Lecture 13

13. Substance, Categories, and the Trinity

Summary
This lecture continues discussion of Aristotle’s categories with focus on the properties of substance, particularly how substance differs from accidents in terms of contraries and individuation. Berquist explores the distinction between first and second substance, examines how definition applies to substances versus accidents, and concludes with extended theological application to the hypostasis of Christ and the Trinity, including numerical symbolism in Thomas Aquinas’s treatment.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Properties of Substance #

  • Second property: Substance is not susceptible to more or less (non-quantum)
    • One man is not more a man than another man
    • One dog is not more a dog than another dog
    • Contrasts with quality (one person can be more courageous than another)
    • Applies to the substance itself, not accidents
  • Third property: Susceptibility of contraries while remaining one in number
    • Example: Berquist himself can be hot/cold, sick/healthy, good/bad while remaining the same person
    • This property is specific to first substances

Substance vs. Accidents in Definition #

  • Definition properly applies to substances, not accidents
  • Problem: definition seems to require defining something by reference to what is outside it
    • Health defined as “good condition of the body” — but health is defined by something external to itself
    • This is not definition in the proper sense
  • What it is (essence) is found primarily in substance, especially first substances
  • Can speak of definition in other genera (virtue, numbers) but not in the same primary way

First and Second Substance #

  • Distinction between first substance (individual: “this man”) and second substance (species/genus: “man”)
  • This is a division of analogia, not a division of genus into species
  • Second substance is said of first substance as species or genus
  • Species is more properly substance than genus
  • Only second substance (species or genus of substance) is said of individual substances “as regards what it is”

Individuation in Substance vs. Accidents #

  • Individual is found per se (primarily) in the genus of substance
  • Substance is individuated by itself (per se)
  • Accidents are individuated by their subject (which is substance)
    • Example: “this whiteness” in “this subject”
  • Two rubber balls: the rubber itself is distinct (different substances), so the spheres are distinct
  • Knowledge: your knowledge and my knowledge of the same theorem are distinct because they exist in different minds (different substances)

The Trinity and Hypostasis #

  • Hypostasis (ὑπόστασις/hypóstasis) etymologically means “to stand under”
  • The hypostasis of the Word is NOT in the genus of substance insofar as it is the hypostasis of divine nature
  • BUT the hypostasis of the Word IS in the genus of substance insofar as it is the hypostasis of human nature in Christ
  • Hypostasis is ordered to genus or species only through the nature which it has
  • Danger of confusion: translating Greek “three hypostases” into Latin “three substances” can sound unorthodox
  • The three persons (Father, Son, Holy Spirit) are distinguished by relations of procession, not by being three substances
  • Real distinction between Father and Son, and between both and Holy Spirit, but they are one God (one divine nature)

Substance as Analogical Term #

  • The word “substance” is used analogically, not univocally
  • Four senses of substance (from Aristotle’s Categories)
  • The distinction of substance is a division of an analogate, not a genus into species
  • This is crucial for understanding how “substance” applies differently to first substances, second substances, and God

Logical vs. Metaphysical Perspective #

  • Logician: considers things as they are in reason; focuses on predication and universality
    • Sees species and genus as said of individual substance
    • Regards universal as having a kind of secondary substantiality
  • First philosopher (metaphysician): considers things as they are beings
    • To be said of a subject (predication) means it is NOT a substance
    • To be in a subject (as accident is in substance) also means it is not a substance proper

Key Arguments #

Why All Men Are Equal #

  • Berquist’s classroom example: some men are strong, weak, healthy, sick, prone to anger, different in knowledge
  • Yet all men are called equal in the phrase “all men are created equal”
  • This equality is justified by the property that one man is not MORE a man than another man
  • Equality refers to substantiality, not to accidental qualities

Why Substance Cannot Be Defined as Accident #

  • Definition requires the thing defined to be completely expressed through its elements
  • Accidents cannot be defined properly because they are defined through reference to substance (their subject)
  • Health is always “condition of the body” — external reference makes it not a true definition
  • Substances, especially individual substances, can be defined (or at least species/genera can be)

Why the Trinity Uses the Word Hypostasis #

  • The persons of Trinity are really distinct from each other
  • They are not distinct by being three substances (which would be three gods)
  • The word hypostasis (“that which stands under”) is used metaphorically/analogically
    • Just as church “stands under” truth (is the pillar of truth)
    • The persons each have the divine nature “under” them as their nature
  • The persons are distinguished by relations of procession, not by division of substance

Why God Uses Secondary Causes #

  • Two reasons Thomas Aquinas gives:
    1. To share nobility of causality: Creatures participate in the excellence of being causes, not merely effects
    2. To create beauty of ordered causes: The hierarchical order of causes is itself beautiful; God wants to create this order
  • Example: God could create each human directly (as He created Adam) but instead works through parents
  • This allows creatures to thank both God and their parents

Important Definitions #

Substance (οὐσία/ousía) #

  • That which exists in itself, not in another
  • First substance: individual existing things (this man, this dog)
  • Second substance: species and genus said of first substances (man, animal)
  • Not susceptible to more or less in its being a substance
  • Capable of receiving contraries while remaining numerically one

Hypostasis (ὑπόστασις/hypóstasis) #

  • Etymology: “that which stands under”
  • In theology: the individual subject that possesses a nature
  • In Trinity: each person has the divine nature; they are three hypostases in one substance (one divine nature)
  • Distinguished from mere accidents by being the ultimate subject of predication

Individuation (individuatio) #

  • Substance individuates per se (by itself): rubber ball A is distinct from rubber ball B because they are different substances
  • Accidents individuate through their subject: this whiteness is distinct from that whiteness because it inheres in different substances

Analogia (Ἀναλογία/Analogía) #

  • Proportion or ratio between two things
  • The distinction of first and second substance is an analogical division, not a univocal genus-species division
  • Allows the same term (substance) to apply in different ways to different things

Examples & Illustrations #

The Two Rubber Balls #

  • Demonstrates why individuals in substance are distinct per se, while those in other genera are distinct through substance
  • Two identical spheres are distinct because they are in different rubber (different substances)
  • Two identical qualities would be distinct only because they inhere in different subjects

Knowledge of a Theorem #

  • Two people knowing the same theorem: their knowledge is two distinct knowledges
  • Why? Because the knowledge exists in two different minds, which are two different substances
  • Knowledge doesn’t exist in itself; it exists in the substance (the mind)

The Church as Pillar of Truth #

  • Metaphor showing how one thing can “stand under” another without being identical to it
  • Church stands under truth through its teaching and tradition
  • Analogous to how persons of Trinity “stand under” divine nature

Adam’s Creation vs. Human Procreation #

  • God created Adam directly
  • But God creates other humans through parents (secondary causes)
  • Shows why secondary causes exist: to share in divine causality and to create order

Notable Quotes #

“Is one man more a man than another man? Well, by man you mean courage, yeah, one man more courage, more, but that’s a quality, right? But in the case of the substance itself, is one man more a man than another man?” — Berquist on the non-quantum nature of substance

“The only way you could say that all men are equal is that one man is not more a man than another man.” — Berquist on human equality

“Hypostasis is not ordered to a genus or a species, except through the nature which it has.” — Thomas Aquinas (cited by Berquist)

“Although universal in particular are found in all genera because we had universal in particular what accident right nevertheless in a special way individual is found in the genus of substance.” — Berquist on individuation

“For the logician considers things according as they are in reason… But the first philosopher, he considers things according as they are beings.” — Thomas Aquinas distinction between logical and metaphysical consideration

Questions Addressed #

Why is substance not susceptible to more or less? #

  • Because being a man is not a matter of degree — either something is a man or it is not
  • Qualities admit of degree (more or less courage) but the essence does not
  • This is essential to understanding what makes something a substance vs. an accident

How can accidents be defined? #

  • They cannot be defined properly because definition requires expressing what a thing is through its essential components
  • Accidents are always defined through reference to their subject (what they inhere in)
  • Health is defined as “good condition of body” — reference to something external
  • True definition is found primarily in substances

What is the relationship between first and second substance? #

  • Not a simple genus-species relationship but an analogical one
  • Second substance (species/genus) is said of first substance
  • Species is more properly substance than genus
  • First substance is primarily substance; second substance is secondarily so

How can there be three hypostases but one God in the Trinity? #

  • The three persons are distinguished by relations of procession (Father generates Son; Holy Spirit proceeds from both)
  • They are not distinguished by having three different divine natures (which would make three gods)
  • They are really distinct from each other but share one divine nature
  • The word “hypostasis” applies analogically, not univocally

Why doesn’t God create everything immediately? #

  • God desires secondary causes to exist so creatures can share in the nobility of causality
  • The hierarchical order of causes is itself beautiful — it reflects divine wisdom and order
  • This explains why humans are born through parents rather than created directly

Historical and Textual Context #

  • The discussion follows Aristotle’s Categories, continuing from prior lectures on substance
  • Berquist references Thomas Aquinas’s treatment in the Summa Theologiae (Prima Pars) and Scriptum on the Sentences
  • The De Potentia is cited for Aquinas’s discussion of Trinity and analogical predication
  • References to medieval Latin translations and the difficulties of translating Greek philosophical terms
  • The lecture includes Berquist’s personal teaching anecdotes with monks and university students