve impulses or by going to lunch?” Answer: Both, in different senses of cause

Second Corollary: Reciprocal Causation in Different Senses

• Two things can be causes of each other, but by different kinds of cause
• Exercise causes health (efficient cause); health causes exercise (final cause—for the sake of health)
• Intercourse causes baby (efficient); baby causes intercourse (final, if intended)
• Studying causes passing exam (efficient); passing exam causes studying (final—for the sake of passing)
• Multiplying length by width causes knowing area (efficient); knowing area causes multiplication (final—for the sake of knowing)
• Premises cause conclusion (efficient); conclusion causes bringing premises together (final—for the sake of seeing the conclusion)
• The good (Hail Mary full of grace): Lord is with her because she’s full of grace (formal/material disposition); she’s full of grace because the Lord is with her (efficient cause)

Third Corollary: Same Cause of Contraries

• Ship’s captain causes both safety (when attentive) and shipwreck (when negligent)
• Guard on duty causes safety of camp (when alert); causes destruction (when sleeping)
• Student’s presence causes learning; absence causes ignorance
• The contrariety lies in presence/absence or application/non-application, not in the cause itself
• Differs from saying contrary causes produce contrary effects; here one cause produces contraries through different modes of action

Important Definitions #

• Material Cause: That from which something comes to be, existing within it; the most obvious and undeniable dependence
• Formal Cause: The order (ordo) or ratio (λόγος/logos) that distinguishes what a thing is; shape or arrangement
• Efficient Cause: The mover or maker; whence first there is a beginning of motion or rest
• Final Cause: That for the sake of which something is or is done; the end or purpose
• Cause (general): What is responsible for the being or becoming of another
• Order (in context of form): Not merely shape but the intelligible arrangement that makes matter into a determinate thing

Examples & Illustrations #

The Word ‘Cat’ #

• Letters C, A, T are material cause
• Order/arrangement is formal cause
• Writer is efficient cause
• Purpose (discussing act, ability, matter, form, and God) is final cause

The Wooden Chair #

• Wood is material cause
• Shape (obtuse angle for sitting comfort) is formal cause
• Carpenter is efficient cause
• Sitting is final cause
• Contrasts: acute angle would cause back problems; inverted V shape would be unsuitable for its purpose

Natural Examples #

• Tree grows in same soil as stone, same rain, same sun, same air—the difference lies in nature intrinsic to each
• Log burns in fire; stone does not—due to nature of wood vs. nature of stone, not external conditions
• Father produces child (efficient cause); mother provides matter (material cause)

Logical Examples #

• Premises contain the parts of the conclusion (subject and predicate); they are quasi-material cause
• Premises cause understanding of conclusion (efficient); conclusion is sought (final—for the sake of knowing)

Modern Examples #

• Building in Shrewsbury with flat roof: roof collapsed under snow; rebuilt with V-shaped roof to shed snow and rain
• Similar buildings in South Dakota with side-by-side peaked roof design

Notable Quotes #

“If someone says [the word cat] doesn’t depend upon C, A, and T, well, let’s take away C and A and T… It would be laughable, right? If you take away C, A, and T, there’s nothing left there.”

“Now you’re forced to say that the word cat… depends upon something besides the letters. And what is it in this case? Order.”

“His ability to shape the matter, it doesn’t explain why he gave it this shape. He’s not limited to that shape. He’s able to give it this shape or that shape… So why did he make this at a slightly obtuse angle? It’s for the sake of what? Sitting, right?”

“No one has been able to add another kind of cause to these four kinds of cause since Aristotle did this in the fourth century B.C.”

“Two things can be causes of each other… but by different kinds [of cause]… It wouldn’t make too much sense to say, I am your father, and you are my father, right?”

Questions Addressed #

How is reason progressively forced to admit the four causes? Beginning with the most obvious and undeniable (material), reason encounters cases where the same matter takes different forms, forcing admission of formal cause; then recognizing that matter doesn’t arrange itself, efficient cause becomes necessary; finally, the fact that the efficient cause’s ability exceeds what it actually produces points to final cause.

Can the same causes apply to immaterial things like logic? Yes—in a syllogism, premises can be understood as quasi-material cause (containing the parts of the conclusion), and the conclusion as the quasi-formal cause toward which reasoning aims. This shows the universality of the four causes beyond physical things.

How can two things be causes of each other? They can when operating as different kinds of cause. Exercise is efficient cause of health; health (as end) is final cause of exercise. This is not contradiction but demonstrates that causation operates in multiple dimensions simultaneously.

Why is the third corollary not as tightly connected to the doctrine of four causes as the first two? The first two corollaries directly flow from the distinction of four kinds of causes (multiple causes as such because there are four kinds; reciprocal causation because they operate in different senses). The third corollary (one cause of contraries) is a separate observation about how presence/absence in the cause can produce contrary effects, not directly derived from the four-fold distinction itself.