25. Quality and Its Four Species in Aristotle

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Nature of Quality #

• Quality defined by “howness”: Quality is fundamentally tied to the word “how” (πῶς), which signifies the limit or determination of a thing
• The connection between “how” and limitation: When we ask “how much?” or “how many?” we are asking about quantity; when we ask “how?” we are asking about quality
• Quality determines the state or condition of a substance without affecting its essence

The Four Species of Quality #

Aristotle distinguishes four species, which Berquist presents in the following order:

1. Habits and dispositions (ἕξεις): Relatively stable qualities like virtue and vice
2. Natural inborn abilities and inabilities: Natural powers or capacities of the soul
3. Passive qualities or sensible qualities: Qualities that affect the senses (colors, temperatures)
4. Figure or form (σχῆμα): Shape and configuration; does not admit of more or less

Properties Distinguishing the Four Species #

1. Contrariety: Found in the first and third species; the second and fourth do not have true contraries
2. Admitting of more and less: Found in the first and third species; the fourth species (figure) does not admit of degree
   • Example: One circle is not more or less a circle than another; a flattened tire is not a circle at all
3. Producing likeness or unlikeness: By quality things are said to be like or unlike one another

Simplicity’s Insight #

• Simplicius observes that contrariety is found in other genera insofar as they contain something of quality
• The question of contrariety in substance is addressed in Aristotle’s Physics, Lectio 11, book 1
• Essential difference (difference in substance) and difference in quality both involve contrariety, but in different ways

Division by Two or Three #

Berquist defends the principle of dividing categories either into two (by opposites) or three (to capture all important distinctions):

• Plato’s method: Always divide by two (evident in the Sophist)
• Aristotle’s method: Sometimes divide by three, which he considers more complete (he notes three is “the first number about which we say all”)
• Two ways to divide the four species:
  • Three and one: The first three species have something in common (they are sources of activity/passivity and can be more or less); the fourth is distinct
  • Two and two: The first two are not directly sensible; the last two are sensible as such

Why Habits Precede Natural Abilities #

Berquist raises a puzzle: Why does Aristotle list habits before natural inborn abilities when the latter seem more fundamental?

• Thomas Aquinas provides an answer in the Prima Secundae: Habits and vices are what dispose us toward our nature—they are on the road to happiness or misery
• This makes the first species of quality especially important for understanding virtue and human flourishing
• Natural abilities are closer to substance but less practically significant for ethics

Why Quantity Precedes Quality #

• Quantity is more basic than certain qualities, especially figure and sensible qualities
• Color is spread over a surface (requiring quantity as a substrate)
• Quantity is tied to the distinction of individual substances—multiple individuals of the same kind differ by quantity of matter
• Example: We can have many human beings because there is enough flesh, blood, and bone
• Aristotle believed the sun was made of all possible solar matter and therefore could exist only once

The Second Species of Quality: Natural Abilities #

• These are the capacities or powers intrinsic to a thing’s nature
• The faculties (δυνάμεις) of the soul are examples
• More fundamental and closer to substance than virtues but less manifest in their effects

The First Species: Virtues and Vices as Dispositions #

• A courageous man and a coward do not act the same way; virtue is a source of characteristic activity
• Virtue requires habituation—it is not merely the ability to feel anger but being habituated to moderate anger appropriately
• The virtue of courage concerns when and how much anger is appropriate (determined by prudence)
• Vice leads to misery; virtue leads to happiness

Sensible vs. Non-Sensible Qualities #

• Sensible qualities (third and fourth species): Known directly through sense perception
  • Private sensibles: Known by one sense only (color by sight, sound by hearing)
  • Common sensibles: Known by multiple senses (shape can be perceived by sight or touch)
• Non-sensible qualities (first and second species): Cannot be directly sensed
  • We do not directly sense another’s justice or courage
  • Natural abilities are not sensible except perhaps as projects or effects

Key Arguments #

The Linguistic Argument for “Howness” #

1. Quality is fundamentally defined by “how” (the way something is)
2. When combined with quantity, “how” becomes “how much” or “how many”
3. Difference is defined (in Porphyry) as “how something is what it is”—it determines which species something falls under
4. Example: A square is a quadrilateral—the how (equal sides meeting at right angles) determines what kind of quadrilateral it is
5. Therefore, quality as a category expresses the determination or limitation of a thing’s state

The Relationship Between the Four Species and Properties #

1. The first three species can have contraries; the fourth cannot
2. The first three admit of more and less; the fourth does not
3. This suggests a natural division: three species with these properties vs. one species (figure) without them
4. Yet all four are united under “quality” because all concern the “how” of a thing

Why Figure Does Not Admit of More or Less #

• A circle is either a circle or it is not; there are no degrees of circularity in the proper sense
• When we say “that wheel is more circular than this one,” we are speaking loosely—the flattened tire is not actually circular
• Lucy’s observation captures a truth: “Every circle is a perfect circle” (all true circles are equally perfect as circles)
• This distinguishes figure from the sensible qualities, which clearly admit of degree (more or less white, more or less hot)

Important Definitions #

Quality (Ποιότης) #

• Definition: The determination or limitation (ὅρος) of a thing; that by which we say something is how it is
• Key property: Distinguished from quantity (how much/many) and relation (towards another)
• Connection to difference: Essential difference (which constitutes species) is a determination of how something is what it is

The Four Species #

1. Ἕξις (Habitus/Disposition): Stable quality that inclines one toward characteristic activity
2. Δυνάμις φυσική (Natural Ability): Intrinsic capacity of nature
3. Πάθη (Passive Qualities/Sensible Qualities): Qualities affecting sensation; more changeable than dispositions
4. Σχῆμα (Figure/Form): Shape and configuration; concrete determination in space

Secundum dici #

• A mode of predication that distinguishes how something is said of another
• Berquist notes this applies to certain relatives that are “said of” one another but not essentially relative in their being
• Example: Quality can be said of something in multiple ways without the thing being essentially a quality

Examples & Illustrations #

The Dinner Sign-Up #

• To plan a dinner, one asks “How many are coming?”
• The answer (a number) is a limit—it constrains resources and preparation
• This illustrates how “how many” concerns limitation in quantity

Wine and Beer Tasting #

• Knowledge of wine as “dry red” vs. knowledge of it as “Cabernet Sauvignon”
• Wine is less known in confusion than in distinction
• Illustrates the gradation and development of sensible knowledge

The Geometry Analogy #

• In Euclid’s Elements, books 1-6 treat geometry (continuous quantity); books 7-9 treat number (discrete quantity)
• Just as one recalls the genus “quantity” to understand this division, one recalls the genus “quality” to understand the four species
• The starting point (book 7) uses the number seven—a symbol of wisdom and completeness

The Square and Isosceles Triangle #

• Square: A quadrilateral—the how it is a quadrilateral is having four equal sides meeting at right angles
• Isosceles triangle: A triangle—the how it is isosceles is having two equal legs
• The word “isosceles” (ἴσα σκέλη, “equal legs”) itself expresses this determination

The Neighbor’s Child and the Potted Plant #

• A neighbor’s child breaks a potted plant
• The appropriate response involves anger, but regulated by prudence
• A slight, unintended bump does not warrant anger; deliberate destruction does
• This illustrates how virtue moderates emotion according to circumstance

The Flattened Tire as Not-a-Circle #

• A wheel becomes more oval as it flattens
• We might say loosely that it is “less circular,” but properly it has ceased to be a circle
• This shows that figure does not admit of true degrees of more and less

Father and Son in Family Relations #

• St. Joseph is called head of the Holy Family
• Though the wife (Mary) and son (Jesus) may be superior in many ways, Joseph is head
• The family can be divided into (a) parents and children, or (b) father, mother, and children
• Both divisions make sense but highlight different aspects

The Child as Union of Parents #

• Marriage is “two-in-one flesh”
• In the marital act, spouses are temporarily united but separate
• In the child, husband and wife are joined inseparably—the child has flesh from both
• This permanent unity is more profound than the temporary act itself
• A person may inherit emotional traits from mother and intellectual traits from father

Notable Quotes #

“Quality is defined by how, right? How are you today?” — On the fundamental meaning of quality as determination and state

“The four sides are all equal, and they all meet at right angles, huh? That’s how it is a quadrilateral, right? That’s how it is what it is.” — Explaining how difference determines species through the concept of how

“Every circle is a perfect circle.” — Lucy’s observation, cited approvingly by Berquist, on why figure does not admit of more or less

“Virtue is the road to happiness. And guess what the road to misery is? Really? It’s vice, right, huh?” — On the practical importance of the first species of quality

“If you’re walking down the hall somebody bumps into you should you get angry and you know well if he just happens to hit you in a little bit you know you should get angry at all right” — Illustrating how prudence determines the appropriate anger in virtue

“You have many men here sitting around this table because there’s enough flesh and blood and bone to go around for all of us. Isn’t that wonderful?” — On why quantity underlies the multiplicity of individual substances

Questions Addressed #

Why Does Aristotle List Four Species Rather Than Two or Three? #

• The four species are real and distinct, even if they can be grouped in different ways
• They can be divided as three-and-one (based on having contraries and admitting of more/less) or two-and-two (based on sensibility)
• Berquist’s principle of “two or three, or both” allows for both divisions to be valid without contradiction

Why List Habits Before Natural Abilities if the Latter Are More Fundamental? #

• Natural abilities are closer to substance (more fundamental ontologically)
• Habits and vices are more important ethically because they determine one’s path to happiness or misery
• Thomas Aquinas explains that habits and vices actively dispose one toward or against one’s fulfillment as a human being
• Order depends on context: ontological vs. practical/ethical importance

Can We Really Divide by “Two or Three”? #

• Yes, both Plato and Aristotle employed both methods
• Dividing by two (opposites) follows a strict logical method
• Dividing by three captures completeness (“the first number about which we say all”)
• Different principles yield different valid divisions; neither is wrong
• Example: Family can be divided parent-child or father-mother-children; both make sense

Is Figure Really a Species of Quality? #

• Figure is distinct from the first three species because it does not admit of more and less
• Yet all four concern the how of a thing (its determination)
• Figure is more tied to quantity (shape requires spatial extension) than the first three species
• But it is classified under quality because it determines how a thing appears, distinct from mere quantity

How Do Sensible Qualities Differ from Non-Sensible Ones? #

• Non-sensible (first and second species): Not perceived directly through sensation
  • Virtue, vice, and natural abilities are known through their effects
• Sensible (third and fourth species): Perceived directly by sense organs
  • Color, temperature, shape are known in sensation itself
• This distinction explains why Aristotle treats private and common sensibles separately

Connections to Other Topics #

To Categories and Predicables #

• Quality is one of the ten categories, expressing a mode of predication
• The four species of quality mirror the role of the five predicables (genus, species, difference, property, accident) in determining essences
• Just as difference limits a genus to a species, the first species of quality (habit) limits natural ability to a determinate state

To Virtue Ethics #

• The first species of quality (habit) is essential to understanding virtue in the ethical tradition
• Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics builds on this metaphysical foundation
• Virtue as a stable disposition is what directs us toward eudaimonia (happiness)

To Natural Philosophy #

• Quality’s connection to sensible properties links to Aristotle’s Physics
• The relation between quantity and quality explains how material substance is individuated and qualified
• Sensible qualities (heat, color) are crucial to understanding change and motion

To Logic and Ontology #

• The principle of dividing by two or three applies to all categorical divisions
• Understanding quality’s unity despite its four species clarifies how a genus can contain multiple species
• The linguistic connection to “how” parallels the logical function of difference in defining species