14. Names Before Definition: The Art of Naming in Logic

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Why Names Precede Definitions #

Three foundational reasons establish the natural order of names before definitions:

1. Epistemological order: We know things in a confused manner before distinct knowledge. Naming requires less distinct knowledge than defining.
2. The question presupposes the name: When Socrates asks “What is virtue?” the name ‘virtue’ must already be understood before attempting to answer with a definition.
3. Definitions composed of names: Since every definition is a speech made of names, and wholes cannot be understood without knowing their parts, names must precede.

The Definition of a Name (Nomina) #

A name is: a vocal sound signifying by custom, no part of which signifies by itself

• Vocal sound: Produced by the voice/vocal cords
• Signifying: Brings something other than itself to mind
• By custom: Through conventional agreement, not by nature
• No part signifies by itself: Even if composed of other words, the parts do not retain independent signification (e.g., ‘Berquist’ from ‘berg’ + ‘quist’ does not signify mountain-branch)

This definition shares four parts with the definition of speech; only the fifth part (parts not signifying) distinguishes names from speech.

Calling Something by Its Own Name vs. Another’s Name #

Two exhaustive divisions exist:

1. By its own name: Romeo calls Juliet by her name ‘Juliet’
2. By another’s name: Romeo calls Juliet ‘honey’ or ‘sweet’ (figurative/metaphorical speech)

Purposes of figurative speech:

• Express emotion
• Arouse emotion in the listener
• Appeal to the imagination

Disciplines and their approaches to names:

• Poet/Rhetorician: Uses figurative names (metaphor, etc.) to please and arouse emotion; this is their purpose
• Grammarian: Concerned with correct sentence formation in a language; studies all types of sentences (commands, prayers, statements); analyzes down to letters
• Logician (Magician): Avoids figurative language; seeks truth and falsity; aims at clarity and precision in understanding what things are; concerned with signification and definition

The Central Logical Problem: The Dilemma of Definition #

The Problem presents a dilemma:

• We cannot define by the thing’s own name (this violates the rule learned in logic: the name of the thing being defined should not appear in its definition; it would be circular and uninformative)
• We cannot define by another thing’s name (calling a glutton a ‘pig’ does not really tell us what a glutton is; a pig is a four-footed animal with a tail, but a glutton is not)
• Both alternatives seem impossible

The Solution: Distinguishing Two Senses of “One’s Own”

1. First sense: What belongs to me alone; no one else has it (my head, my nose)
2. Second sense: What belongs to me but not only to me (my mother, my daughter, my country, my teacher)

Application to definition: When we say “define by its own name,” we mean in the second sense. A dog is an animal—‘animal’ is the dog’s own name in the second sense (it belongs to the dog but not only to the dog; cats, horses are also animals). A square is a parallelogram—‘parallelogram’ is the square’s own name in the second sense.

This resolves the dilemma: we define by the thing’s own name (second sense) without using the specific name that begins the definition.

Porphyry’s Five Names (Quinque Nomina) #

Porphyry distinguishes five types of names relative to definition:

1. The name of the thing being defined (e.g., ‘dog’)
2. The name that begins the definition (e.g., ‘animal’ in “a dog is an animal…”)
3. The name that completes a perfect definition
4. The name that completes an imperfect definition
5. The name useless for naming or defining the thing

These distinctions are useful not only for definition but also for division and demonstration. The Isagoge (Introduction) of Porphyry was originally an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories, but developed into an introduction to all logic and consequently to philosophy.

Key Arguments #

Why Definition Cannot Use the Thing’s Own Name (First Sense) #

Argument:

• If I define “dog” as “dog,” nothing becomes more known
• The statement is true but uninformative
• The purpose of definition is to make known what was unknown
• Therefore, the rule: do not use the specific name of the thing being defined

Why Definition Cannot Use Another Thing’s Name Alone #

Argument:

• Defining a glutton as a “pig” does not clarify what a glutton is
• A pig is a four-footed animal with a tail; a glutton has none of these properties
• Figurative names express or arouse emotion but do not clarify essence
• Therefore, we must use names that properly belong to the thing being defined

The Resolution Through the Second Sense of “One’s Own” #

Argument:

• “Dog” and “animal” are different names
• Yet “animal” is the dog’s own name in the second sense
• “Animal” belongs to dog (dog is an animal) but not only to dog (cats, horses are also animals)
• This allows definition by the thing’s own name without circular definition

Important Definitions #

Nomen (Name): Vocal sound signifying by custom, no part of which signifies by itself

Sermo (Speech): Vocal sound signifying by custom, having parts that signify by themselves

Definitio (Definition): Speech signifying what a thing is; makes known distinctly what a thing is

Signum (Sign) [Augustine’s definition]: That which strikes the senses and brings to mind something other than itself

Examples & Illustrations #

Names with Etymological Parts #

• Berquist: From Swedish ‘berg’ (mountain) + ‘quist’ (branch), but the name does not signify mountain-branch
• Johnson: Contains ‘John’ and ‘son,’ but neither signifies anything in the name itself; a woman can be Johnson

Letters and Order as Parts of a Word #

• Cat vs. Act: Same letters (C-A-T) but in different order. The order of letters is a part of the word distinct from the letters themselves. You cannot call the order of letters a “part” in the same sense as you call C, A, and T parts.

Figurative Speech Examples #

• Romeo calling Juliet “honey” or “sweet”
• Calling someone a “pig” (when they are gluttonous)
• “He’s a Romeo” (meaning a lover, not a citizen of Verona)
• “He’s an Einstein” (meaning intelligent)
• “He’s a Don Juan” (meaning a seducer)

The Problem of Equivocal Words #

• Part: Confusing quantitative parts (organs in a body) with genus/species senses (animal as part of man’s definition; man as part of animal’s extension) leads to the sophism “the part is greater than the whole”
• A student argued: “If nature acted for an end, all things would come to an end, but they haven’t.” This confuses end as termination with end as purpose.

Notable Quotes #

“Both that by demonstration and that by definition… The complex unknown statement, right, by demonstration. The simple unknown, what it is, or something, by definition.”

“We name things before we define them… we know things in a confused way before, what? Distinctly.”

“The purpose of the definition is to make known something that you don’t know. So if I say a dog is a dog, I don’t make it known any more than the word dog did.”

“The most common mistake in thinking is what? Due to mixing up the senses of a word. It’s the most common mistake.”

“The Greeks really thought out how to use names in a way that helps the mind, right? And the moderns had just lost that.”

“If you don’t understand the names you’re using, you’re not wise.”

Questions Addressed #

Why should names be considered before definitions? #

• Answer: Because we name things before we define them (natural epistemological order); the question seeking definition uses the name of the thing; definitions are composed of names as parts, and parts must be known before wholes.

How can we define something without using its own name (violating the logical rule)? #

• Answer: By distinguishing two senses of “one’s own.” The thing’s own name in the second sense (what belongs to it but not only to it) can be used in definition without circular reasoning, while the specific name that begins the definition is avoided.

Why do poets and rhetoricians use figurative language while logicians avoid it? #

• Answer: Poets and rhetoricians aim to express or arouse emotion and appeal to imagination; logicians aim at clarity and precision in understanding what things are. Figurative language obscures rather than clarifies essence.

What is the solution to the dilemma that seems to make definition impossible? #

• Answer: Recognize that “one’s own” has two senses. We can define by the thing’s own name (second sense) without using the specific name that begins the definition, thus avoiding circularity while maintaining informative content.