15. Calling Things by Their Own Name: The Two Senses of 'One's Own'

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Central Dilemma of Definition #

• The Problem: We cannot define a thing by its own name (violates the logical rule), but we also cannot define it by the name of another thing (that doesn’t tell us what it is)
• Apparent Contradiction: Every name is either the name of the thing or the name of another thing—so which do we use?
• The Solution: Distinguishing two senses of “one’s own” (τὸ ἴδιον / proprium)

Two Senses of ‘One’s Own’ #

First Sense: What belongs to me alone

• My own head (nobody else has this head)
• My own wife (she is nobody else’s wife)
• My own watch (nobody else uses it)
• These are exclusive possessions

Second Sense: What belongs to me, but not only to me

• My own mother (she is also someone else’s mother)
• My own daughter (she is also the wife’s daughter; some say “our daughter”)
• My own country (shared with fellow citizens)
• My own teacher (e.g., Euclid—can be teacher to many)
• My own God (shared with all believers)
• My own good (truth as my good, but also a common good)

How Definition Resolves the Dilemma #

• When we define something, we call it by its own name in the second sense
• We use names that are common to the thing and other things
• The combination of these common names is unique to the thing being defined
• Example: A square is defined using “quadrilateral” (common to many), “equilateral” (common to square and rhombus), and “right-angled” (common to square and oblong)—but only the square has all three together

Application: Calling by Name vs. Another Thing’s Name #

• By its own name: Romeo calling Juliet “Juliet”
• By another thing’s name (figurative): Romeo calling Juliet “honey” or “sweet”
• Mistaken use: A child calling a cat a dog
• Figurative use (not mistaken): Calling a glutton a “pig” (expresses emotion, appeals to imagination)

Why We Don’t Use Figurative Names in Logic #

• Figurative names don’t tell us what a thing actually is
• “A glutton is a pig” doesn’t reveal the nature of gluttony
• The logician needs clarity; the poet uses metaphor to arouse emotion
• When explaining what figurative speech is, we cannot use figurative speech (except as example)

The Importance of ‘One’s Own’ in Practical Philosophy #

• We must see the common good as our own good (in the second sense)
• The victory of the basketball team is my good as a team member
• Truth is my good as a philosopher (not private good, but genuine good)
• God is my good (shared with all believers, yet truly my chief good)
• This prevents confusion between private interest and genuine self-interest

Key Arguments #

The Rule of Logic and Its Rationale #

• Rule: Do not use the name of the thing being defined in its definition
• Reason: “A dog is a dog” or “A rose is a rose” is true but uninformative; it makes nothing more known
• Corollary: Using a completely different name (e.g., defining dog as cat or triangle) is useless

The Distinction as Resolution #

1. We cannot use the thing’s name in the first sense (exclusively its own)
2. But we can use the thing’s name in the second sense (common to it and others)
3. Therefore, we define by common names whose combination is unique to the thing

Why Names are Common but Definitions Are Unique #

• “Quadrilateral” alone doesn’t specify which quadrilateral
• “Equilateral” alone doesn’t specify which equilateral shape
• “Right-angled” alone doesn’t specify which right-angled shape
• But “equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral” specifies only the square

Important Definitions #

Name (τὸ ὄνομα / nomen) #

1. Vocal sound produced by the voice
2. Signifying by custom or human agreement (not by nature, unlike a baby’s cry)
3. No part signifies by itself (even if composed of parts, they don’t signify separately when functioning as a name)

Note: In English, “name” is broader than “noun”; it includes verbs and adjectives, though Greek and Latin use the same word (ὄνομα/nomen) for both noun and verb.

Sign (σημεῖον / signum) #

• Traditional definition from St. Augustine: “That which strikes the senses and brings to mind something other than itself”
• A sign is always sensible, but apart from the form it imprints on the senses, it brings to mind something else

‘One’s Own’ (τὸ ἴδιον / proprium) #

• First sense: What belongs to me alone (exclusive)
• Second sense: What belongs to me but not only to me (common but particular to me)

Examples & Illustrations #

Possession and ‘One’s Own’ #

• First sense examples: My head, my watch, my teeth, my wife (exclusive)
• Second sense examples: My mother, my daughter, my country, my teacher, my God
• Key insight: “Go home to your own house”—the child’s house is not only his; it’s shared with parents and siblings, yet it is still truly his own

Figurative Speech #

• Metaphor: “A wife is honey” (appeals to likeness—honey is sweet and pleasant, as is the beloved)
• Synecdoche: “He’s a brain” (calling something by the name of a prominent part)
• Irony: Saint Paul’s use of irony in his epistles (saying the opposite of what is meant)
• Purpose: Figurative speech expresses emotion and arouses emotion; appeals to the imagination

Famous Lovers as Metonymy #

• “He’s a Romeo” doesn’t mean he’s a citizen of Verona; it means he’s a lover (famous example of a lover)
• “He’s a Don Juan” or “a Casanova” (similar usage)
• “He’s another Einstein” (the student is intelligent)

The Problem of Clear Questioning #

• “What is a pig?” is less clear than “What is a glutton?” (because “pig” is figurative)
• Using the wrong name entirely (calling a dog a cat) is entirely misleading
• For definition, the logician should use the thing’s own proper name, not a figurative one

Notable Quotes #

“Outside of the mind, everything is, what, singular, right? I never had man in general sitting in my class. I taught humanity.”

“What a scholar does is to distinguish, you know, the basic meanings of these words, right?”

“If I speak of my own watch, right, then I can speak of my own mother. A sense of my own the same there? You possess your mother. I’m not thinking that so much, see.”

“My own wife is nobody else’s wife. My own head is nobody else’s head. Right? But my own mother and my own daughter is somebody else’s mother and somebody else’s daughter.”

“If you want to define something, should you call it by its own name or by the name of another thing? Well, you want to know it for a reason.”

“You can’t use metaphors to say what a metaphor is. You can use metaphors to exemplify a metaphor, but you can’t use metaphors to say what a metaphor is.”

Questions Addressed #

Q: How do we escape the dilemma between defining by a thing’s own name and defining by another thing’s name? #

A: By recognizing that “one’s own” has two senses. In the second sense (what belongs to me but not only to me), we can define a thing by names that are common to it and other things, because the combination of those common names is unique to the thing.

Q: Why can’t we use figurative names like “pig” for “glutton” in a definition? #

A: Because figurative names don’t reveal what a thing actually is. “Pig” means a four-footed animal with a tail and a snout—that’s not what a glutton is. Metaphor appeals to the imagination and arouses emotion, which is useful for poetry and rhetoric, but not for logical definition seeking clarity about the nature of things.

Q: Isn’t it contradictory to define by common names when no single name distinguishes the thing from everything else? #

A: No, because while each name is common to many things, their combination is unique. Just as one point is uniquely specified by a specific longitude and latitude (each common to infinite points), one thing is uniquely specified by a specific combination of common names.

Q: How does the distinction between the two senses of ‘one’s own’ apply to practical philosophy? #

A: It prevents confusion between private good and genuine good. We must see the common good (truth, God, the victory of the team, the good of the country) as our own good in the second sense—not something foreign to us, but genuinely our good, even though it’s not exclusively ours.