9. Being, Predication, and the Ten Categories

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• Being as Equivocal by Reason: Words like ‘being’ have multiple meanings that are ordered and related, not arbitrary. Modern philosophers fail to distinguish these senses.
• Why Being Cannot Be a Genus: Being cannot be contracted to more particular determinations the way a genus contracts to species through differences, because nothing can exist outside being. A difference must be outside the genus’s essence, but nothing is outside being except nothing itself.
• The Five Books of Metaphysics: Aristotle’s fifth book of metaphysics is entirely devoted to distinguishing equivocal terms (names) that have ordered meanings and are foundational to wisdom. These terms (like ‘whole,’ ‘part,’ ‘being’) appear in axioms but often go undistinguished by modern philosophers.
• Three Ways of Predication: All predicates relate to the subject in one of three fundamental ways, generating the ten categories.

Key Arguments #

Why Being Cannot Be a Genus #

• A genus is contracted to species by differences that are outside the essence of the genus
• For example, in “rational animal,” the difference “rational” is outside the essence of the genus “animal”
• But nothing can be outside the essence of being, because what is outside being is nothing
• Therefore, being cannot be divided by differences the way genera are divided
• Being must instead be divided into diverse highest genera (the ten categories) according to diverse ways of being

The Connection Between Predication and Categories #

• As being is said in many ways, so predicates relate to subjects in many ways
• This proportionality determines the ten categories
• Everything else is said of or exists in individual substances
• The ten categories are distinguished by the diverse ways something can be said of an individual substance

The Three Ways Predicates Relate to Subjects #

First Way: Signifying What the Subject Is

• The predicate signifies the essence or nature of the subject
• Example: “Socrates is an animal” or “Socrates is a man”
• This pertains to the category of substance (πρώτη οὐσία, first substance; individual substance)
• These signify what an individual substance is

Second Way: Signifying Something In the Subject

Absolute denominations (not toward another):

• Quantity (ποσόν): Following upon matter; every material thing has quantity
  • Example: “Socrates is five feet tall”
  • Angels, having no matter, need not have quantity as material bodies do
• Quality (ποιόν): Following upon form
  • Example: “Socrates is white” or “Socrates is a grammarian”
  • Example: “Socrates is healthy”

Relative denominations (toward another; πρός τι):

• Relation: Something in the subject but existing only toward another
  • Four is double toward two and half toward eight
  • Four is neither double nor half in itself; these exist only in relation
  • Examples: father/son, teacher/student, taller/shorter
  • The relational accident inheres in the subject but constitutively refers to another

Third Way: Signifying Something Outside the Subject

From extrinsic cause:

• Action (ποιεῖν): When the predicate is taken from the agent/mover as acting upon another
  • Example: “I am kicking you”
  • The agent is the source; the action originates from it toward another
• Passion (πάσχειν): When the predicate is taken as the subject undergoes or is acted upon
  • Example: “You are being kicked”
  • The undergoing is terminated in the subject receiving it
  • Same reality as action but considered from the perspective of the patient

From extrinsic measure:

• When (ποτέ): Measured by time
  • Example: “Socrates is at noon”
  • Time serves as extrinsic measure
• Where (ποῦ): Measured by place without regard to order of parts
  • Example: “Socrates is in this room”
  • Place as mere location
• Position (κείμενον, situs): Order of parts in place
  • Example: “Socrates is standing” (as opposed to sitting or lying down)
  • Requires consideration of how the parts are arranged in space
  • Distinguished from mere “where” by including the order of spatial parts

Special to humans:

• Habitus (ἕξις): Having or clothing; extrinsic to the body
  • Examples: clothed, armed, shod, discalced (barefoot)
  • Unlike animals, whose features are natural, humans put on and remove such things
  • Reflects human rationality and cultural adaptation

Important Definitions #

• Being (τὸ ὄν, ens): Said in many related ways; cannot be defined as a genus but only through the ten categories
• Equivocal by reason (ἀπὸ λόγου): Words with multiple meanings that are ordered and proportional, not arbitrary
• Figure of predication (figurae praedicationis): The diverse modes or ways in which something can be said of a subject
• Category (κατηγορία, praedicamentum): One of the ten highest genera into which being is first divided
• First substance (πρώτη οὐσία): Individual substance; what is primarily substance and stands under other things
• Second substance (δευτέρα οὐσία): Species or genus in which a first substance is contained
• Denomination: The way a thing is named or described; can be intrinsic or extrinsic
• Extrinsic measure: Measure from outside the thing measured (time and place)
• Passion (πάθος, passio): Better rendered as “undergoing” to avoid modern connotations; the reception of action from an agent

Examples & Illustrations #

The Guardian Angel Example #

• Does the guardian angel have quantity (size) like material bodies? No, because angels have no matter.
• Does the guardian angel have qualities (wisdom, love)? Yes, without needing to be physical.
• This illustrates how quantity depends on matter while quality can exist in immaterial substances.

Relation Examples #

• “Am I a father or a son?” Both, but toward different people—toward children and toward my own father.
• “Am I a teacher or a husband?” A teacher toward students, a husband toward one’s spouse—same person, different relations.
• “Am I tall or short?” Depends on the comparison. I am taller than some, shorter than others. Neither is my size in itself.

Standing vs. Sitting #

• Standing requires something external to stand on (the ground or floor).
• If one crouches without any support beneath, one is not truly sitting (which requires a chair or extrinsic support).
• Position (situs) requires denomination from something outside—extrinsic to the body itself.

Action and Passion in Daily Life #

• When I kick you: I am performing an action (the originating cause is in me, moving toward you).
• When you are kicked by me: You undergo passion (the change is terminated in you, coming from me).
• Same event, different perspectives; both real but distinguished by direction.

Human Habitus #

• A bride wears a wedding dress; a soldier wears a uniform; a fireman wears protective gear.
• These are human habitus because they are put on and taken off as needed.
• Animals do not change their “clothing”—their fur or feathers grow naturally; they lack the rationality to adopt and remove such things.
• This reflects human nature and cultural adaptation.

Notable Quotes #

“Did you ever run across a guy stopping on a word and saying this word is equivocal by reason, and then distinguishing the senses in the order? No.” — Berquist, reporting his conversation with Warren Murray about modern philosophers’ failure to distinguish equivocal terms

“They don’t understand the words they use every day.” — Berquist, on philosophers’ neglect of distinguishing meanings in equivocal-by-reason terms

“Nothing can be outside the essence of being except nothing.” — Berquist, explaining why being cannot be contracted as a genus

“You can say nothing is nothing… What does ‘is’ mean there? Because nothing isn’t, is it?” — Berquist, on the strange being of negations and nothing itself

“Being cannot be contracted like a genus is contracted… for a difference does not partake of the genus.” — Thomas Aquinas, as cited by Berquist, on why being is not a genus

Questions Addressed #

Why can’t being be a genus?

• A genus is contracted to species by differences that lie outside the genus’s essence. For instance, “animal” is contracted to “man” by the difference “rational,” which is outside the essence of animal.
• But being (ens) is such that nothing can be outside its essence—what is outside being is simply nothing.
• Therefore, being cannot be divided by differences into species the way lower genera are divided.
• Instead, being is divided into ten highest genera (the categories) according to diverse ways of being.

How do the ten categories follow from the structure of predication?

• All predication involves saying something of something else.
• These predicative acts follow diverse patterns: signifying what the subject is, signifying something in the subject, or signifying something outside the subject.
• The modes of these predications correspond precisely to the ten categories.
• As Aristotle states: “In as many ways as being is said, in so many ways is predication said.”

Why does modern philosophy fail where ancient and medieval philosophers succeed?

• Modern philosophers rarely stop to distinguish the senses of equivocal-by-reason words that are foundational to their arguments.
• They use words like “being,” “opposite,” “whole,” “part” without distinguishing their ordered meanings.
• This is exemplified in Marxist philosophy: Marx’s dialectical materialism centers on “opposite” as central to conflict, yet Marx never distinguishes the different senses of “opposite” (contradiction, contrariety, privation, etc.).
• Such undistinguished language leads to confusion and error at the very foundations.

How is “standing” (position) distinguished from merely “being in a place”?

• “Where” (ubi) refers to place as mere location without regard to the order of one’s parts.
• “Position” (situs) refers specifically to the order and arrangement of one’s parts within space.
• Standing, sitting, lying down—these are different positions because the parts are arranged differently, even if one remains in the same location.
• Thus position requires an extrinsic measure (place) in a specific sense.

What is the significance of habitus being distinct from other categories?

• Habitus (having, clothing) is unique to substances capable of rationality and cultural adaptation.
• Animals possess their defining features naturally (fur, feathers) without putting them on or taking them off.
• Humans rationally adopt and discard clothing, armor, and other external things according to need and custom.
• This reflects human nature and our unique position as rational animals capable of freely choosing what to adopt or discard.

Theological Application #

• Understanding that relations exist toward another (πρός τι) helps illuminate the Trinity: the three Persons are distinguished by relations toward each other (Father toward Son, Son toward Father and Spirit, etc.).
• The categories apply to creatures but not univocally to God, who transcends them as pure act (actus purus) without potentiality, composition, or genus.