Lecture 10

10. Equivocal Terms by Reason and Theological Applications

Summary
This lecture explores how words become equivocal by reason—a fundamental concept for understanding how a single term can have multiple ordered meanings across different contexts. Berquist demonstrates three primary ways equivocation by reason occurs: when one thing keeps a common name while another receives a new name, when part of a term’s meaning is dropped in generalization, and when a name is carried over by reason of proportion or likeness of ratios. The lecture illustrates these principles through philosophical examples (substance, habit, sensation, motion) and theological applications (the Trinity, divine attributes, the relationship between philosophy and revealed theology).

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

  • Three Ways a Word Becomes Equivocal by Reason

    • One thing retains the common name, another receives a new name
    • Part of the meaning is dropped, generalizing the term
    • A name is carried over by reason of proportion or likeness of ratios
  • Distinction vs. Negation in Predication: How attributes involving negation (like God being “pure act”) function in Thomistic theology

  • The Role of Act and Potency: Understanding how act is prior to potency in being, knowledge, and goodness—and how this relates to the first cause

  • Equivocation by Reason in Theological Language: How terms like “theology,” “understanding,” “infinity,” and “perfection” function across different contexts (philosophy vs. revealed theology, divine vs. human intellect)

Key Arguments #

Why One Thing Keeps the Common Name #

  • Case 1: Something Noteworthy is Added

    • “Animal” keeps its name for creatures that have nothing noteworthy beyond being a living body with senses
    • “Man” receives a new name because man has something noteworthy: universal reason and will
    • Example: “Habit” vs. “disposition”—habit is a firm disposition that is difficult to lose, so it gets distinguished and receives the name “habit” while “disposition” keeps the generic name
  • Case 2: Fullness vs. Imperfection of the Meaning

    • A thing keeps the common name because it fully and perfectly possesses what the name signifies
    • Another thing has the meaning only imperfectly and thus receives a new name
    • Example: “Cat” vs. “kitten”—a cat fully is a cat; a kitten is not yet fully developed as a cat
    • Example: “Woman” vs. “girl”—a woman fully is a woman; a girl has not yet reached full development
    • This explains why revealed theology keeps the name “theology” while natural theology becomes “first philosophy” or “wisdom”

Dropping Out Part of the Meaning #

  • The Greek word for πάσχειν (to undergo/be acted upon) originally means something harmful
  • When one experiences a pin-prick or collision, the harm is obvious—one clearly undergoes something
  • But beautiful music acting upon the ear is also an “undergoing,” yet it perfects rather than harms
  • By dropping the harmful aspect but keeping the notion of “being acted upon,” the term generalizes to cover sensation
  • Further generalization: the mind itself undergoes something when it understands—it is acted upon by the intelligible object
  • Example of “road”: The word originally means a concrete path (stone, cement, tar) with a before and after
  • Dropped meaning: the concrete material
  • Kept meaning: the idea of “before and after”
  • Applied to: “the road in human knowledge,” “the private road of each science,” “the road of reason”
  • This is genuine equivocation by reason, not mere metaphor

Equivocation by Proportion or Likeness of Ratios #

  • A name is carried over from one thing to another by reason of the ratio the second thing bears to the first

  • Example: Logic and Philosophy

    • Philosophy is knowledge that a lover of wisdom pursues
    • Logic is not philosophy, but it has a ratio to philosophy—it is the tool of philosophy
    • So “logic” can be called by analogy, carrying the name from the primary (philosophy) to the instrumental (logic’s relation to philosophy)
  • Likeness of Ratios (Proportion in the Strict Sense)

    • Not a simple ratio of one thing to another, but a likeness between two ratios
    • Example: The word “before” in different contexts
      • “Before” in place: spatial precedence
      • “Before” in time: temporal precedence
      • “Before” in being: “X is before Y in being” means if X can be without Y, but Y cannot be without X, then X is before Y
      • “Before” in knowledge: “X is before Y in knowledge” means if X can be known without Y, but Y cannot be known without X, then X is more known
    • These are not the same meaning, but they share a proportional likeness: the ratio of “independent to dependent” carries across different domains
    • This is how we understand act and potency: act is like motion to a terminus—potency is like the ability to be moved; form is like actually walking compared to being able to walk
    • Example: Matter and Form through Proportion
      • “Matter is to substance as clay is to shape (sphere/cube)”
      • Clay can become a sphere or cube but not simultaneously
      • When actually a sphere, it is still able to become a cube
      • Similarly, matter can be man or dog but not simultaneously
      • This proportional likeness allows us to understand that matter is pure potency
    • Aristotle notes that the best metaphors are based on likeness of ratios

Important Definitions #

  • Equivocal by Reason (ἀνώνυμος λόγῳ): A name said of two or more things with related but distinct meanings, ordered according to a principle—either one thing’s primacy over another, or a shared proportion. Contrasted with equivocal by chance (mere homonyms) and univocal (one meaning).

  • Passion (πάσχειν): Originally, being acted upon in a harmful way; generalized to mean any undergoing, including perfective undergoing (like beautiful music acting on the ear).

  • Proportion (ἀναλογία): A likeness of ratios; not merely one ratio but a correspondence between two different relationships (e.g., 2:4 :: 3:6, or the relationship of matter to form as clay is to sphere).

  • Intelligible Object (ἀντικείμενον νοητόν): That which acts upon the intellect in understanding; the mind is acted upon (undergoes passion) by what it understands.

Examples & Illustrations #

The Animal / Man Example #

  • “Animal” without anything noteworthy = animal (ungulate, feline, etc.)
  • “Animal” + universal reason and will = man
  • Because man has something exceptional added, he gets a new name while “animal” is kept for the non-rational creature
  • This shows how equivocation by reason reflects the natural hierarchy of beings

The Habit / Disposition Example #

  • A disposition can be easily lost (e.g., a temporary mood)
  • A habit is a firm disposition that persists (good habits, bad habits)
  • “Disposition” keeps the generic name
  • “Habit” gets distinguished as the firmer, more difficult-to-lose version
  • Reflects reality: habits are more substantial and defining than passing dispositions

Mozart and Human Hearing #

  • No one knew how beautiful a woman’s voice could be until Mozart wrote arias for it
  • Mozart’s music acts upon the ear and perfects it in a noble object
  • This is undergoing (passion) in the fullest sense—being acted upon by beauty
  • Yet it is not harmful but elevating
  • Shows how the word “πάσχειν” (undergoing) generalizes from the harmful to the perfective

The Water Heating Example #

  • Water becoming hot = category of quality (acquiring a new quality)
  • Stove heating water = category of action (the stove acting outward)
  • Water being heated by the stove = category of passion (the water undergoing from an external cause)
  • Same physical event, but categorized differently based on perspective

The Pin-Prick and the Room #

  • Sticking someone with a pin: obviously undergoing something harmful
  • Walking and bumping into something: clearly being acted upon
  • But sitting in a room: also undergoing something, yet in a generalized sense
  • Being in a room vs. my teeth in my mouth: both are “in,” but in different ratios
    • I am contained by the room but can leave freely
    • My teeth are attached to my jaw, more literally contained
    • The ratio differs (containment :: free presence vs. attachment :: inherent attachment), yet both use “in”

The Road Examples #

  • Concrete meaning: A path made of stone, cement, or tar with spatial extension
  • Generalized meaning: Any ordered sequence with before and after
  • Applied to: “the road in human knowledge,” “the private road of each science,” “the road of reason”
  • This generalizing by dropping concrete meaning but keeping the structural idea (before/after) is equivocation by reason

The Paul and the Car Story #

  • Berquist’s son Paul, given a toy car, was initially confused about its purpose
  • Berquist made “vroom vroom” sounds to show him
  • When asked about “the first road in human knowledge,” Paul responded: “There are cars and trucks on it”
  • Shows how a child can get stuck on the primary, concrete meaning
  • Illustrates how abstraction works: we drop the concrete content but keep the structural form (“before and after”)

The First Matter / Potency Example #

  • Clay becomes sphere, cube, pyramid (but not simultaneously)
  • Primary matter becomes man, dog, horse (but not simultaneously)
  • Proportion: What clay is to shape, primary matter is to substantial form
  • When clay is actually a sphere, it is still able to become a cube
  • When matter is actually a man, it is still able to become something else
  • This proportional understanding allows us to see that matter is pure potency without needing direct definition

Notable Quotes #

“Every respectable word in philosophy is equivocal by reason.” — Berquist (attributing the principle to philosophical tradition)

“The man who sees how something comes to be will get a clear view of it.” — Aristotle (cited by Berquist on understanding equivocation)

“Act cannot be defined as the first thing known.” — Aristotle (Book I of Natural Hearing, cited by Berquist)

“The best metaphors are based on a likeness of ratios.” — Aristotle (cited by Berquist on proportion and metaphor)

Questions Addressed #

Why does one thing keep the common name and another receive a new name? #

Answer: When one thing has something notably superior or more perfect that the other lacks, the one with the perfection receives a distinctive new name while the more basic or imperfect one keeps the generic name. This reflects the hierarchy of being and the principle that the more perfect is better known and more properly named.

How do we come to understand act by analogy? #

Answer: We cannot define act directly as the first principle known. Instead, we understand it through likeness of ratios (proportion). For example, we understand form (act) by seeing how it relates to matter (potency) as actually walking relates to the ability to walk, or as a sphere relates to clay that can become a sphere.

Why does “theology” have an equivocal meaning? #

Answer:

  • Natural theology (philosophy) is knowledge of God but imperfect
  • Revealed theology is knowledge of God and more perfect and fuller
  • Revealed theology keeps the name “theology” (because it is the fuller realization of what theology means)
  • Natural theology becomes distinguished as “first philosophy” or “wisdom”
  • This is equivocation by reason: one meaning kept by the more perfect, a new name given to the less perfect

How can the same action be categorized in different ways? #

Answer: The categorization depends on perspective:

  • Water becoming hot = quality (the change intrinsic to the water)
  • The stove heating = action (the stove’s external causality)
  • The water being heated = passion (the external causality from the stove’s perspective affecting the water)
  • Same event, but the category shifts based on whether we view it from inside the subject, from the agent, or from the patient

What is the difference between “where” (ubi) and “position” (situs)? #

Answer:

  • “Where”: Simple location (I am in this room)
  • “Position”: The order of parts in place relative to something external (standing requires the floor; sitting requires a chair)
  • Position adds the notion of support and relative arrangement, whereas “where” is mere location

Theological Applications #

God’s Attributes through Equivocation by Reason #

  • God’s attributes (simplicity, unity, infinity, perfection) are not equivocal by chance but by reason
  • Each attribute shows something about God via negation (pure act = no potency = no composition)
  • Multiple attributes can be shown from the one principle of “pure act” as the great middle term
  • The attributes themselves are ordered: infinity is tied to perfection; unity is connected to simplicity

The Trinity and Equivocation by Reason #

  • The divine persons are distinguished by relations of proceeding
  • Father: neither proceeds from another, nor does another proceed from him alone
  • Son: proceeds from another (the Father), but another does not proceed solely from him
  • Holy Spirit: proceeds from another (both Father and Son), but another does not proceed from him
  • Using crisscrossed divisions of “proceeds/does not proceed” and “another proceeds/does not proceed”, we get four logical slots but only three are real
  • This demonstrates how equivocation by reason applies even in the highest theology

The Human Intellect as Imperfect Understanding #

  • Angels have intellectus (understanding) fully and perfectly—a mind full of forms
  • God has intellectus perfectly—infinite understanding
  • Man has intellectus obscuratus (darkened/overclouded understanding)—must reason to arrive at understanding
  • Angels keep the name “understanding” because they have it fully
  • Man receives the name “reason” because he must reason his way to understanding
  • This is equivocation by reason: the same power (intellect) is named differently based on its perfection

Historical and Methodological Notes #

  • This lecture emphasizes Aristotle’s principle that in as many ways as predication comes about, in so many ways being is said
  • Understanding equivocation by reason is essential for reading both Aristotle and Thomas accurately
  • Modern philosophers often fail to recognize these equivocations, leading to confusion
  • The method applies across all sciences: natural philosophy, logic, mathematics, metaphysics, and theology