55. The Fallacy of Accident and the Per Se/Per Accidens Distinction
Summary
This lecture explores the fallacy of accident (fallacia accidentis), a sophisticated logical error that occurs when what belongs to something accidentally (per accidens) is treated as if it belongs essentially (per se), or vice versa. Berquist examines the distinction between per se and per accidens through analysis of Porphyry’s five predicables (genus, difference, species, property, accident) and illustrates how this fallacy deceives even the wise by involving necessary truths. The lecture demonstrates how materialism and evolutionary thinking commit this fallacy by treating what is prior in potency as prior simply.
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Lecture Notes
Main Topics #
The Fallacy of Accident (Fallacia Accidentis) #
- A fallacy occurring outside of speech, unlike equivocation and amphiboly
- Involves misattributing what belongs per accidens to something that belongs per se, or vice versa
- Albert the Great emphasizes its deceptive power: it has the greatest virtue to deceive, even deceiving the wise
- Only sophistry negotiates about being per accidens, using it deceptively as if it were per se
Per Se vs. Per Accidens #
- Per se (κατὰ αὑτό): Something belongs to a thing according to the ratio of its own definition or essence
- Per accidens (κατὰ συμβεβηκός): Whatever is in something but not according to its essential definition
- Three types of relations between things:
- Entirely the same in definition (synonyms) - only per se
- Entirely extraneous (e.g., white and man) - only per accidens
- Partially related (e.g., genus and species, species and property) - both per se and per accidens in different respects
Porphyry’s Five Predicables and the Order of Being vs. Knowing #
- In the order of being: genus comes before difference, which comes before species
- A quadrilateral can exist without being equilateral; equilateral things exist without being square
- Matter comes before form in the order of being
- In the order of knowing: species comes before difference in how we understand things
- We know man as a species before we understand the specific differences that make it a species
- Porphyry strategically reorders his treatment to accommodate this distinction
- The distinction reflects Aristotle’s own procedure in the Categories: substance first (order of being), then quality (order of knowing)
Key Arguments #
The Socrates Example #
- Premises:
- Socrates is a man (true)
- Man is a species (true)
- False conclusion: Therefore, Socrates is a species
- The error: Socrates is a man insofar as man signifies “an animal with reason” (essential definition). But man is a species insofar as man is said of Socrates (belonging to man in reason, not in the thing itself). These are different senses of “man.”
The Definition Example #
- Premises:
- A square is an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral (true)
- An equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral is a definition (true)
- False conclusion: Therefore, a square is a definition
- The error: To be a definition happens to equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral insofar as it is said of square—i.e., insofar as it expresses what square is. But we do not say “square is a definition” because being a definition is not part of what square is; rather, it is an accident of the expression.
The Animal/Predication Example #
- Premises:
- Man is a substance (substance is said of man)
- Animal is said of man (animal is said of man)
- False conclusion: Therefore, animal is a substance (because substance is said of animal)
- The error: Substance is said of animal, but not as animal is said of man. The ratio (the respect in which the term applies) differs. Substance applies to animal as expressing what it is; animal is said of man for the same reason. But the fact that substance is said of animal is not the reason why substance is said of man.
The Materialist Fallacy #
- Error: Materialists claim matter is the source of everything
- Confusion: They treat what is prior in some sense (potency/matter) as prior simply (absolutely)
- Aristotle’s correction: Act is prior simply because something must already be in act to move from potency to act
- This is a misapplication of the fallacy of accident to metaphysics
Important Definitions #
- Per se (κατὰ αὑτό): According to the thing’s own nature or definition
- Per accidens (κατὰ συμβεβηκός): Happening to a thing in addition to its nature, not according to its essential definition
- Fallacia accidentis: The logical error of treating what is accidental to a thing as essential, or vice versa
- Ratio: The respect, sense, or way in which a predicate applies to a subject
- Middle term: The term that connects the two extremes in a syllogism and whose different senses produce the fallacy
Examples & Illustrations #
The Word Cat on a Blackboard #
- Depends on the letters C, A, T (matter—most obvious dependence)
- Depends on their order (form—requires reflection to recognize)
- The same letters arranged as TAC (Thomas Climes College) show that order matters
- Illustrates how recognizing different kinds of causality reveals what we initially miss
Timon of Athens #
- Initially generous, inviting people to dinner and giving gifts
- When his finances fail and friends refuse to lend him money, he turns against all mankind
- Later, he addresses the earth as “common mother” with an “infinite breast”
- Example of confusing a particular accident (betrayal by certain men) with the nature of humanity itself
- Shows the power of the fallacy even in the realm of judgment and virtue
The Squirrel (referenced from earlier lectures) #
- An example of how even creatures we might dislike can reveal something admirable upon careful observation
- Illustrates the importance of precise judgment rather than hasty generalization
Questions Addressed #
How do we distinguish per se from per accidens in borderline cases? #
- The key is recognizing the ratio (the respect in which a predicate applies)
- Man is said of Socrates because man signifies what Socrates is (per se)
- Man is a species insofar as man is said of many (per accidens to man itself)
- To avoid the fallacy, we must always ask: in what sense does this apply?
Why does the fallacy of accident deceive even the wise? #
- It often involves necessary truths and valid logical form, making it appear sound
- The deception lies in not recognizing that the middle term is connected to the extremes in different ways
- Only careful analysis of the ratio in each case reveals the error
How do the orders of being and knowing differ? #
- Order of being: What exists independently; matter before form, genus before difference, father before child
- Order of knowing: How we grasp things; species before difference, child before understanding parentage, image before complex thought
- Porphyry and Aristotle strategically adjust their order of treatment to account for this distinction
Notable Quotes #
“It should be known that the Accident here is taken insofar as it’s distinguished against per se. Per se is said to be in something according to the ratio of its own definition.” - De Fallacis Quaestiones Quodlibetales (attributed to Thomas Aquinas)
“To be a species happens to man insofar as man is said of Socrates, right? But nevertheless, it belongs to what? Man as such to be a species, right?” - Berquist, illustrating the distinction
“In order of being, genius is before equilateral. It can be without equilateral. And equilateral is before what? It can be without square, but not vice versa.” - Berquist, explaining the order of causes in definition